A significant limitation in what you propose is that it requires Bob to 
have a public key that Alice knows. In general we don't find that to be 
the case in most telephony applications.

        Thanks,
        Paul

Vadim Lebedev wrote:
> I see,
> Well this particular attack could be prevented by adding a timestamp +  
> key validity period into the encrypted material...
> This is still much cheaper than using SSL in signalling path.
> Actually the current approach (SSL in signalling path and rtp key in  
> clear in SDP) seems to be weaker in case of compromised server - the  
> bad guy will be able to actually HEAR,SEE and FAKE
> rtp streams.
> 
> 
> Anyway thanks a lot for the feedback
> 
> Vadim
> Le 2 juin 09 à 18:55, Alexander Krassiev a écrit :
> 
>> Man in a middle. Encrypted key can be stored and re-used by man-in-a- 
>> middle to forge future conversations (to garble the stream). Further  
>> enhancing your suggestion will bring us close to SSL/TLS I am afraid.
>>
>> On Jun 2, 2009, at 8:27 AM, Vadim Lebedev wrote:
>>
>>> Vadim Lebedev wrote:
>>>
>>> Any thoughts on this issue?
>>> I've just realised that this approach will make lawful interception
>>> REALLY complicated... Maybe this
>>> is the reason there is no an RFC covering it?  Or am i missing  
>>> something?
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>> Vadim
>>>
>>>> Hello,
>>>>
>>>> I've been reading various RFC describing  tranmission of master key
>>>> for SRTP unside SDP's.
>>>> They require (like in rfc4568) the INVITE/200/ACK be transmitted  
>>>> using
>>>> TLS to avoid key interception.
>>>>
>>>> I wonder why nobody proped following scheme:
>>>>
>>>> Alice generates a mester key, encrypts it wih Bob's public key and
>>>> signs it with her own private key.
>>>> The resulting material is stored in SDP which can be transmitted   
>>>> ove
>>>> unsecure connection...
>>>> Bob receives the INVITE request extract the signed keye authenicate
>>>> the Alice signature and decodes the master key using his onw private
>>>> key....
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Thanks
>>>> Vadim
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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