Hiya Stephen, On 5/18/16 5:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > Hi Sandy, > > On 18/05/16 22:12, Sandra Murphy wrote: >> comments inline. speaking as a regular ol’ wg member >> >> On May 18, 2016, at 12:20 PM, Brian Haberman >> <br...@innovationslab.net> wrote: >> >>> Hiya Stephen, >>> >>> On 5/18/16 12:09 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>> >>>> Hiya, >>>> >>>> On 18/05/16 17:06, Brian Haberman wrote: >>>>> Hiya Stephen, >>>>> >>>>> On 5/18/16 11:51 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>>> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position >>>>>> for draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-11: Discuss >>>>>> >>>>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and >>>>>> reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. >>>>>> (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Please refer to >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for >>>>>> more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found >>>>>> here: >>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> >>>>>> > DISCUSS: >>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> > I'd like to check one thing - this may be needed for strict >>>>>> compliance with RPKI thing but it seems kinda weird to also >>>>>> impose that here, but anyway... >>>>>> >>>>>> Is 3.2 step 1 needed? That seems like useless complexity >>>>>> here. If it is needed, how does the verifier check that it's >>>>>> really a single-use? I don't see the point TBH. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This text was driven by the statement in RFC 6487 (Section 3) >>>>> that says: >>>>> >>>>> The private key associated with an EE certificate is used to >>>>> sign a single RPKI signed object, i.e., the EE certificate is >>>>> used to validate only one object. >>>>> >>>>> Step 1 in 3.2 is there so that this approach follows the above >>>>> directive on the use of the RPKI infrastructure/certificates. >>>> >>>> Well... sure. But what is the benefit here? IIRC that was >>> >>> I *think* the benefit is supposed to be compliance with the RPKI >>> approach... >>> >>>> something related to making more fine-grained revocation possible >>>> or something which doesn't seem that useful here since a verifier >>>> will likely already have processed stuff already or am I mixed >>>> up? >>> >>> I don't think you are mixed up, but I will let others in SIDR chime >>> in… >> >> There was at one point in the history of resource certificates the >> idea that EE certs could be used multiple times. (EE certs even had >> their own manifests!) >> >> The signed object definition encapsulated the EE cert used to verify >> the signature. That revocation of the signed object could be >> accomplished by revoking the EE cert. Which meant that the EE cert >> should be used just to sign that one object, as Stephen says. >> (otherwise chaos ensues) >> >> As the only defined use of EE certs at the time of the publication of >> 6487 was the use to verify signed objects, the text about EE certs >> was reduced to just that necessary to support the single-use. >> >> This is different. The validity of the rpsl object is not tied to >> the validity of the EE cert. The comments from the wg were that this >> draft should talk about the syntax of the new attribute, not the >> authorization/semantics. So revocation of the EE cert in this case >> would/might not have the effect of revoking the rpsl object. I >> personally don’t think it likely that it ever will, but that’s IMHO >> only. >> >> So it is a moot question as to whether the single-use is a part of >> “the RPKI approach” for this rpsl-sig use. > > But that means that there is no reason to include the requirement > here then or am I missing something? Deleting that "step" in the > signing process would seem like a good idea so. (Assuming that > current implementers, if any, are fine with that.)
As one implementer, I have no problem dropping this step. There is nothing in my RPSL code that enforces this (it is a function of the RPKI EE cert usage). > >> >>> >>>> >>>> If there's no benefit, it seems like that adds a bunch of CA code >>>> just for fun (or "compliance" maybe;-) >> >> curious: how would this single-use requirement add anything to the CA >> code? If the requirement is in 6487, the CA code would already have >> the checks. I ask only because I might be missing something. > > What I was trying to say was that requiring signers of this to > include all the CA code is the problem/oddity, esp if there's no > real benefit. > > So the single-use thing doesn't add to the CA code, it adds a > need for the CA code in the wrong place. > > And I guess if the spec says "once only" then I can well imagine > some poor verifier implementer keeping some kind of cache and > checking it'd not seen a signature before or something like that. > And that'd also be kinda pointless code too I think. I certainly don't do any type of checking at the verification step. Regards, Brian
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