I'm not sure if this is a nitpick or a legitimate concern, but:

"Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate
   more specifics to protect against mis-origination of a less specific
   prefix.  Having a ROA for the covering prefix should protect it."

I'm not sure I totally agree with this. Sure, with a relatively complete 
implementation among major networks, coupled with some sane policies in how 
those networks deal with invalid routes, that is basically true. However, in an 
incremental deployment model, it's a little overly optimistic.

Perhaps some sort of caveat about incremental deployment and policy is 
appropriate here?

Off of the top of my head-
"As it is deployed in more and more networks, use of RPKI-based origin 
validation coupled with appropriate policies to handle invalid announcements 
will lessen (and hopefully eliminate?) the need to originate more specifics..."

Thanks
Wes George

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