I think this draft should probably get out of the WG in a cluster.
There is normative references to draft-sidr-bgpsec-algs. However, you
could WGLC this draft because unless you're planning on the name format
or the alg in draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs there's nothing really to
argue about. It could then just wait on the protocol/alg to go forward
in a sensible cluster.
There's one tweak I'd do before a WGLC: update references to the
published RFC #s. Why don't I post a new version and then you & Sandy
can decide whether to start the WGLC button.
The only thing remaining would be to get example encodings, but I think
that can wait.
spt
On 3/28/12 2:33 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
Sean/Tom,
Tom had some comments on the previous (I believe) version of this
draft, are they addressed to your satisfaction Tom?
Sean, if Tom's ok with the changes, should we move this along?
-Chris
<cochair>
On Mon, Dec 5, 2011 at 1:20 PM,<[email protected]> wrote:
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group of
the IETF.
Title : A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate
Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
Author(s) : Mark Reynolds
Sean Turner
Steve Kent
Filename : draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01.txt
Pages : 11
Date : 2011-12-05
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths
in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that
protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper
operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under
development as a component to address the requirement to provide
security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a
protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong
cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS
Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous
System (AS). The certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the
private key are authorized to send out secure route advertisements on
behalf of the specified AS. This document also profiles the
Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format of
certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate path
validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; therefore,
this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (draft-
ietf-sidr-res-cert-profile).
A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01.txt
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01.txt
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