Module Name: src Committed By: msaitoh Date: Fri Mar 29 00:52:24 UTC 2013
Modified Files: src/doc [netbsd-6-0]: CHANGES-6.0.2 Log Message: ticket #859 To generate a diff of this commit: cvs rdiff -u -r1.1.2.24 -r1.1.2.25 src/doc/CHANGES-6.0.2 Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the copyright notices on the relevant files.
Modified files: Index: src/doc/CHANGES-6.0.2 diff -u src/doc/CHANGES-6.0.2:1.1.2.24 src/doc/CHANGES-6.0.2:1.1.2.25 --- src/doc/CHANGES-6.0.2:1.1.2.24 Fri Mar 15 18:52:53 2013 +++ src/doc/CHANGES-6.0.2 Fri Mar 29 00:52:23 2013 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $NetBSD: CHANGES-6.0.2,v 1.1.2.24 2013/03/15 18:52:53 riz Exp $ +# $NetBSD: CHANGES-6.0.2,v 1.1.2.25 2013/03/29 00:52:23 msaitoh Exp $ A complete list of changes from the NetBSD 6.0.1 release to the NetBSD 6.0.2 release: @@ -169,3 +169,21 @@ lib/libc/arch/alpha/gen/__setjmp14.S 1. such as those in /rescue. [martin, ticket #846] +sys/kern/subr_cprng.c 1.16 + + Re-fix 'fix' for SA-2013-003. Because the original fix evaluated a + flag backwards, in low-entropy conditions there was a time interval + in which /dev/urandom could still output bits on an unacceptably + short key. Output from /dev/random was *NOT* impacted. + + Eliminate the flag in question -- it's safest to always fill the + requested key buffer with output from the entropy-pool, even if we + let the caller know we couldn't provide bytes with the full entropy + it requested. + + Advisory will be updated soon with a full worst-case analysis of the + /dev/urandom output path in the presence of either variant of the + SA-2013-003 bug. Fortunately, because a large amount of other input + is mixed in before users can obtain any output, it doesn't look as + dangerous in practice as I'd feared it might be. + [tls, ticket #859]