CVSROOT: /cvs
Module name: src
Changes by: [email protected] 2026/09/18 19:14:47
Modified files:
lib/libtls : tls_ocsp.c
Log message:
libtls: fix OCSP responder authorization bypass
If a CA revokes a valid TLS server cert using OCSP, a client configured to
require a valid OCSP staple should always reject that cert. If the server's
private key has been compromised, it was possible to bypass this requirement.
The problem is the behavior of OCSP_TRUSTOTHER which skips chain
validation for the OCSP trust chain to the root and the checking that
the staple was signed by a CA of the validating chain. So remove this flag.
This only affects callers of tls_config_ocsp_require_stapling(). In OpenBSD
base these are reachable in OpenBSD base via opt-in behaviors of nc(1) -T
and ftp(1) -S via the "muststaple" keyword. No ports call these functions.
Reported by Acts1631 and Jiho Kim
ok beck kenjiro
