http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/2010/09/07/engaging-syria-undermining-iran/

Engaging Syria, Undermining Iran
by Srdja Trifkovic
September 7th, 2010

In his comment on my latest on the Israeli-Palestinian saga, WGN host Milt 
Rosenberg notes that we are now dealing with Iran as much as with the PLO 
government: behind Hamas and Hizbollah, and alongside Syria and Lebanon, lurks 
the government in Teheran. “That elephant in the room must be named, confronted 
and undermined,” he says. While I agree that Iran should be “confronted and 
undermined” for a variety of geostrategic reasons and in a variety of ways, I 
do 
not believe that American military action against Iran is either warranted or 
feasible. Tehran may want to develop the bomb, but there is a yawning gap 
between its wishes and capabilities: The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate is 
still essentially valid. If Israel begs to differ, it should take unilateral 
military action and bear the cost, relations with Washington included.
Our creative yet effective policy of “confronting and undermining” should start 
with an opening to Damascus. The rationale is implied in the New York Times’ 
front-page feature, “Syria’s Solidarity With Islamists Ends at Home” (Saturday, 
September 4). It had supported Islamist groups abroad and tolerated greater 
role 
for religion at home, we are told, but it has recently reversed course, “moving 
forcefully to curb the influence of Muslim conservatives in public life.” The 
government has asked imams for recordings of their Friday sermons and started 
to 
strictly monitor religious schools. In recent weeks more than 1,000 teachers 
who 
wear the face veil were transferred to administrative duties. According to the 
Times,
The crackdown, which began in 2008 but has gathered steam this summer, is an 
effort by President Bashar al-Assad to reassert Syria‘s traditional secularism 
in the face of rising threats from radical groups in the region, Syrian 
officials say. The policy amounts to a sharp reversal for Syria, which for 
years 
tolerated the rise of the conservatives. And it sets the government on the 
seemingly contradictory path of moving against political Islamists at home, 
while supporting movements like Hamas and Hezbollah abroad. Syrian officials 
are 
adamant that the shifts stem from alarming domestic trends, and do not affect 
support for those groups, allies in their struggle against Israel.
“Alarming domestic trends” cannot but affect Syria’s relations with those 
movements and their primary external backer. Assad’s connection with Iran can 
and should be broken. It is neither natural nor inevitable. He is a secularist, 
whereas Ahmadinejad is a millenarian Islamic visionary. He is an Alawite, 
whereas Hizbullah and their Iranian paymasters are “Twelver” Shiites. He is an 
Arab, and therefore unlikely to be indifferent to the implications of Iran’s 
desire to project its power and influence across the Fertile Crescent and all 
the way to the Mediterranean. If Assad can be won over to the idea of a peace 
treaty with Israel, in return for Washington’s recognition of the legitimacy of 
his regime, a key link in Iran’s strategic design will have been broken. 
Hizbullah cannot function effectively if the lifeline from Damascus is severed.
Syria presents a diplomatic realist with many creative possibilities. Assad is 
obviously nervous about the Islamist menace, and probably keen to make a deal 
if 
he is then left in peace at home. The Syrians’ true mood is evident in the 
Golan 
Heights, taken by Israel in 1967 and held ever since: for many years now there 
have been no skirmishes, infiltrations, or rocket firings—nothing. It is one of 
the most peaceful boundaries in the Middle East. It is at least possible—I’d 
say 
probable—that Bashir is ready to sign a peace treaty with Israel, and let it 
keep some parts of Golan “on lease” (99 years, say) if Syria is openly removed 
from Washington’s list of “rogue states” that may be in need of a touch of 
color-coded revolution. Engaging Syria is one way to deplete Iran’s regional 
assets indirectly. If Assad can be won over to the idea of a peace treaty with 
Israel, in return for Washington’s recognition of the legitimacy of his regime, 
a key link in Iran’s strategic design will have been broken.
On the credit side Syria had never been guilty of a terrorist outrage such as 
Lockerbie, yet Libya’s Gaddafi, having done his penance, is deemed clubbable. 
In 
the aftermath of 9-11 Damascus passed on to the United States hundreds of files 
on Al Qaeda and other anti-Western terrorist individuals and movements 
throughout the Middle East, many of which targeted Jordan, Saudi Arabia and 
others besides the United States. Syria has the potential to become America’s 
more useful partner in the “War on Terror” than a “friend” like Saudi Arabia 
has 
ever been—or could ever be.
On the other hand, any “regime change” in Damascus is a risky proposition for 
as 
long as the Muslim Brotherhood represents the only alternative to Assad. It is 
unfortunate that, for some years now, certain U.S. agencies have been putting 
out feelers to some Islamist activists opposed to the Syrian regime. The 
end-result would not be very different from the current U.S. de facto alliance 
with the fundamentalists in Iraq. The Iraqi scenario entailed replacing an 
unpleasant secularist autocrat with a regime to Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s 
liking. It would be beyond absurd to bring down Bashar al-Assad—a far less 
unpleasant secularist autocrat who presents even less of a threat to 
America—for 
the benefit of the Ikwanis. Bashir is not a priori anti-American and he is less 
anti-Israeli than either his Islamist partners or his Islamist foes. He may be 
induced into a deal that would serve U.S. interests in the region at little or 
no cost to American prestige or treasury.
Engaging Syria would help “confront and undermine” Iran, and at the same time 
it 
would help the quest for a solution in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. A new 
element in the equation is badly needed. The “Oslo Process,” as conceived by 
those who initiated it in the early 1990’s, had come to an end well over a 
decade ago. There is no replacement on the horizon. The political principle of 
Oslo was an ongoing trade-off of various items in bilateral negotiations 
between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians working jointly toward a final, permanent 
peace agreement. This principle has broken down, and the ongoing Washingtonian 
exercise in futility cannot revive it. Bringing Bashir on board may help.


Dr. S. Trifkovic, Foreign Affairs Editor
CHRONICLES: A Magazine of American Culture
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?cat=4
www.trifkovic.mysite.com



[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Одговори путем е-поште