OK, I just got around to reading this doc, and I have several observations:
In the introduction (Section 1) the first example is:
provider A allowed a child, C, to move to
other provider(s) and keep their [sic] address space, either temporarily or
permanently, and C's child, G, wished to stay with provider A.
This seems like a poor example, absent additional info about the
nature of the contractual arrangement between C and G. It might be
the case that the arrangement allows G to opt out of having C
advertise the address space that C received from A and sub-allocated
to G, but that was not stated. If that option is not part of the deal
between C and G, then G may have no basis for asking A to advertise
this space, right? So, it would help to have more details in this
example to make sure we're not suggesting that the RPKI be used to
circumvent an agreement.
I think the second, more generic example, is better, but it too could
use some tweaking. The situation here is one in which a resource
holder (C) is a player in the RPKI, but does not want to assume
responsibility for managing resources that it sub-allocates, e.g., to
G, AND it has no objection to this function being provided by the
resource holder from which C receives its allocation. I agree with
Wes's example. G may be looking to outsource management of its RPKI
functions, but not change service providers. That has different
implications for how this process is managed, and who does it. For
example, G might hire someone
to manage RPKI functions for it, and that need not be A, IF C is willing to
issue a CA cert to the 3rd party selected by G. This would be invisible to RPs,
if it is managed in the way I mentioned, whether the service is
provided by A or Z.
Section 3 talks about A having to verify that G is the holder of the
resources in question. It omits a discussion about A verifying with C
that C does not object to A inserting itself into the hierarchy in
this fashion, essentially between C and G. The initial example fro
Section 1 is used here and, again, I think it needs additional text
to state assumptions as I noted above. I worry about the statement
"Although A has the rights over their child's, C's, resources, it
would be prudent and polite to ensure that C agrees to A forming a
relationship to G." This implies details of the relationship between
A and C that have not been stated.
I also would have imagined a different technical proposal here. For
example, A might reissue a certificate to C removing G's prefix(es)
at some point in this process (consistent with a "make before break"
model). This would ensure that C does not reallocate the prefix that
A is now managing directly in its relationship with G. Also, removing
that prefix would prevent C from issuing a ROA for the subsuming
address space, causing G's traffic to be directed to C, if
more-specific routes for G disappear. Yes, there needs to be a time
overlap for this, but not suggesting this as the preferred end state
is likely to confuse matters.
The text here suggests that A might issue EE certificates and ROAs on
behalf of G. I'd suggest it would be much cleaner for A to create a
CA certificate representing G and the issue EE certificates and ROAs
(and manifests and CRLs) relative to that CA, if G does not wish to
operate its own CA. Since these certificates contain no names, A is
not impersonating C or G by doing this, and it makes for a cleaner
distinction between the resources that A is managing in the normal,
hierarchic fashion, and the ones that are being treated specially._______________________________________________
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