On 8/24/2011 3:57 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
On Aug 24, 2011, at 2:45 PM, Joe Touch wrote:
On 8/24/2011 1:27 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
On Aug 24, 2011, at 12:19 PM, Joe Touch wrote:
Is there ever a reason that this service should exist as a totally open and
insecure port?
Given that it is explicitly listed in the draft, I find it worrisome that you
even ask the question.
Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP
using a port, RPKI-Rtr, to be assigned, see Section 12. Operators
SHOULD use procedural means, ACLs, ... to reduce the exposure to
authentication issues.
I saw a declaration that this was required, but no REASON that unprotected
transport was necessary.
Three paragraphs earlier in the document:
Unfortunately,
there is no protocol to do so on all currently used platforms.
Therefore, as of this document, there is no mandatory to implement
transport which provides authentication and integrity protection.
I recall that discussion, but not the assertion that this would mean
that you'd suggest using an insecure port.
If that's the case, I strongly recommend NOT asking for a system port.
This was discussed heavily in the WG.
Also, is there a reason for not assuming that the out-of-band and
in-band services cannot exist on the same port (other than performance
of the connection establishment)?
Those aren't enough !?!?
"those"? I listed only one - performance.
Sorry, I misread your parenthetical as "other than performance and
connection establishment". The idea that you can do TLS on the same port
as not-TLS has been widely debated. It was finally agreed (maybe not by
you) that the STARTTLS method for sharing a port may or may not be
appropriate for each protocol. When I look at this protocol, I do not
see a way to do it without completely rewriting the protocol interactions.
Here I wasn't asking about TLS vs open, I was asking about TLS vs.
IPsec/MD5/AO, and whether that has a different answer than TLS vs. open.
Whether for this protocol or not, I would appreciate understanding that
in more detail - even if off-list. I cannot see how the protocol matters
if TLS is started or not on a per-connection basis since the TLS would
wrap (or not) the data of the connect at the start. We can continue that
off-list, though.
Joe
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