Module Name: src
Committed By: maxv
Date: Fri Feb 13 17:50:48 UTC 2015
Modified Files:
src/share/man/man9: veriexec.9
src/sys/conf: files
Added Files:
src/sys/kern: kern_veriexec.c
Log Message:
Rename kern_verifiedexec.c to kern_veriexec.c. "Veriexec" is the name of
the subsystem, not "Verifiedexec".
The revisions of kern_verifiedexec.c are now in Attic/.
No change between kern_verifiedexec.c and kern_veriexec.c.
Also, update the man page accordingly.
Okayed by christos@ and blymn@ some months ago.
To generate a diff of this commit:
cvs rdiff -u -r1.27 -r1.28 src/share/man/man9/veriexec.9
cvs rdiff -u -r1.1127 -r1.1128 src/sys/conf/files
cvs rdiff -u -r0 -r1.1 src/sys/kern/kern_veriexec.c
Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the
copyright notices on the relevant files.
Modified files:
Index: src/share/man/man9/veriexec.9
diff -u src/share/man/man9/veriexec.9:1.27 src/share/man/man9/veriexec.9:1.28
--- src/share/man/man9/veriexec.9:1.27 Tue Mar 18 18:20:40 2014
+++ src/share/man/man9/veriexec.9 Fri Feb 13 17:50:48 2015
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $NetBSD: veriexec.9,v 1.27 2014/03/18 18:20:40 riastradh Exp $
+.\" $NetBSD: veriexec.9,v 1.28 2015/02/13 17:50:48 maxv Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright 2006 Elad Efrat <[email protected]>
.\" Copyright 2006 Brett Lymn <[email protected]>
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
.\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
.\" POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd March 18, 2011
+.Dd February 13, 2015
.Dt VERIEXEC 9
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ containing the filename.
.It Sy Path Purpose
.It src/sys/dev/verified_exec.c driver for userland communication
.It src/sys/sys/verified_exec.h shared (userland/kernel) header file
-.It src/sys/kern/kern_verifiedexec.c subsystem code
+.It src/sys/kern/kern_veriexec.c subsystem code
.It src/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c rename, remove, and unmount policies
.It src/sys/kern/vfs_vnops.c regular file access policy
.El
Index: src/sys/conf/files
diff -u src/sys/conf/files:1.1127 src/sys/conf/files:1.1128
--- src/sys/conf/files:1.1127 Tue Jan 27 21:34:43 2015
+++ src/sys/conf/files Fri Feb 13 17:50:48 2015
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $NetBSD: files,v 1.1127 2015/01/27 21:34:43 skrll Exp $
+# $NetBSD: files,v 1.1128 2015/02/13 17:50:48 maxv Exp $
# @(#)files.newconf 7.5 (Berkeley) 5/10/93
version 20141030
@@ -1422,7 +1422,7 @@ file dev/kttcp.c kttcp needs-flag
# Veriexec
defpseudo veriexec
-file kern/kern_verifiedexec.c veriexec
+file kern/kern_veriexec.c veriexec
file dev/verified_exec.c veriexec needs-flag
# isochronous pseudo device for IEEE 1394, i.LINK or FireWire
Added files:
Index: src/sys/kern/kern_veriexec.c
diff -u /dev/null src/sys/kern/kern_veriexec.c:1.1
--- /dev/null Fri Feb 13 17:50:48 2015
+++ src/sys/kern/kern_veriexec.c Fri Feb 13 17:50:48 2015
@@ -0,0 +1,1584 @@
+/* $NetBSD: kern_veriexec.c,v 1.1 2015/02/13 17:50:48 maxv Exp $ */
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2005, 2006 Elad Efrat <[email protected]>
+ * Copyright (c) 2005, 2006 Brett Lymn <[email protected]>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: kern_veriexec.c,v 1.1 2015/02/13 17:50:48 maxv Exp $");
+
+#include "opt_veriexec.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/kmem.h>
+#include <sys/vnode.h>
+#include <sys/namei.h>
+#include <sys/exec.h>
+#include <sys/once.h>
+#include <sys/proc.h>
+#include <sys/rwlock.h>
+#include <sys/syslog.h>
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+#include <sys/inttypes.h>
+#include <sys/verified_exec.h>
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__)
+# include <sys/systm.h>
+# include <sys/imgact.h>
+# include <crypto/sha1.h>
+# include <crypto/sha2/sha2.h>
+# include <crypto/ripemd160/rmd160.h>
+#else
+# include <sys/sha1.h>
+# include <sys/sha2.h>
+# include <sys/rmd160.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/md5.h>
+#include <uvm/uvm_extern.h>
+#include <sys/fileassoc.h>
+#include <sys/kauth.h>
+#include <sys/conf.h>
+#include <miscfs/specfs/specdev.h>
+#include <prop/proplib.h>
+#include <sys/fcntl.h>
+
+/* Readable values for veriexec_file_report(). */
+#define REPORT_ALWAYS 0x01 /* Always print */
+#define REPORT_VERBOSE 0x02 /* Print when verbose >= 1 */
+#define REPORT_DEBUG 0x04 /* Print when verbose >= 2 (debug) */
+#define REPORT_PANIC 0x08 /* Call panic() */
+#define REPORT_ALARM 0x10 /* Alarm - also print pid/uid/.. */
+#define REPORT_LOGMASK (REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_VERBOSE|REPORT_DEBUG)
+
+/* state of locking for veriexec_file_verify */
+#define VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED 0x00 /* Nothing locked, callee does it */
+#define VERIEXEC_LOCKED 0x01 /* Global op lock held */
+
+
+#define VERIEXEC_RW_UPGRADE(lock) while((rw_tryupgrade(lock)) == 0){};
+
+struct veriexec_fpops {
+ const char *type;
+ size_t hash_len;
+ size_t context_size;
+ veriexec_fpop_init_t init;
+ veriexec_fpop_update_t update;
+ veriexec_fpop_final_t final;
+ LIST_ENTRY(veriexec_fpops) entries;
+};
+
+/* Veriexec per-file entry data. */
+struct veriexec_file_entry {
+ krwlock_t lock; /* r/w lock */
+ u_char *filename; /* File name. */
+ u_char type; /* Entry type. */
+ u_char status; /* Evaluation status. */
+ u_char page_fp_status; /* Per-page FP status. */
+ u_char *fp; /* Fingerprint. */
+ void *page_fp; /* Per-page fingerprints */
+ size_t npages; /* Number of pages. */
+ size_t last_page_size; /* To support < PAGE_SIZE */
+ struct veriexec_fpops *ops; /* Fingerprint ops vector*/
+ size_t filename_len; /* Length of filename. */
+};
+
+/* Veriexec per-table data. */
+struct veriexec_table_entry {
+ uint64_t vte_count; /* Number of Veriexec entries. */
+ const struct sysctlnode *vte_node;
+};
+
+static int veriexec_verbose;
+static int veriexec_strict;
+static int veriexec_bypass = 1;
+
+static char *veriexec_fp_names = NULL;
+static size_t veriexec_name_max = 0;
+
+static const struct sysctlnode *veriexec_count_node;
+
+static fileassoc_t veriexec_hook;
+static specificdata_key_t veriexec_mountspecific_key;
+
+static LIST_HEAD(, veriexec_fpops) veriexec_fpops_list =
+ LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(veriexec_fpops_list);
+
+static int veriexec_raw_cb(kauth_cred_t, kauth_action_t, void *,
+ void *, void *, void *, void *);
+static struct veriexec_fpops *veriexec_fpops_lookup(const char *);
+static void veriexec_file_free(struct veriexec_file_entry *);
+
+static unsigned int veriexec_tablecount = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Veriexec operations global lock - most ops hold this as a read
+ * lock, it is upgraded to a write lock when destroying veriexec file
+ * table entries.
+ */
+static krwlock_t veriexec_op_lock;
+
+/*
+ * Sysctl helper routine for Veriexec.
+ */
+static int
+sysctl_kern_veriexec_algorithms(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ int error;
+ const char *p;
+
+ if (newp != NULL)
+ return EPERM;
+
+ if (namelen != 0)
+ return EINVAL;
+
+ p = veriexec_fp_names == NULL ? "" : veriexec_fp_names;
+
+ len = strlen(p) + 1;
+
+ if (*oldlenp < len && oldp)
+ return ENOMEM;
+
+ if (oldp && (error = copyout(p, oldp, len)) != 0)
+ return error;
+
+ *oldlenp = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sysctl_kern_veriexec_strict(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
+{
+ struct sysctlnode node;
+ int error, newval;
+
+ node = *rnode;
+ node.sysctl_data = &newval;
+
+ newval = veriexec_strict;
+ error = sysctl_lookup(SYSCTLFN_CALL(&node));
+ if (error || newp == NULL)
+ return error;
+
+ if (newval < veriexec_strict)
+ return EPERM;
+
+ veriexec_strict = newval;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SYSCTL_SETUP(sysctl_kern_veriexec_setup, "sysctl kern.veriexec setup")
+{
+ const struct sysctlnode *rnode = NULL;
+
+ sysctl_createv(clog, 0, NULL, &rnode,
+ CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
+ CTLTYPE_NODE, "veriexec",
+ SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec"),
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ CTL_KERN, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
+
+ sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
+ CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE,
+ CTLTYPE_INT, "verbose",
+ SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec verbose level"),
+ NULL, 0, &veriexec_verbose, 0,
+ CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
+ sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
+ CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE,
+ CTLTYPE_INT, "strict",
+ SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec strict level"),
+ sysctl_kern_veriexec_strict, 0, NULL, 0,
+ CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
+ sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
+ CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
+ CTLTYPE_STRING, "algorithms",
+ SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec supported hashing "
+ "algorithms"),
+ sysctl_kern_veriexec_algorithms, 0, NULL, 0,
+ CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
+ sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, &veriexec_count_node,
+ CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
+ CTLTYPE_NODE, "count",
+ SYSCTL_DESCR("Number of fingerprints on mount(s)"),
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add ops to the fignerprint ops vector list.
+ */
+int
+veriexec_fpops_add(const char *fp_type, size_t hash_len, size_t ctx_size,
+ veriexec_fpop_init_t init, veriexec_fpop_update_t update,
+ veriexec_fpop_final_t final)
+{
+ struct veriexec_fpops *ops;
+
+ /* Sanity check all parameters. */
+ if ((fp_type == NULL) || (hash_len == 0) || (ctx_size == 0) ||
+ (init == NULL) || (update == NULL) || (final == NULL))
+ return (EFAULT);
+
+ if (veriexec_fpops_lookup(fp_type) != NULL)
+ return (EEXIST);
+
+ ops = kmem_alloc(sizeof(*ops), KM_SLEEP);
+
+ ops->type = fp_type;
+ ops->hash_len = hash_len;
+ ops->context_size = ctx_size;
+ ops->init = init;
+ ops->update = update;
+ ops->final = final;
+
+ LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&veriexec_fpops_list, ops, entries);
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have space for any names, allocate enough for six
+ * which should be sufficient. (it's also enough for all algorithms
+ * we can support at the moment)
+ */
+ if (veriexec_fp_names == NULL) {
+ veriexec_name_max = 64;
+ veriexec_fp_names = kmem_zalloc(veriexec_name_max, KM_SLEEP);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we're running out of space for storing supported algorithms,
+ * extend the buffer with space for four names.
+ */
+ while (veriexec_name_max - (strlen(veriexec_fp_names) + 1) <
+ strlen(fp_type)) {
+ char *newp;
+ unsigned int new_max;
+
+ /* Add space for four algorithm names. */
+ new_max = veriexec_name_max + 64;
+ newp = kmem_zalloc(new_max, KM_SLEEP);
+ strlcpy(newp, veriexec_fp_names, new_max);
+ kmem_free(veriexec_fp_names, veriexec_name_max);
+ veriexec_fp_names = newp;
+ veriexec_name_max = new_max;
+ }
+
+ if (*veriexec_fp_names != '\0')
+ strlcat(veriexec_fp_names, " ", veriexec_name_max);
+
+ strlcat(veriexec_fp_names, fp_type, veriexec_name_max);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static void
+veriexec_mountspecific_dtor(void *v)
+{
+ struct veriexec_table_entry *vte = v;
+
+ if (vte == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+ sysctl_free(__UNCONST(vte->vte_node));
+ veriexec_tablecount--;
+ kmem_free(vte, sizeof(*vte));
+}
+
+static int
+veriexec_listener_cb(kauth_cred_t cred, kauth_action_t action, void *cookie,
+ void *arg0, void *arg1, void *arg2, void *arg3)
+{
+ int result;
+ enum kauth_system_req req;
+
+ if (action != KAUTH_SYSTEM_VERIEXEC)
+ return KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
+
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
+ req = (enum kauth_system_req)arg0;
+
+ if (req == KAUTH_REQ_SYSTEM_VERIEXEC_MODIFY &&
+ veriexec_strict > VERIEXEC_LEARNING) {
+ log(LOG_WARNING, "Veriexec: Strict mode, modifying "
+ "tables not permitted.\n");
+
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise Veriexec.
+ */
+void
+veriexec_init(void)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ /* Register a fileassoc for Veriexec. */
+ error = fileassoc_register("veriexec",
+ (fileassoc_cleanup_cb_t)veriexec_file_free, &veriexec_hook);
+ if (error)
+ panic("Veriexec: Can't register fileassoc: error=%d", error);
+
+ /* Register listener to handle raw disk access. */
+ if (kauth_listen_scope(KAUTH_SCOPE_DEVICE, veriexec_raw_cb, NULL) ==
+ NULL)
+ panic("Veriexec: Can't listen on device scope");
+
+ error = mount_specific_key_create(&veriexec_mountspecific_key,
+ veriexec_mountspecific_dtor);
+ if (error)
+ panic("Veriexec: Can't create mountspecific key");
+
+ if (kauth_listen_scope(KAUTH_SCOPE_SYSTEM, veriexec_listener_cb,
+ NULL) == NULL)
+ panic("Veriexec: Can't listen on system scope");
+
+ rw_init(&veriexec_op_lock);
+
+#define FPOPS_ADD(a, b, c, d, e, f) \
+ veriexec_fpops_add(a, b, c, (veriexec_fpop_init_t)d, \
+ (veriexec_fpop_update_t)e, (veriexec_fpop_final_t)f)
+
+#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_RMD160
+ FPOPS_ADD("RMD160", RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(RMD160_CTX),
+ RMD160Init, RMD160Update, RMD160Final);
+#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_RMD160 */
+
+#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA256
+ FPOPS_ADD("SHA256", SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA256_CTX),
+ SHA256_Init, SHA256_Update, SHA256_Final);
+#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA256 */
+
+#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA384
+ FPOPS_ADD("SHA384", SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA384_CTX),
+ SHA384_Init, SHA384_Update, SHA384_Final);
+#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA384 */
+
+#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA512
+ FPOPS_ADD("SHA512", SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA512_CTX),
+ SHA512_Init, SHA512_Update, SHA512_Final);
+#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA512 */
+
+#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA1
+ FPOPS_ADD("SHA1", SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA1_CTX),
+ SHA1Init, SHA1Update, SHA1Final);
+#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA1 */
+
+#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_MD5
+ FPOPS_ADD("MD5", MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(MD5_CTX),
+ MD5Init, MD5Update, MD5Final);
+#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_MD5 */
+
+#undef FPOPS_ADD
+}
+
+static struct veriexec_fpops *
+veriexec_fpops_lookup(const char *name)
+{
+ struct veriexec_fpops *ops;
+
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ LIST_FOREACH(ops, &veriexec_fpops_list, entries) {
+ if (strcasecmp(name, ops->type) == 0)
+ return (ops);
+ }
+
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate fingerprint. Information on hash length and routines used is
+ * extracted from veriexec_hash_list according to the hash type.
+ *
+ * NOTE: vfe is assumed to be locked for writing on entry.
+ */
+static int
+veriexec_fp_calc(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, int lock_state,
+ struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, u_char *fp)
+{
+ struct vattr va;
+ void *ctx, *page_ctx;
+ u_char *buf, *page_fp;
+ off_t offset, len;
+ size_t resid, npages;
+ int error, do_perpage, pagen;
+
+ if (lock_state == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
+ vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
+ error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, l->l_cred);
+ if (lock_state == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
+ VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+
+#ifdef notyet /* XXX - for now */
+ if ((vfe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED) &&
+ (vfe->page_fp_status == PAGE_FP_NONE))
+ do_perpage = 1;
+ else
+#endif /* notyet */
+ do_perpage = 0;
+
+ ctx = kmem_alloc(vfe->ops->context_size, KM_SLEEP);
+ buf = kmem_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, KM_SLEEP);
+
+ page_ctx = NULL;
+ page_fp = NULL;
+ npages = 0;
+ if (do_perpage) {
+ npages = (va.va_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1;
+ page_fp = kmem_alloc(vfe->ops->hash_len * npages, KM_SLEEP);
+ vfe->page_fp = page_fp;
+ page_ctx = kmem_alloc(vfe->ops->context_size, KM_SLEEP);
+ }
+
+ (vfe->ops->init)(ctx);
+
+ len = 0;
+ error = 0;
+ pagen = 0;
+ for (offset = 0; offset < va.va_size; offset += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ len = ((va.va_size - offset) < PAGE_SIZE) ?
+ (va.va_size - offset) : PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, vp, buf, len, offset,
+ UIO_SYSSPACE,
+ ((lock_state == VERIEXEC_LOCKED)?
+ IO_NODELOCKED : 0),
+ l->l_cred, &resid, NULL);
+
+ if (error) {
+ if (do_perpage) {
+ kmem_free(vfe->page_fp,
+ vfe->ops->hash_len * npages);
+ vfe->page_fp = NULL;
+ }
+
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ (vfe->ops->update)(ctx, buf, (unsigned int) len);
+
+ if (do_perpage) {
+ (vfe->ops->init)(page_ctx);
+ (vfe->ops->update)(page_ctx, buf, (unsigned int)len);
+ (vfe->ops->final)(page_fp, page_ctx);
+
+ if (veriexec_verbose >= 2) {
+ int i;
+
+ printf("hash for page %d: ", pagen);
+ for (i = 0; i < vfe->ops->hash_len; i++)
+ printf("%02x", page_fp[i]);
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ page_fp += vfe->ops->hash_len;
+ pagen++;
+ }
+
+ if (len != PAGE_SIZE)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ (vfe->ops->final)(fp, ctx);
+
+ if (do_perpage) {
+ vfe->last_page_size = len;
+ vfe->page_fp_status = PAGE_FP_READY;
+ vfe->npages = npages;
+ }
+
+bad:
+ if (do_perpage)
+ kmem_free(page_ctx, vfe->ops->context_size);
+
+ kmem_free(ctx, vfe->ops->context_size);
+ kmem_free(buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/* Compare two fingerprints of the same type. */
+static int
+veriexec_fp_cmp(struct veriexec_fpops *ops, u_char *fp1, u_char *fp2)
+{
+ if (veriexec_verbose >= 2) {
+ int i;
+
+ printf("comparing hashes...\n");
+ printf("fp1: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < ops->hash_len; i++) {
+ printf("%02x", fp1[i]);
+ }
+ printf("\nfp2: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < ops->hash_len; i++) {
+ printf("%02x", fp2[i]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return (memcmp(fp1, fp2, ops->hash_len));
+}
+
+static struct veriexec_table_entry *
+veriexec_table_lookup(struct mount *mp)
+{
+ /* XXX: From raidframe init */
+ if (mp == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return mount_getspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key);
+}
+
+static struct veriexec_file_entry *
+veriexec_get(struct vnode *vp)
+{
+ return (fileassoc_lookup(vp, veriexec_hook));
+}
+
+bool
+veriexec_lookup(struct vnode *vp)
+{
+ return (veriexec_get(vp) == NULL ? false : true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Routine for maintaining mostly consistent message formats in Veriexec.
+ */
+static void
+veriexec_file_report(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, const u_char *msg,
+ const u_char *filename, struct lwp *l, int f)
+{
+ if (vfe != NULL && vfe->filename != NULL)
+ filename = vfe->filename;
+
+ if (filename == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (((f & REPORT_LOGMASK) >> 1) <= veriexec_verbose) {
+ if (!(f & REPORT_ALARM) || (l == NULL))
+ log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: %s [%s]\n", msg,
+ filename);
+ else
+ log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: %s [%s, prog=%s pid=%u, "
+ "uid=%u, gid=%u]\n", msg, filename,
+ l->l_proc->p_comm, l->l_proc->p_pid,
+ kauth_cred_getuid(l->l_cred),
+ kauth_cred_getgid(l->l_cred));
+ }
+
+ if (f & REPORT_PANIC)
+ panic("Veriexec: Unrecoverable error.");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the fingerprint of the given file. If we're called directly from
+ * sys_execve(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_DIRECT. If we're called from
+ * exec_script(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_INDIRECT. If we are called from
+ * vn_open(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_FILE.
+ *
+ * NOTE: The veriexec file entry pointer (vfep) will be returned LOCKED
+ * on no error.
+ */
+static int
+veriexec_file_verify(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const u_char *name,
+ int flag, int lockstate, struct veriexec_file_entry **vfep)
+{
+ struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
+ int error;
+
+#define VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe) ((vfe->status == FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL) || \
+ (vfe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED))
+
+ if (vfep != NULL)
+ *vfep = NULL;
+
+ if (vp->v_type != VREG)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (lockstate == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
+ rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
+
+ /* Lookup veriexec table entry, save pointer if requested. */
+ vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
+ if (vfep != NULL)
+ *vfep = vfe;
+ if (vfe == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ error = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Grab the lock for the entry, if we need to do an evaluation
+ * then the lock is a write lock, after we have the write
+ * lock, check if we really need it - some other thread may
+ * have already done the work for us.
+ */
+ if (VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe)) {
+ rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_WRITER);
+ if (!VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe))
+ rw_downgrade(&vfe->lock);
+ } else
+ rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_READER);
+
+ /* Evaluate fingerprint if needed. */
+ if (VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe)) {
+ u_char *digest;
+
+ /* Calculate fingerprint for on-disk file. */
+ digest = kmem_zalloc(vfe->ops->hash_len, KM_SLEEP);
+
+ error = veriexec_fp_calc(l, vp, lockstate, vfe, digest);
+ if (error) {
+ veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Fingerprint calculation error.",
+ name, NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS);
+ kmem_free(digest, vfe->ops->hash_len);
+ rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
+ if (lockstate == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ return (error);
+ }
+
+ /* Compare fingerprint with loaded data. */
+ if (veriexec_fp_cmp(vfe->ops, vfe->fp, digest) == 0)
+ vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_VALID;
+ else
+ vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH;
+
+ kmem_free(digest, vfe->ops->hash_len);
+ rw_downgrade(&vfe->lock);
+ }
+
+ if (!(vfe->type & flag)) {
+ veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Incorrect access type.", name, l,
+ REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
+
+ /* IPS mode: Enforce access type. */
+ if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS) {
+ rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
+ if (lockstate == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ return (EPERM);
+ }
+ }
+
+ out:
+ /* No entry in the veriexec tables. */
+ if (vfe == NULL) {
+ veriexec_file_report(NULL, "No entry.", name,
+ l, REPORT_VERBOSE);
+
+ if (lockstate == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ /*
+ * Lockdown mode: Deny access to non-monitored files.
+ * IPS mode: Deny execution of non-monitored files.
+ */
+ if ((veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) ||
+ ((veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS) &&
+ (flag != VERIEXEC_FILE)))
+ return (EPERM);
+
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ switch (vfe->status) {
+ case FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL:
+ /* Should not happen. */
+ rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
+ if (lockstate == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Not-evaluated status "
+ "post evaluation; inconsistency detected.", name,
+ NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_PANIC);
+
+ /*NOTREACHED*/
+
+ case FINGERPRINT_VALID:
+ /* Valid fingerprint. */
+ veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Match.", name, NULL,
+ REPORT_VERBOSE);
+
+ break;
+
+ case FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH:
+ /* Fingerprint mismatch. */
+ veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Mismatch.", name,
+ NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
+
+ /* IDS mode: Deny access on fingerprint mismatch. */
+ if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IDS) {
+ rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
+ error = EPERM;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* Should never happen. */
+ rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
+ if (lockstate == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Invalid status "
+ "post evaluation.", name, NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_PANIC);
+ }
+
+ if (lockstate == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+veriexec_verify(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const u_char *name, int flag,
+ bool *found)
+{
+ struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
+ int r;
+
+ if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
+ return 0;
+
+ r = veriexec_file_verify(l, vp, name, flag, VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED, &vfe);
+
+ if ((r == 0) && (vfe != NULL))
+ rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
+
+ if (found != NULL)
+ *found = (vfe != NULL) ? true : false;
+
+ return (r);
+}
+
+#ifdef notyet
+/*
+ * Evaluate per-page fingerprints.
+ */
+int
+veriexec_page_verify(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, struct vm_page *pg,
+ size_t idx, struct lwp *l)
+{
+ void *ctx;
+ u_char *fp;
+ u_char *page_fp;
+ int error;
+ vaddr_t kva;
+
+ if (vfe->page_fp_status == PAGE_FP_NONE)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (vfe->page_fp_status == PAGE_FP_FAIL)
+ return (EPERM);
+
+ if (idx >= vfe->npages)
+ return (0);
+
+ ctx = kmem_alloc(vfe->ops->context_size, KM_SLEEP);
+ fp = kmem_alloc(vfe->ops->hash_len, KM_SLEEP);
+ kva = uvm_km_alloc(kernel_map, PAGE_SIZE, VM_PGCOLOR_BUCKET(pg),
+ UVM_KMF_COLORMATCH | UVM_KMF_VAONLY | UVM_KMF_WAITVA);
+ pmap_kenter_pa(kva, VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(pg), VM_PROT_READ, 0);
+ pmap_update(pmap_kernel());
+
+ page_fp = (u_char *) vfe->page_fp + (vfe->ops->hash_len * idx);
+ (vfe->ops->init)(ctx);
+ (vfe->ops->update)(ctx, (void *) kva,
+ ((vfe->npages - 1) == idx) ? vfe->last_page_size
+ : PAGE_SIZE);
+ (vfe->ops->final)(fp, ctx);
+
+ pmap_kremove(kva, PAGE_SIZE);
+ pmap_update(pmap_kernel());
+ uvm_km_free(kernel_map, kva, PAGE_SIZE, UVM_KMF_VAONLY);
+
+ error = veriexec_fp_cmp(vfe->ops, page_fp, fp);
+ if (error) {
+ const char *msg;
+
+ if (veriexec_strict > VERIEXEC_LEARNING) {
+ msg = "Pages modified: Killing process.";
+ } else {
+ msg = "Pages modified.";
+ error = 0;
+ }
+
+ veriexec_file_report(msg, "[page_in]", l,
+ REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
+
+ if (error) {
+ ksiginfo_t ksi;
+
+ KSI_INIT(&ksi);
+ ksi.ksi_signo = SIGKILL;
+ ksi.ksi_code = SI_NOINFO;
+ ksi.ksi_pid = l->l_proc->p_pid;
+ ksi.ksi_uid = 0;
+
+ kpsignal(l->l_proc, &ksi, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ kmem_free(ctx, vfe->ops->context_size);
+ kmem_free(fp, vfe->ops->hash_len);
+
+ return (error);
+}
+#endif /* notyet */
+
+/*
+ * Veriexec remove policy code.
+ */
+int
+veriexec_removechk(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *pathbuf)
+{
+ struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
+ int error;
+
+ if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
+ return 0;
+
+ rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
+
+ vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+
+ if (vfe == NULL) {
+ /* Lockdown mode: Deny access to non-monitored files. */
+ if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN)
+ return (EPERM);
+
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Remove request.", pathbuf, l,
+ REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
+
+ /* IDS mode: Deny removal of monitored files. */
+ if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IDS)
+ error = EPERM;
+ else
+ error = veriexec_file_delete(l, vp);
+
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Veriexec rename policy.
+ *
+ * XXX: Once there's a way to hook after a successful rename, it would be
+ * XXX: nice to update vfe->filename to the new name if it's not NULL and
+ * XXX: the new name is absolute (ie., starts with a slash).
+ */
+int
+veriexec_renamechk(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *fromvp, const char *fromname,
+ struct vnode *tovp, const char *toname)
+{
+ struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, *tvfe;
+
+ if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
+ return 0;
+
+ rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
+
+ if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) {
+ log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing rename of `%s' to "
+ "`%s', uid=%u, pid=%u: Lockdown mode.\n", fromname, toname,
+ kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred), l->l_proc->p_pid);
+
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ return (EPERM);
+ }
+
+ vfe = veriexec_get(fromvp);
+ tvfe = NULL;
+ if (tovp != NULL)
+ tvfe = veriexec_get(tovp);
+
+ if ((vfe != NULL) || (tvfe != NULL)) {
+ if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS) {
+ log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing rename of `%s' "
+ "to `%s', uid=%u, pid=%u: IPS mode, %s "
+ "monitored.\n", fromname, toname,
+ kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred),
+ l->l_proc->p_pid, (vfe != NULL && tvfe != NULL) ?
+ "files" : "file");
+
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ return (EPERM);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Monitored file is renamed; filename no longer relevant.
+ *
+ * XXX: We could keep the buffer, and when (and if) updating the
+ * XXX: filename post-rename, re-allocate it only if it's not
+ * XXX: big enough for the new filename.
+ */
+ if (vfe != NULL) {
+ /* XXXX get write lock on vfe here? */
+
+ VERIEXEC_RW_UPGRADE(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ /* once we have the op lock in write mode
+ * there should be no locks on any file
+ * entries so we can destroy the object.
+ */
+
+ if (vfe->filename_len > 0)
+ kmem_free(vfe->filename, vfe->filename_len);
+
+ vfe->filename = NULL;
+ vfe->filename_len = 0;
+
+ rw_downgrade(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ }
+
+ log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: %s file `%s' renamed to "
+ "%s file `%s', uid=%u, pid=%u.\n", (vfe != NULL) ?
+ "Monitored" : "Non-monitored", fromname, (tvfe != NULL) ?
+ "monitored" : "non-monitored", toname,
+ kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred), l->l_proc->p_pid);
+
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Monitored file is overwritten. Remove the entry.
+ */
+ if (tvfe != NULL)
+ (void)veriexec_file_delete(l, tovp);
+
+ } else
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static void
+veriexec_file_free(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe)
+{
+ if (vfe != NULL) {
+ if (vfe->fp != NULL)
+ kmem_free(vfe->fp, vfe->ops->hash_len);
+ if (vfe->page_fp != NULL)
+ kmem_free(vfe->page_fp, vfe->ops->hash_len);
+ if (vfe->filename != NULL)
+ kmem_free(vfe->filename, vfe->filename_len);
+ rw_destroy(&vfe->lock);
+ kmem_free(vfe, sizeof(*vfe));
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+veriexec_file_purge(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, int have_lock)
+{
+ if (vfe == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (have_lock == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
+ rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_WRITER);
+ else
+ VERIEXEC_RW_UPGRADE(&vfe->lock);
+
+ vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL;
+ if (have_lock == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
+ rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
+ else
+ rw_downgrade(&vfe->lock);
+}
+
+static void
+veriexec_file_purge_cb(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, void *cookie)
+{
+ veriexec_file_purge(vfe, VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invalidate a Veriexec file entry.
+ * XXX: This should be updated when per-page fingerprints are added.
+ */
+void
+veriexec_purge(struct vnode *vp)
+{
+
+ rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
+ veriexec_file_purge(veriexec_get(vp), VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED);
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enforce raw disk access policy.
+ *
+ * IDS mode: Invalidate fingerprints on a mount if it's opened for writing.
+ * IPS mode: Don't allow raw writing to disks we monitor.
+ * Lockdown mode: Don't allow raw writing to all disks.
+ *
+ * XXX: This is bogus. There's an obvious race condition between the time
+ * XXX: the disk is open for writing, in which an attacker can access a
+ * XXX: monitored file to get its signature cached again, and when the raw
+ * XXX: file is overwritten on disk.
+ * XXX:
+ * XXX: To solve this, we need something like the following:
+ * XXX: open raw disk:
+ * XXX: - raise refcount,
+ * XXX: - invalidate fingerprints,
+ * XXX: - mark all entries for that disk with "no cache" flag
+ * XXX:
+ * XXX: veriexec_verify:
+ * XXX: - if "no cache", don't cache evaluation result
+ * XXX:
+ * XXX: close raw disk:
+ * XXX: - lower refcount,
+ * XXX: - if refcount == 0, remove "no cache" flag from all entries
+ */
+static int
+veriexec_raw_cb(kauth_cred_t cred, kauth_action_t action, void *cookie,
+ void *arg0, void *arg1, void *arg2, void *arg3)
+{
+ int result;
+ enum kauth_device_req req;
+ struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
+
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
+ req = (enum kauth_device_req)arg0;
+
+ switch (action) {
+ case KAUTH_DEVICE_RAWIO_SPEC: {
+ struct vnode *vp, *bvp;
+ int error;
+
+ if (req == KAUTH_REQ_DEVICE_RAWIO_SPEC_READ) {
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ vp = arg1;
+ KASSERT(vp != NULL);
+
+ /* Handle /dev/mem and /dev/kmem. */
+ if (iskmemvp(vp)) {
+ if (veriexec_strict < VERIEXEC_IPS)
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ error = rawdev_mounted(vp, &bvp);
+ if (error == EINVAL) {
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: See vfs_mountedon() comment in rawdev_mounted().
+ */
+ vte = veriexec_table_lookup(bvp->v_mount);
+ if (vte == NULL) {
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (veriexec_strict) {
+ case VERIEXEC_LEARNING:
+ case VERIEXEC_IDS:
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
+
+ rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_WRITER);
+ fileassoc_table_run(bvp->v_mount, veriexec_hook,
+ (fileassoc_cb_t)veriexec_file_purge_cb, NULL);
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+
+ break;
+ case VERIEXEC_IPS:
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
+ break;
+ case VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN:
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case KAUTH_DEVICE_RAWIO_PASSTHRU:
+ /* XXX What can we do here? */
+ if (veriexec_strict < VERIEXEC_IPS)
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return (result);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a new Veriexec table.
+ */
+static struct veriexec_table_entry *
+veriexec_table_add(struct lwp *l, struct mount *mp)
+{
+ struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
+ u_char buf[16];
+
+ vte = kmem_zalloc(sizeof(*vte), KM_SLEEP);
+ mount_setspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key, vte);
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "table%u", veriexec_tablecount++);
+ sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &veriexec_count_node, &vte->vte_node,
+ 0, CTLTYPE_NODE, buf, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
+ 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
+
+ sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
+ CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_STRING, "mntpt",
+ NULL, NULL, 0, mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname,
+ 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
+ sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
+ CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_STRING, "fstype",
+ NULL, NULL, 0, mp->mnt_stat.f_fstypename,
+ 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
+ sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
+ CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_QUAD, "nentries",
+ NULL, NULL, 0, &vte->vte_count, 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
+
+ return (vte);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a file to be monitored by Veriexec.
+ *
+ * Expected elements in dict: file, fp, fp-type, entry-type.
+ */
+int
+veriexec_file_add(struct lwp *l, prop_dictionary_t dict)
+{
+ struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
+ struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe = NULL, *hh;
+ struct vnode *vp;
+ const char *file, *fp_type;
+ int error;
+
+ if (!prop_dictionary_get_cstring_nocopy(dict, "file", &file))
+ return (EINVAL);
+
+ error = namei_simple_kernel(file, NSM_FOLLOW_NOEMULROOT, &vp);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+
+ /* Add only regular files. */
+ if (vp->v_type != VREG) {
+ log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Not adding `%s': Not a regular file.\n",
+ file);
+
+ error = EBADF;
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ vfe = kmem_zalloc(sizeof(*vfe), KM_SLEEP);
+
+ rw_init(&vfe->lock);
+
+ /* Lookup fingerprint hashing algorithm. */
+ fp_type = prop_string_cstring_nocopy(prop_dictionary_get(dict,
+ "fp-type"));
+ if ((vfe->ops = veriexec_fpops_lookup(fp_type)) == NULL) {
+ log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Invalid or unknown fingerprint type "
+ "`%s' for file `%s'.\n", fp_type, file);
+
+ error = EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (prop_data_size(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "fp")) !=
+ vfe->ops->hash_len) {
+ log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Bad fingerprint length for `%s'.\n",
+ file);
+
+ error = EINVAL;
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ vfe->fp = kmem_alloc(vfe->ops->hash_len, KM_SLEEP);
+ memcpy(vfe->fp, prop_data_data_nocopy(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "fp")),
+ vfe->ops->hash_len);
+
+ rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_WRITER);
+
+ /*
+ * See if we already have an entry for this file. If we do, then
+ * let the user know and silently pretend to succeed.
+ */
+ hh = veriexec_get(vp);
+ if (hh != NULL) {
+ bool fp_mismatch;
+
+ if (strcmp(vfe->ops->type, fp_type) ||
+ memcmp(hh->fp, vfe->fp, hh->ops->hash_len))
+ fp_mismatch = true;
+ else
+ fp_mismatch = false;
+
+ if ((veriexec_verbose >= 1) || fp_mismatch)
+ log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: Duplicate entry for `%s' "
+ "ignored. (%s fingerprint)\n", file,
+ fp_mismatch ? "different" : "same");
+
+ veriexec_file_free(vfe);
+
+ /* XXX Should this be EEXIST if fp_mismatch is true? */
+ error = 0;
+
+ goto unlock_out;
+ }
+
+ /* Continue entry initialization. */
+ if (prop_dictionary_get_uint8(dict, "entry-type", &vfe->type) == FALSE)
+ vfe->type = 0;
+ else {
+ uint8_t extra_flags;
+
+ extra_flags = vfe->type & ~(VERIEXEC_DIRECT |
+ VERIEXEC_INDIRECT | VERIEXEC_FILE | VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED);
+ if (extra_flags) {
+ log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: Contaminated flags `0x%x' "
+ "for `%s', skipping.\n", extra_flags, file);
+
+ error = EINVAL;
+
+ goto unlock_out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(vfe->type & (VERIEXEC_DIRECT | VERIEXEC_INDIRECT |
+ VERIEXEC_FILE)))
+ vfe->type |= VERIEXEC_DIRECT;
+
+ vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL;
+ if (prop_bool_true(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "keep-filename"))) {
+ vfe->filename_len = strlen(file) + 1;
+ vfe->filename = kmem_alloc(vfe->filename_len, KM_SLEEP);
+ strlcpy(vfe->filename, file, vfe->filename_len);
+ } else
+ vfe->filename = NULL;
+
+ vfe->page_fp = NULL;
+ vfe->page_fp_status = PAGE_FP_NONE;
+ vfe->npages = 0;
+ vfe->last_page_size = 0;
+
+ if (prop_bool_true(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "eval-on-load")) ||
+ (vfe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED)) {
+ u_char *digest;
+
+ digest = kmem_zalloc(vfe->ops->hash_len, KM_SLEEP);
+
+ error = veriexec_fp_calc(l, vp, VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED,
+ vfe, digest);
+ if (error) {
+ kmem_free(digest, vfe->ops->hash_len);
+ goto unlock_out;
+ }
+
+ if (veriexec_fp_cmp(vfe->ops, vfe->fp, digest) == 0)
+ vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_VALID;
+ else
+ vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH;
+
+ kmem_free(digest, vfe->ops->hash_len);
+ }
+
+ vte = veriexec_table_lookup(vp->v_mount);
+ if (vte == NULL)
+ vte = veriexec_table_add(l, vp->v_mount);
+
+ /* XXX if we bail below this, we might want to gc newly created vtes. */
+
+ error = fileassoc_add(vp, veriexec_hook, vfe);
+ if (error)
+ goto unlock_out;
+
+ vte->vte_count++;
+
+ veriexec_file_report(NULL, "New entry.", file, NULL, REPORT_DEBUG);
+ veriexec_bypass = 0;
+
+ unlock_out:
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+
+ out:
+ vrele(vp);
+ if (error)
+ veriexec_file_free(vfe);
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+veriexec_table_delete(struct lwp *l, struct mount *mp) {
+ struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
+
+ vte = veriexec_table_lookup(mp);
+ if (vte == NULL)
+ return (ENOENT);
+
+ veriexec_mountspecific_dtor(vte);
+ mount_setspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key, NULL);
+
+ return (fileassoc_table_clear(mp, veriexec_hook));
+}
+
+int
+veriexec_file_delete(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp) {
+ struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
+ int error;
+
+ vte = veriexec_table_lookup(vp->v_mount);
+ if (vte == NULL)
+ return (ENOENT);
+
+ rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_WRITER);
+ error = fileassoc_clear(vp, veriexec_hook);
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ if (!error)
+ vte->vte_count--;
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert Veriexec entry data to a dictionary readable by userland tools.
+ */
+static void
+veriexec_file_convert(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, prop_dictionary_t rdict)
+{
+ if (vfe->filename)
+ prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "file",
+ prop_string_create_cstring(vfe->filename));
+ prop_dictionary_set_uint8(rdict, "entry-type", vfe->type);
+ prop_dictionary_set_uint8(rdict, "status", vfe->status);
+ prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "fp-type",
+ prop_string_create_cstring(vfe->ops->type));
+ prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "fp",
+ prop_data_create_data(vfe->fp, vfe->ops->hash_len));
+}
+
+int
+veriexec_convert(struct vnode *vp, prop_dictionary_t rdict)
+{
+ struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
+
+ rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
+
+ vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
+ if (vfe == NULL) {
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ return (ENOENT);
+ }
+
+ rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_READER);
+ veriexec_file_convert(vfe, rdict);
+
+ rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+veriexec_unmountchk(struct mount *mp)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ if ((veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
+ || doing_shutdown)
+ return (0);
+
+ rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
+
+ switch (veriexec_strict) {
+ case VERIEXEC_LEARNING:
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case VERIEXEC_IDS:
+ if (veriexec_table_lookup(mp) != NULL) {
+ log(LOG_INFO, "Veriexec: IDS mode, allowing unmount "
+ "of \"%s\".\n", mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
+ }
+
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case VERIEXEC_IPS: {
+ struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
+
+ vte = veriexec_table_lookup(mp);
+ if ((vte != NULL) && (vte->vte_count > 0)) {
+ log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: IPS mode, preventing"
+ " unmount of \"%s\" with monitored files.\n",
+ mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
+
+ error = EPERM;
+ } else
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN:
+ default:
+ log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Lockdown mode, preventing unmount "
+ "of \"%s\".\n", mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
+ error = EPERM;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+veriexec_openchk(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *path, int fmode)
+{
+ struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe = NULL;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (vp == NULL) {
+ /* If no creation requested, let this fail normally. */
+ if (!(fmode & O_CREAT))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Lockdown mode: Prevent creation of new files. */
+ if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) {
+ log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing new file "
+ "creation in `%s'.\n", path);
+ error = EPERM;
+ }
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
+ error = veriexec_file_verify(l, vp, path, VERIEXEC_FILE,
+ VERIEXEC_LOCKED, &vfe);
+
+ if (error) {
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((vfe != NULL) && ((fmode & FWRITE) || (fmode & O_TRUNC))) {
+ veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Write access request.", path, l,
+ REPORT_ALWAYS | REPORT_ALARM);
+
+ /* IPS mode: Deny write access to monitored files. */
+ if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS)
+ error = EPERM;
+ else
+ veriexec_file_purge(vfe, VERIEXEC_LOCKED);
+ }
+
+ if (vfe != NULL)
+ rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
+
+ rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
+ out:
+ return (error);
+}
+
+static void
+veriexec_file_dump(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, prop_array_t entries)
+{
+ prop_dictionary_t entry;
+
+ /* If we don't have a filename, this is meaningless. */
+ if (vfe->filename == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ entry = prop_dictionary_create();
+
+ veriexec_file_convert(vfe, entry);
+
+ prop_array_add(entries, entry);
+}
+
+int
+veriexec_dump(struct lwp *l, prop_array_t rarray)
+{
+ struct mount *mp, *nmp;
+
+ mutex_enter(&mountlist_lock);
+ for (mp = TAILQ_FIRST(&mountlist); mp != NULL; mp = nmp) {
+ /* If it fails, the file-system is [being] unmounted. */
+ if (vfs_busy(mp, &nmp) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ fileassoc_table_run(mp, veriexec_hook,
+ (fileassoc_cb_t)veriexec_file_dump, rarray);
+
+ vfs_unbusy(mp, false, &nmp);
+ }
+ mutex_exit(&mountlist_lock);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+veriexec_flush(struct lwp *l)
+{
+ struct mount *mp, *nmp;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ mutex_enter(&mountlist_lock);
+ for (mp = TAILQ_FIRST(&mountlist); mp != NULL; mp = nmp) {
+ int lerror;
+
+ /* If it fails, the file-system is [being] unmounted. */
+ if (vfs_busy(mp, &nmp) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ lerror = veriexec_table_delete(l, mp);
+ if (lerror && lerror != ENOENT)
+ error = lerror;
+
+ vfs_unbusy(mp, false, &nmp);
+ }
+ mutex_exit(&mountlist_lock);
+
+ return (error);
+}
