On Sun, May 17, 2015 at 4:37 PM, Robert J. Hansen <r...@sixdemonbag.org> wrote: >> This is a DOS because Mallory could effectively increase Alice's >> public key to a size that it would be untenable for Bob to >> download it from the pool. > > There are so many other, better ways to DoS the entire keyserver network > that I have real trouble taking this one seriously.
Uploading user attribute packets with bogus self-signatures is probably the easiest way to DoS the entire keyserver network. A bot could add 1TB of bloat to the keyserver network by adding 5MB (to stay under the limit) user attribute images to only 200k public keys. By contrast, assuming a signature is 2KB, they would need to submit 200m bogus signatures to have the same impact. Additionally, due to sks's packet merging properties, one could submit different 5MB user attribute images multiple times and the public key would grow by 5MB each time. So it would only take 200 requests for a bot to increase someone's public key size to 1GB (effectively DoS'ing that person from being retrieved via gpg --recv-key). Are we just going to wait around until someone starts doing this? We can solve these vulnerabilities now. Daniel _______________________________________________ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org https://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel