This was forwarded to me; it makes for impressive reading on quick thinking... Tom > Subject: FW: DHL out of Baghdad] MISSILE HIT........ > HELL OF A STORY > > > > > >I know you all heard of the story of the DHL Plane > that was hit by a > > >missile coming out of Baghdad last year, and > returned safely - But > >did > >you realize what a close thing it was??? I hadn't! > What a story!! > >Capt. Al Haynes is no longer the only guy to fly a > transport > >category > >aircraft by thrust alone - Perhaps they had Sioux > City in mind as > >they > >Quickly RE-Learned how to fly! Al may have saved 3 > more.... > > > >Here's the Story from Aero-News.net...... > > > >2003 Hugh Gordon-Burge Trophy Awarded to DHL Flight > Crew Prestigious > >award given to crew of Airbus hit by missile as > they were leaving > >Baghdad > > > >The Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators, a > British organization > >formed in 1929, promotes air safety by presenting > trophies and other > >awards for outstanding performance in aviation by > individuals or > >organisations. The Hugh Gordon-Burge Memorial Award > is given to the > >Captain, a member of a flight deck crew, or a cabin > attendant whose > >actions contribute outstandingly by the saving of > his/her aircraft > >or passengers, or made a significant contribution > to future air > >safety. > > > >The Guild has awarded the 2003 Hugh Gordon-Burge > Award to Captain > >Eric Gennotte, First Officer Steeve Michielsen and > Flight Engineer > >Mario Rofail. All three work for DHL. The text of > the award is > >transcribed here, verbatim. > > > >On 22nd November 2003, a DHL A300 B4 had been > airborne from Baghdad > >Airport for just over 3 minutes when the calm in > the cockpit was > >shattered by the sound of a loud bang. At about > 8,000ft an explosion > >was heard, followed by a cacophony of aural > warnings and visual > >displays showing a master warning on all flight > controls. > > > >Unbeknown to the crew at that time, the aircraft > had been struck by > >a missile. The Flight Engineer, Mario Rofail, > called that the green > >and yellow hydraulic systems were lost, and as he > started preparing > >for the double hydraulic loss emergency checklist > procedure the > >Captain, Eric Gennotte, announced that he was > having difficulty > >controlling the aircraft. The First Officer, Steeve > Michielsen, > >tried unsuccessfully to assist the Captain to try > and regain > >control. The F/E then announced that the third > hydraulic system was > >lost as well. > > > >At that point the crew realised that there was > little likelihood > >that the flight controls would become functional > again. There was no > >emergency checklist or procedure to help them > recover from this > >scenario. The situation appeared hopeless and they > were very much on > >their own. > > > >The aircraft was without conventional pilot input. > The stick and > >rudder were ineffective. The flight control > surfaces deprived of > >their hydraulic muscle, were aligned with the > airflow (hinge moment > >zero). > > > >The configuration was frozen: 1) Slats and flaps > could not be > >extended 2) Spoilers were no longer controllable 3) > The position of > >the horizontal stabiliser could not be adjusted. It > was and > >continued to remain at the trim position for 215 > Knots with climb > >thrust. (This setting was to pose particular > challenges for the crew > >as they attempted to stabilise the aircraft for an > approach descent > >profile) > > > >A state of emergency was declared by Steeve to ATC. > The crew was > >told that the left engine was on fire. Mario > advised his fellow crew > >members that this was not possible since all engine > indications and > >fire warning systems were normal. However, with no > hydraulics and a > >fire visible from the left wing he knew the > aircraft was seriously > >damaged. > > > >The tension was extreme on the flight deck. The > 'sense of disbelief' > >was felt by all the crew members. > > > >Eric announced that they could control the pitch > attitude by > >adjusting thrust. Then began a learning period > during which Eric, > >Steeve and Mario, discovered how to control the > pitch by modulating > >thrust. Initially the thrust lever movements were > large and > >essentially symmetrical, and the aircraft thus > continued a wide, > >unsteady, 360 degree turn to the left. > > > >The crew found that they could effectively stop the > climb by > >reducing thrust, which caused an initial airspeed > decrease whilst > >the nose dropped, but then the airspeed started to > increase. > > > >They had to cope with this apparent paradox, due to > the change in > >pitching moment that could not be corrected by the > jammed horizontal > >stabiliser. The initial climb at 215 knots was > changed into a > >shallow controlled descent by reducing thrust, > leading to an > >unavoidable speed increase: Between 10,000 and > 5,000 feet, IAS > >varied between 270 and 290 knots. > > > >At that time Eric ordered the extension of the > landing gear by the > >emergency gravity extension procedure, even though > the speed > >exceeded the maximum allowed for landing gear > extension. > > > >Mario successfully manually extended the gear. It > made a lot of > >noise since the gear doors remained open. The > extended gear provided > >additional drag, which helped stabilise the > aircraft. This was the > >only means to bring the speed back towards 210 > knots. The decision > >to extend the gear so early on proved to be a vital > decision. > > > >With the aircraft controllable in pitch around > level flight and at a > >speed compatible with landing, Eric, supported by > Steeve and Mario, > >set about learning to control the direction of > flight. > > > >Asymmetric handling of the throttles could control > bank. When the > >left engine alone was accelerated, the wings > returned to the > >horizontal, similarly when the right engine only > was retarded the > >same levelling effect could be achieved. > > > >This was a very difficult procedure to perform, > especially when > >trying simultaneously to maintain horizontal flight > and follow a > >heading: 1) The response to thrust change appeared > rapidly in pitch, > >but roll response was delayed, since the roll > resulted from the > >sideslip induced by the asymmetric thrust, and > there was a lag > >before this took effect 2) Since the left wing was > damaged, the > >degree of asymmetric thrust had to be found which > was sufficient to > >compensate for the asymmetry of lift, and it had to > be maintained > >while the thrust was adjusted to control the slope; > easier said than > >done > > > >Eric was effectively flying an experimental > aircraft and was > >continually gaining experience in manipulating the > aircraft by the > >throttles. Steeve provided close assistance making > some corrective > >inputs. There were a few rather alarming roll > excursions beyond 30 > >degrees during that time. The aircraft remained > very difficult to > >control, however confidence was gained as the > flight progressed. > > > >Eventually, they could consider navigation back to > the field which > >had been lost from sight during the "training > manoeuvres". Steeve > >took on the navigation. He suggested that a long > final of at least > >20 nautical miles was needed. The aircraft started > a second 360 > >degree orbit, this time under more control. Eric > started a right > >turn to come back towards runway 33R, the longer of > the two runways > >at Baghdad. > > > >The descent flight path then had to be established. > That was not > >simple either: the descent angle selected by the > average value of > >thrust was not easy to assess, since the whole > process was subject > >to oscillation. It was thus an average descent > angle that had to be > >judged, all the while maintaining the heading by > asymmetric > >adjustment of the engines. > > > >To complicate matters further, the turbulence > associated with a wind > >of 20 knots from 290 degrees (left crosswind > component tended to > >excite natural oscillations, and in addition GPWS > warnings > >associated with the abnormal landing configuration > sounded > >repeatedly on short final. > > > >Eric concentrated on the essential, keeping the > aircraft under > >control and reaching the airfield where the fire > services could > >fight the fire on the left wing. > > > >Steeve assisted with efficient and timely > call-outs, announcing > >distances and altitudes. He stressed the point that > the power must > >not be completely reduced on touch-down; otherwise, > the symmetrical > >thrust would induce a turn to the left, > particularly undesirable > >just before ground contact. > > > >Mario, who, in addition to a close watch on all the > systems, > >monitored the fuel remaining in the damaged left > wing. It was vital > >that both engines were kept running by ensuring a > positive supply of > >fuel and ignition. If one of the engines had lost > power or failed, > >the aircraft and crew would have certainly been > lost. He was > >therefore prepared to open the cross feed in case > the left main tank > >emptied, but not too soon because the fuel in the > right wing would > >then be lost through the leak on the left side. > Furthermore, he was > >able to relieve both pilots by taking over all > radio communication > >and made sure the aircraft was depressurised before > touchdown to > >guarantee a successful emergency evacuation. > > > >Mario contacted ATC for an updated visual > assessment to request if > >the aircraft was still on fire. A military > helicopter replied that > >the left wing was on fire and that the flame was > the length of the > >aircraft (50 metres). In spite of the extreme > stress Mario had the > >courtesy to say "thank you" to the controller. He > also requested > >that both runways 33L and 33R be kept free and that > all emergency > >services be ready. > > > >The tension again increased as the ground > approached. At 250ft, the > >pitch attitude, still slowly oscillating, dropped > towards a negative > >value, which was most alarming so close to the > ground. It was > >restored nose-up by a large increase in the thrust > on both engines. > > > >Towards 100ft, the aircraft was tracking to the > runway threshold, > >but with a heading ten degrees less than the > orientation of the > >runway. Eric made his final lateral control > correction, reducing the > >right engine only. The aircraft banked to the right > and the angle of > >convergence began to diminish. > > > >Twenty-five long minutes after impact of the > missile, the A300 B4 > >finally landed on runway 33L, without further > damage: 1) At a > >positive pitch attitude 2) With a moderate sink > rate (less than > >10ft/sec, far below the tolerances for the landing > gear) 3) At an > >angle of bank of ten degrees to the right, and > heading diverging > >about eight degrees to the left of the runway axis > > > >Without any direct means of directional control, > however, the > >aircraft rapidly went off the side of the runway. > The throttles were > >retarded and selected to full reverse by Mario. The > sandy ground > >provided a significant extra braking force and the > aircraft, in > >spite of the high speed at touchdown, stopped after > a landing run of > >the order of one kilometre, raising an impressive > cloud of sand > >behind it. > > > >After engine shutdown the crew evacuated the > aircraft from the > >right, inches away from a coil of razor wire. They > ran a safe > >distance from the aircraft as the wing was still on > fire only to be > >intercepted by some military emergency services > personnel who warned > >them that they were standing in a possible mine > field. Their > >incredible feat was almost spoiled after taking > their first steps > >back on the ground. > > > >For their amazing and momentous actions in the > saving of their > >aircraft, the Hugh Gordon-Burge Memorial Award is > presented to each > >crewmember of the DHL flight. > > > >Aero-News Networks would like add our > congratulations to Captain > >Gennotte, FO Michielsen and FE Rofail for winning > this prestigious > >award. FMI: www.gapan.org, www.dhl.com > > >
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