Module Name: src
Committed By: wiz
Date: Wed Sep 4 05:37:07 UTC 2019
Modified Files:
src/share/man/man4: rnd.4
Log Message:
New sentence, new line. Use \(em.
To generate a diff of this commit:
cvs rdiff -u -r1.27 -r1.28 src/share/man/man4/rnd.4
Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the
copyright notices on the relevant files.
Modified files:
Index: src/share/man/man4/rnd.4
diff -u src/share/man/man4/rnd.4:1.27 src/share/man/man4/rnd.4:1.28
--- src/share/man/man4/rnd.4:1.27 Wed Sep 4 04:03:25 2019
+++ src/share/man/man4/rnd.4 Wed Sep 4 05:37:06 2019
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $NetBSD: rnd.4,v 1.27 2019/09/04 04:03:25 riastradh Exp $
+.\" $NetBSD: rnd.4,v 1.28 2019/09/04 05:37:06 wiz Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2014 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
.\" All rights reserved.
@@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ quantum computers.
Systems with nonvolatile storage should store a secret from
.Pa /dev/urandom
on disk during installation or shutdown, and feed it back during boot,
-so that the work the operating system has done to gather entropy --
-including the work its operator may have done to flip a coin! -- can be
+so that the work the operating system has done to gather entropy \(em
+including the work its operator may have done to flip a coin! \(em can be
saved from one boot to the next, and so that newly installed systems
are not vulnerable to generating cryptographic keys predictably.
.Pp
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ in
which is enabled by default; see
.Xr rc.conf 5 .
.Sh LIMITATIONS
-Some people worry about recovery from state compromise -- that is,
+Some people worry about recovery from state compromise \(em that is,
ensuring that even if an attacker sees the entire state of the
operating system, then the attacker will be unable to predict any new
future outputs as long as the operating system gathers fresh entropy
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ Past versions of the
subsystem were concerned with
.Sq information-theoretic
security, under the premise that the number of bits of entropy out must
-not exceed the number of bits of entropy in -- never mind that its
+not exceed the number of bits of entropy in \(em never mind that its
.Sq entropy estimation
is essentially meaningless without a model for the physical processes
the system is observing.
@@ -571,7 +571,8 @@ But every cryptographic protocol in prac
PGP, etc., expands short secrets deterministically into long streams of
bits, and their security relies on conjectures that a computationally
bounded attacker cannot distinguish the long streams from uniform
-random. If we couldn't do that for
+random.
+If we couldn't do that for
.Fa /dev/random ,
it would be hopeless to assume we could for HTTPS, SSH, PGP, etc.
.Pp
