I have reviewed the draft.

It remains vague and incomplete, in the Residual Threats section. This,
despite extensive discussion (since the -00 version) on the list regarding
very specific, very real, residual threats.

It not only fails to discuss them, it fails to enumerate them.

The extensive discussion is in the archives, and contains substantive
comments from at least 1/4 active participants in SIDR, including those
with the greatest degree of operational and/or implementation experience.

I would request that the WGLC be retracted until the authors decide to
address those previous comments.

Chairs: There should not be a need to re-raise the particulars - if the
authors got shot down before, and fail to include text or address the
complaints, I fail to see why they are submitting this, or the chair(s) are
doing a WGLC.

The objective of a threats model should be to model the threats, and
identify known weaknesses. If it is substantially incomplete, it is not
ready to go. It fails to accomplish its _only_ goal.

Excluding threats from this doc, because the solution does not address
them, is beyond ridiculous. It is laughable.

Sorry if this offends the authors. The authors' work is at issue, not the
authors themselves. They are fine and upstanding individuals. This ID, in
its current form, however, is, IMHO, junk.

Brian

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Murphy, Sandra
<[email protected]>wrote:

> The authors have indicated that they believe the draft
>
> Threat Model for BGP Path Security
> draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02
>
> is ready for a working group last call.
>
> This starts the two week working group last call.  It will end on Aug 28.
>  Please review the draft and send comments to the list.
>
> --Sandy
> _______________________________________________
> sidr mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
>
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