The issue is: once it's signed, it can't be removed. (you could always add another one, but that would change BGP significantly). "origin" does not seem to be an attribute subject to change.
-- Jakob Heitz. On Oct 23, 2012, at 8:40 AM, "Hannes Gredler" <[email protected]> wrote: > randy, > > do we really want to go down that road: > i mean do we want to protect all the attributes which ever could > affect BGPs path decision process ? > > /hannes > > On Oct 23, 2012, at 5:14 PM, Randy Bush wrote: > >> sandy asked so i investigated. >> >> bgp has an origin atttribute. it looks as if we need to protect it. >> >> the origin attribute may have three values, >> unspecified >> igp >> egp >> supposedly denoting from where the route was injected into bgp. >> >> jeff haas has a better memory than i, and noted that >> >> the key is that 'egp' does not mean an abstract egp, but the old egp >> protocol which was classful and aggregated. >> >> if it aggregated, you had to be careful that this did not suddenly hide >> things and ignorance thereof could open you up to loops. so the origin >> attribute was added. >> >> but it is in the bgp decision process. it is prettly low down, but >> could be used for traffic engineering or other, less nice, influencing >> of the decision process. >> >> hence, bgpsec should probably should protect it. >> >> randy >> _______________________________________________ >> sidr mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr >> > > > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
