On Jul 4, 2007, at 5:47 PM, Tom McCabe wrote:
--- Randall Randall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
On Jul 4, 2007, at 3:17 PM, Tom McCabe wrote:
So, we die whenever we're put under anesthesia?
No, I don't think so.
But I thought you just defined death as "the cessation
of the process of life". If anesthesia doesn't shut
down enough bodily processes to qualify, what about
people who have gone into cardiac arrest? What about
drowning victims, who are sometimes revived over an
hour after the classical life signs have stopped?
I'm not sure about the last, but I assume it's the
same person until convinced otherwise.
There's no sharp dividing line that I know of, but
there are certainly scenarios in which we can say
that the process that is the person has stopped,
and scenarios in which it's clear that the process
hasn't stopped (even if all the parts were replaced).
If I *did* think so (and I don't), why would that
make a difference? If a copy of me was created, he
would certainly feel like he was me; I don't think
anyone disputes that.
So, then, what's the difference between "you" and "the
copy"?
Well, I existed before the experiment began. Looking
around, it doesn't appear as though the copy does. Even
if there were no intrinsic difference, however, the fact
that you can specify that you have "two" Randalls
implies that they are not really a single Randall.
To go for the most extreme case possible: I blast some
guy into charred ash and smoke with a flamethrower.
Obviously, all organic chemical processes whatsoever
have ceased. I then use the handy nearby utility fog
to collect all the atoms that were once him, and put
them all back in the original places. The new self is
totally identical, atom-for-atom, to the old self, so
how is this "death" in any meaningful sense of the
word?
The atoms involved don't seem to have anything to do
with it, to me. In the person-as-a-process model, you
stopped the run, and starting a new one where that one
left off (or slightly before) doesn't bring back the
person, but only creates a new person with the old
one's memories.
If I start up Firefox on my machine here, and shut it
down, and then restart it, it's not the same run, even
though it's Firefox on the same computer.
--
Randall Randall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
"If we have matter duplicators, will each of us be a sovereign
and possess a hydrogen bomb?" -- Jerry Pournelle
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