Great, thanks all. Appreciate the clarification! Lots of docs and history to wade through as a process n00b and I apologize for any wasted cycles.
</thread> -dave On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 10:31 AM, Murphy, Sandra <sandra.mur...@parsons.com>wrote: > There's even a chair consensus statement on route leaks and forward plan: > > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/current/msg06014.html > > --Sandy, speaking as wg co-chair > ________________________________________ > From: sidr-boun...@ietf.org [sidr-boun...@ietf.org] on behalf of > Christopher Morrow [morrowc.li...@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, September 06, 2013 10:54 PM > To: Stephen Kent > Cc: g...@ietf.org g...@ietf.org; sidr > Subject: Re: [sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-06.txt > > On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 4:38 PM, Stephen Kent <k...@bbn.com> wrote: > > Dave, > > > > Fair questions for a somewhat complex environment. > > > > SIDR develops security standards for inter-domain routing, working within > > the context of > > BGP standards developed by IDR. > > > > GROW has more of an operations focus, and is intended to provide input to > > IDR. > > > > So, your doc on route leaks, if approved in GROW, could inform IDR about > > changes > > needed to BGP to counter this problem (which is not contrary to current > BGP > > semantics). In turn, IDR could elect to revise BGP to address this > problem, > > and > > then IDR could ask SIDR to develop security mechanisms to enable ASes to > > enforce the > > revised BGP specs, for example. > > this does sound like the agreed upon plan ... yes. > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > sidr@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr > _______________________________________________ > GROW mailing list > g...@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/grow >
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