Dear WG,

This version was uploaded because looking at this on-line proved more 
convenient for IESG review, as opposed to the version of this that I sent as an 
email attachment. We have a had a discussion about remaining DISCUSS items and 
a -10 version is coming soon as well. Possibly still before I board my plane 
home tomorrow, otherwise early next week.

Kind regards,

Tim

> On 16 Nov 2017, at 15:59, internet-dra...@ietf.org wrote:
> 
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing WG of the IETF.
> 
>        Title           : RPKI Validation Reconsidered
>        Authors         : Geoff Huston
>                          George Michaelson
>                          Carlos M. Martinez
>                          Tim Bruijnzeels
>                          Andrew Lee Newton
>                          Daniel Shaw
>       Filename        : draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-09.txt
>       Pages           : 22
>       Date            : 2017-11-15
> 
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies an alternative to the certificate validation
>   procedure specified in RFC 6487 that reduces aspects of operational
>   fragility in the management of certificates in the RPKI, while
>   retaining essential security features.
> 
>   Where the procedure specified in RFC 6487 requires that Resource
>   Certificates are rejecting entirely if they are found to over-claim
>   any resources not contained on the issuing certificate, the
>   validation process defined here allows an issuing Certificate
>   Authority to chose to communicate that such Resource Certificates
>   should be accepted for the intersection of their resources and the
>   issuing certificate.
> 
>   This choice is signalled by form of a set of alternative Object
>   Identifiers (OIDs) of RFC 3779 X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and
>   AS Identifiers, and certificate policy for the Resource Public Key
>   Infrastructure (RFC 6484).  It should be noted that in case these
>   OIDs are not used for any certificate under a Trust Anchor, the
>   validation procedure defined here has the same outcome as the
>   procedure defined in RFC 6487
> 
>   Furthermore this document provides an alternative to ROA (RFC 6482),
>   and BGPSec Router Certificate (BGPSec PKI Profiles - publication
>   requested) validation.
> 
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered/
> 
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-09
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-09
> 
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-09
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
> _______________________________________________
> sidr mailing list
> sidr@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
> 

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