While I think the document may be pretty solid currently, the meta-issue of the tail wagging the dog exists.
I.e. There still exists the potential for additional requirements to surface, related to the design and implementation of the bgpsec protocol, which have the potential to "inform" additional requirements for the EE certs, and/or other (new) cert types. So, even if it passes WGLC intact, I'm of the opinion that it should be kept in the "hold" buffer, until the other work goes through more substantial development and review cycles. Brian On Fri, Apr 13, 2012 at 4:16 PM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.li...@gmail.com > wrote: > Helo WG peoples, > The following update posted today. Sean and Tom have come to agreement > on their differences, I believe this closes the last open items on > this document. > > Let's start a WGLC for this, ending: 4/27/2012 or 27/4/2012 > > Thanks! > -Chris > <co-chair> > > On Fri, Apr 13, 2012 at 3:03 PM, <internet-dra...@ietf.org> wrote: > > > > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts > directories. This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing > Working Group of the IETF. > > > > Title : A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, > Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests > > Author(s) : Mark Reynolds > > Sean Turner > > Steve Kent > > Filename : draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03.txt > > Pages : 11 > > Date : 2012-04-13 > > > > This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for > > the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths > > in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that > > protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper > > operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under > > development as a component to address the requirement to provide > > security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a > > protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong > > cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified > > by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure > > (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS > > Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous > > System (AS). The certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the > > private key are authorized to send out secure route advertisements on > > behalf of the specified AS. This document also profiles the > > Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format of > > certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate path > > validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; therefore, > > this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC > > 6487). > > > > > > A URL for this Internet-Draft is: > > > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03.txt > > > > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: > > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ > > > > This Internet-Draft can be retrieved at: > > > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03.txt > > > > _______________________________________________ > > sidr mailing list > > sidr@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > sidr@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr >
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