Hi Ben,
Great!
I added this NEW text to cover your DDoS comment:
o Instructing the BR to install entries which in turn will induce a
DDoS attack by means of the notifications generated by the BR.
This DDoS can be softened by defining a notification interval, but
given that this interval parameter can be disabled or set to a low
value by the misbehaving entity, the same problem will be
observed.
Thank you for the review.
Cheers,
Med
> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Benjamin Kaduk [mailto:ka...@mit.edu]
> Envoyé : jeudi 10 janvier 2019 20:07
> À : BOUCADAIR Mohamed TGI/OLN
> Cc : The IESG; draft-ietf-softwire-y...@ietf.org; Sheng Jiang; softwire-
> cha...@ietf.org; softwires@ietf.org
> Objet : Re: Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-softwire-yang-14: (with
> DISCUSS and COMMENT)
>
> Hi Med,
>
> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 02:08:02PM +0000, mohamed.boucad...@orange.com wrote:
> > Hi Benjamin,
> >
> > Thank you for the review.
> >
> > Please see inline.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Med
> >
> > > -----Message d'origine-----
> > > De : Benjamin Kaduk [mailto:ka...@mit.edu]
> > > Envoyé : mardi 8 janvier 2019 20:38
> > > À : The IESG
> > > Cc : draft-ietf-softwire-y...@ietf.org; Sheng Jiang; softwire-
> > > cha...@ietf.org; jiangsh...@huawei.com; softwires@ietf.org
> > > Objet : Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-softwire-yang-14: (with
> > > DISCUSS and COMMENT)
> > >
> > > Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
> > > draft-ietf-softwire-yang-14: Discuss
> > >
> > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> > > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> > > introductory paragraph, however.)
> > >
> > >
> > > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> > > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> > >
> > >
> > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-softwire-yang/
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > DISCUSS:
> > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > This document has 7 listed authors/editors. Since, per RFC 7322,
> documents
> > > listing more than five authors are unusaul, and seven is greater than
> five,
> > > let's talk about the author count.
> > >
> >
> > [Med] Will leave this one to our AD.
>
> And he has done a fine job with it!
>
> >
> > > The binding-table-versioning container's "version" leaf is of type uint64
> > > but the in-module description indicates that it is a timestamp. If it is
> > > actually supposed to be a timestamp, then the units and zero time need to
> > > be specified, but it seems more likely that this should just be described
> > > as an abstract version number, if I understand the prose text about this
> > > container correctly.
> > >
> >
> > [Med] Thank you for catching this one.
> >
> > There is a copy/paste bug:
> >
> > OLD:
> >
> > container binding-table-versioning {
> > description
> > "binding table's version";
> > leaf version {
> > type uint64;
> > description
> > "Timestamp when the binding table was activated.
> >
> > A binding instance may be provided with binding
> > entries that may change in time (e.g., increase
> > the size of the port set). When an abuse party
> > presents an external IP address/port, the version
> > of the binding table is important because, depending
> > on the version, a distinct customer may be
> > identified.
> >
> > The timestamp is used as a key to find the
> > appropriate binding table that was put into effect
> > when an abuse occurred. ";
> > }
> > leaf date {
> > type yang:date-and-time;
> > description
> > "Timestamp of the binding table";
> > reference
> > "RFC7422: Deterministic Address Mapping to Reduce
> > Logging in Carrier-Grade NAT Deployments";
> > }
> > }
> >
> >
> > NEW:
> >
> > container binding-table-versioning {
> > description
> > "binding table's version";
> > leaf version {
> > type uint64;
> > description
> > "A version number for the binding table.";
> > }
> > leaf date {
> > type yang:date-and-time;
> > description
> > "Timestamp when the binding table was activated.
> >
> > A binding instance may be provided with binding
> > entries that may change in time (e.g., increase
> > the size of the port set). When an abuse party
> > presents an external IP address/port, the version
> > of the binding table is important because, depending
> > on the version, a distinct customer may be
> > identified.
> >
> > The timestamp is used as a key to find the
> > appropriate binding table that was put into effect
> > when an abuse occurred. ";
> > reference
> > "RFC7422: Deterministic Address Mapping to Reduce
> > Logging in Carrier-Grade NAT Deployments";
> > }
> > }
>
> Ah, a very easy resolution -- sorry for missing that it was just a
> copy/paste issue.
>
> > >
> > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > COMMENT:
> > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > Please expand CE on first usage.
> > >
> > > Section 4.1
> > >
> > > It feels a little strange to put something as generic as
> > > /if:interfaces/if:interface/if:statistics:sent-ipv4-packets in the
> > > ietf-softwire-ce module. Are these counters likely to be useful for
> other
> > > (non-softwire?) tunneling techniques?
> >
> > [Med] Some of these counters may be applicable to some other tunneling
> techniques, but not all of them. As such, these counters cannot be considered
> as generic.
> >
> > If in the future, a YANG module is to be defined for some tunneling
> technique and similar counters are also applicable fro that technique, that
> module can use the traffic-stat grouping defined in draft-ietf-softwire-yang.
>
> Ok.
>
> > >
> > > Section 5.2
> > >
> > > o softwire-num-max: used to set the maximum number of softwire
> > > binding rules that can be created on the lw4o6 element
> > > simultaneously. This paramter must not be set to zero because
> > > this is equivalent to disabling the BR instance.
> > >
> > > This seems to leave it ambiguous whether a server should reject an
> attempt
> > > to set it to zero, or accept it but diable the BR instance.
> >
> > [Med] The text is clear, IMO. Furthermore, the range of allowed values is
> called out explicitly in the module:
> >
> > leaf softwire-num-max {
> > type uint32 {
> > range "1..max";
> > }
>
> My apologies, I must have found the wrong place in the module -- I thought
> there was not a range specified.
>
> >
> > >
> > > Section 7
> > >
> > > leaf enable-hairpinning {
> > > type boolean;
> > > default "true";
> > > description
> > > "Enables/disables support for locally forwarding
> > > (hairpinning) traffic between two CEs.";
> > > reference "Section 6.2 of RFC7596";
> > >
> > > Is a global toggle sufficient or would there be cases where more
> > > fine-grained control would be needed?
> > >
> >
> > [Med] A+P is designed to reduce as much as possible the per-subscriber
> state at the network/BR. Requiring fine-grained control would require some
> extra state to be maintained, which is not desired. Having the general
> parameter is sufficient.
>
> Okay, thanks for the explanation (and no need to cover it in the document
> itself).
>
> > > Section 8
> > >
> > > container algo-versioning {
> > > [...]
> > > leaf date {
> > >
> > > type yang:date-and-time;
> > > description
> > > "Timestamp when the algorithm instance was activated.
> > >
> > > An algorithm instance may be provided with mapping
> > > rules that may change in time (for example, increase
> > > the size of the port set). When an abuse party
> > > presents an external IP address/port, the version
> > > of the algorithm is important because depending on
> > > the version, a distinct customer may be identified.
> > >
> > > nit: "abuse party" is probably not a term that everyone is familiar with.
> > > (similarly in br-instances)
> >
> > [Med] We used "abuse" in reference to what is discussed in RFC6269 :
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6269#section-13.1. We may add a pointer to
> that section if you think this is useful.
>
> I think "abuse" is fine, it's just the combination "abuse party" that is
> unexpected. If we want to indicate "the party responsible for abuse", it
> may be easiest to just use that descriptive phrase rather than trying to
> coin a compound noun.
>
> > >
> > > Section 9
> > >
> > > Is there any possibility of a situation where the
> > > invalid-/added/modified-entry notifications cause a substantial amount of
> > > notification traffic (i.e., a DoS level of traffic)?
> > >
> >
> > [Med] This is in theory possible if the BR is under the control of a non-
> authorized/misbehaving entity. The DDoS can be softened by defining a
> notification interval, but given that this interval parameter can be disabled
> or set to a low value by the misbehaving entity, the same problem will be
> observed.
>
> Probably worth a mention, then.
>
> Thanks (and I'll go clear my Discuss now),
>
> Benjamin
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