> From: sidr-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:sidr-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Randy Bush
>
> how about
>
>    To relieve routers of the load of performing certificate validation,
>    cryptographic operations, etc., the RPKI-Router protocol, [RFC6810],
>    does not provide object-based security to the router.  I.e. the
>    router may not validate the data cryptographically from a well-known
>    trust anchor.  The router trusts the cache to provide correct data
>    and relies on transport based security for the data received from the
>    cache.  Therefore the authenticity and integrity of the data from the
>    cache should be well protected, see Section 7 of [RFC6810].
[WEG] fine, though it's unclear if "may" in the above is intended to be 
normative. I think it's not, but just pointing it out.

>
>    As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI
>    data, operators SHOULD locate RPKI caches close to routers that
>    require these data and services in order to minimize the impact of
>    likely failures in local routing, intermediate devices, long
>    circuits, etc.  One also should consider trust boundaries, routing
>    bootstrap reachability, etc.  E.g. a router should bootstrap from a
>    chache which is reachable with minimal reliance on other
>    infrastructure such as DNS or routing protocols.
[WEG] this is better, but I still maintain that in the first sentence, "close" 
isn't actually the goal we're trying for.

How about:

...operators SHOULD consider the relationship between the routers that require 
these data and services and the location of the RPKI caches in the network's 
topology. Caches SHOULD be located so that they can take advantage of 
geographic redundancy and minimize the impact of likely failures in local 
routing, ....

And add this at the end to explain why reliance on routing protocols @ 
bootstrap is risky:

...or routing protocols. Reliance on routing protocol convergence to reach a 
cache at bootstrap time can result in significant increases in total 
convergence time as the router converges partially, synchronizes with the RPKI 
cache, and then must re-converge based on the data from the cache.


Thanks

Wes

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