On Dec 8, 2008, at 1:22 PM, Jiri Kuthan wrote:
Dean Willis wrote:
On Dec 8, 2008, at 8:49 AM, Jiri Kuthan wrote:
Elwell, John wrote:
[JRE] The number of negatives will diminish, true, but it will
never
approach zero, because there will always be negative cases
arising from
forking, call forwarding, problematic B2BUAs, etc..
indeed.
So it is a question
whether it will get sufficiently close to zero that the odd false
negative can safely be ignored. I am rather doubtful.
The question remains: why would like to worry about the negative
case
when we know it has zero information value?? I cannot conceive
anyone
would like to use such non-information and I don't see the point in
studying it then.
How would DERIVE change the behavior of the user in the positive
case?
That's a policy thing. Perhaps (as an example) increase a call
atempt score
beyond a threshold that will prevent the call from falling in
voicemail.
How would DERIVE change the behavior of the user in the negative
case?
not at all.
Well, the Security area wonks are going to want us to have a threat
assessment. What is the risk? In what scenarios does it occur? What
are the consequences?
Given the threat assessment, we then need to understand how the
solution impacts that threat. What are the possible ranges of policy?
What is the recommended policy? How does it impact behavior in a
system that uses this solution?
--
Dean
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