> -----Original Message----- > From: Dean Willis [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: 30 July 2008 17:23 > To: Uzelac, Adam > Cc: Cullen Jennings; Elwell, John; SIP IETF > Subject: Re: [Sip] Thoughts on SIP Identity issues > > > On Jul 30, 2008, at 12:05 PM, Uzelac, Adam wrote: > > > I believe that the problem statement (and associated use > cases) that > > John presented in the WG session are valid. I think it was > > unfortunate that those use cases couldn't be discussed more in the > > WG session. This email appears to me simply John trying to > further > > the discussions to bring out arguments. > > > > One particular note I would like to share - given a comment at the > > mic regarding 4474 working as designed and desired - is that there > > are situations (good, bad or indifferent) that necessitate changes > > in the SDP. John cited media steering as a use case. Another use > > case is media steering for transcoding. Use case below: > > > > Ent A--->SSP1--->Ent B > > > In this use case, Ent A and SSP1 have established certain > "rules of > > engagement", like G729, 2833, t.38, etc. Ent B and SSP1 have > > established their own "rules of engagement", for instance G711 for > > voice, inband DTMF/FAX, etc. Being there's no common denominator > > for the media, the SDP in INVITE "steers" to a device that can > > trancode. > > > > This is more that sterring; the media is being terminated at > a device > that transcodes it. Then a new media stream flows out the other side. > > When media transcoding is occurring, media integrity is > hop-by-hop. I > maintain that we have no need for an end-to-end identity > representation when the media itself is hop by hop. > > > > Another use case, would be for those SSPs that have Lawful > Intercept > > requirements. Steering the media to something that will can > > intercept should that be a regulatory obligation. > > > Same as above. Although one should note that proper use of DTLS-SRTP > to detect the lawful intercept. [JRE] Media steering is sufficient to accomplish LI. The encrypted stream is delivered to the authorities. The authorities need to go to the end domain to be able to have access to the encryption key and/or the unencrypted stream. An intermediate domain cannot be held responsible for encryption done by end domains.
John _______________________________________________ Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip This list is for NEW development of the core SIP Protocol Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip Use [EMAIL PROTECTED] for new developments on the application of sip
