> there are also some issues with cert validation to think about (I
> think, though maybe that's a simple problem where the cert only
> validates up a chain for your as-level-cert? no other CA's
> accepted...).

wrong trust relationship.  e.g. i don't think you want the upstream to
issue a router cert to a downstream who wants to use upstream's server.

the way i figure it is that the docco can stay as it is regarding
transport, and we can use cleartext or ssh while running a betting pool
on which is slower, AO code in routers and servers or endless ietf
discussions.  we have running code, no other doc depends on this one, so
ietf process can remain a source of amusement.

a couple of changes are actually in a yet-to-be-published rev

  o 5.5 the router is no longer expected to keep a ref count

      The cache server is responsible for assuring that it has told the
      router client to have one and only one IPvX PDU for a unique
      {prefix, len, max-len, asn} at any one point in time.  Should the
      router client receive an IPvX PDU with a {prefix, len, max-len,
      asn} identical to one it already has active, it SHOULD raise a
      Duplicate Announcement Received error.

  o Brian Weis's comment on BGPsec also has some relevance here.  so i
    added a bit to sec 4

      As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are
      time dependent, servers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
      approximately an hour.

    or maybe there is some nice text elsewhere which covers this?

randy
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