Peter asked at the mic about how SIDR/BGPSEC could/would/etc deal with
VPN providers. I believe he meant something like MPLS VPN (RFC2547)
providers. I think that after some discussion about this with a few of
the document authors a summary of direction is:
A set of questions about the problem space (again, assuming 2547-type
vpn deployment was the target of the question)
o “what are you trying to secure?”
i vpn-provider to vpn-provider routing domain?
ii single-customer routing domain?
o not all customer routes are picked up by BGP in VPN scenarios
i ospf/rip/eigrp/static routes
ii lack of origin by the AS-Owner (ROAs would be required to the
VPN provider, not a problem)
o not all customers have unique ip space across a single provider,
never mind multiple providers
o not all customers have unique ASNs across a single provider
o route-targets are only unique across a single vpn-provider
Of the above the only open question was as to what the scope of
‘secure’ would be, we decided (in the discussion) that the scope we
would apply to the discussion is the:
vpn-provider to vpn-provider security
Given a scenario that looks like:
vpn-provider BOB with vpns:
A - route-target A - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
B - route-target B - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
C - route-target C - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
vpn-provider SALLY with vpns:
Z - route-target Z - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
Y - route-target Y - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
X - route-target X - prefix 10.0.0.0/8
Each provider has their own Trust Anchor: TA-BOB and TA-SALLY
these Trust Anchors contain (notionally) the following routing/roa information:
TA-BOB:
AS-A:RT-A:10.0.0.0/8
AS-B:RT-B:10.0.0.0/8
AS-C:RT-C:10.0.0.0/8
AS-D:RT-D:10.0.0.0/8
TA-SALLY:
AS-Z:RT-Z:10.0.0.0/8
AS-Y:RT-Y:10.0.0.0/8
AS-X:RT-X:10.0.0.0/8
AS-D:RT-V:10.0.0.0/8
The two vpn-providers are connected together in order that their
customers can have a vpn extending across both networks, for the case
where a single provider (BOB) needs to extend their VPN service
reach/territory into a region where they do not have (for reasons
unimportant to the discussion) presence/facilities. If the intent is
to secure vpn-provider to vpn-provider route exchange, some service
must exist that translates:
AS-D:RT-D:10.0.0.0/8 vs AS-D:RT-V:10.0.0.0/8
A proposed mapping service would accomplish this translation between
the vpn-providers that participate in the single-customer,
multi-provider network scenario. An open question, is whether this is
necessary in a single provider deployment.
It seems that the mechanisms being proposed for BGPSEC can be extended
to support the vpn-provider solution with the addition of a
RouteTarget extension to the ROA End Entity Cert. This would require
updating the certificate profile [draft-ietf-sidr-cp], and running the
algorithm change process [draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility], in order
to flood proper certificates out with the new extension. We could, of
course, choose to change the cert profile today (except that it is in
rfc editor queue at this time) and decide that RT=0 (for instance) is
the “Internet”. It seems that the other mechanisms (mapping service)
still need to be better defined, so revising the certificate profile
later shouldn’t be a show stopper.
I hope the above helps some with Peter's question? Also, I'm really
just the note taker on the above, the authors were more involved with
the thought process (which makes sense to me, I do admit). Thanks for
your indulgence!
-Chris
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