The issue is: once it's signed, it can't be removed. (you could always add 
another one, but that would change BGP significantly).
"origin" does not seem to be an attribute subject to change.

--
Jakob Heitz.


On Oct 23, 2012, at 8:40 AM, "Hannes Gredler" <[email protected]> wrote:

> randy,
> 
> do we really want to go down that road:
> i mean do we want to protect all the attributes which ever could
> affect BGPs path decision process ?
> 
> /hannes
> 
> On Oct 23, 2012, at 5:14 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
> 
>> sandy asked so i investigated.
>> 
>> bgp has an origin atttribute.  it looks as if we need to protect it.
>> 
>> the origin attribute may have three values, 
>> unspecified
>> igp
>> egp
>> supposedly denoting from where the route was injected into bgp.
>> 
>> jeff haas has a better memory than i, and noted that
>> 
>> the key is that 'egp' does not mean an abstract egp, but the old egp
>> protocol which was classful and aggregated.
>> 
>> if it aggregated, you had to be careful that this did not suddenly hide
>> things and ignorance thereof could open you up to loops.  so the origin
>> attribute was added.
>> 
>> but it is in the bgp decision process.  it is prettly low down, but
>> could be used for traffic engineering or other, less nice, influencing
>> of the decision process.
>> 
>> hence, bgpsec should probably should protect it.
>> 
>> randy
>> _______________________________________________
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>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
>> 
> 
> 
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