> I sent Randy the text below. not including the text in brackets
> The requirements described here focus on protecting the AS Path > information used in BGP. This is [partially] motivated by the fact > that an attacker who can modify AS Path information can mislead > otherwise well-behaving AS; [possibly] inducing them to forward > packets in improper or possibly even harmful fashions. one wants to protect the entire NLRI, not just the AS-Path. and the intro currently says precisely that. for reference, here is the current intro RPKI-based Origin Validation ([I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]) provides a measure of resilience to accidental mis-origination of prefixes. But it provides neither cryptographic assurance (announcements are not signed), nor assurance of the AS Path of the announcement. This document describes requirements to be placed on a BGP security protocol, herein termed BGPsec, intended to rectify these gaps. your paragraph drags intent in. as we are unable to know intent, what is the win here? then it gets into data plane forwarding, which the draft very explicitly avoids. what is a 'proper' direction? what is a 'harmful' direction? i feel the ground opening a big hole under me. again, what's the win? as i can not know your intent <g>, i suspect you are trying to motivate the requirements in a practical manner. while this is an understandable goal, doing so seems to drag in all sorts of issues that might better be avoided. which is why the current bit of intro, quoted above, is very careful just to state it in terms of assurance. can other folk help us here? randy _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
