---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, Nov 30, 2011 at 5:44 PM
Subject: "How War Reignited In Sudan While No One Was Looking,"  from
The New Republic (on-line), November 29, 2011
To: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>


"How War Reignited In Sudan While No One Was Looking"

from The New Republic (on-line), November 29, 2011

http://www.tnr.com/article/world/97921/south-sudan-khartoum-obama



    by Eric Reeves



Violence has escalated in recent weeks in many places in both (north)
Sudan and the newly independent Republic of South Sudan. This is
especially true in Blue Nile and South Kordofan---border states that
ended up in the North, but are home to large populations that fought
with the southern Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and identify
with southerners---militarily, politically, and culturally. Many Sudan
observers are being asked if renewed war can be avoided in this
tortured country. Responses vary, but the simplest answer is that it
can't, because it has already begun.



The bellicose rhetoric from the North's leaders in Khartoum is more
intense now than at any time since the separation of the North and the
South on July 9. And it’s not just rhetoric. On November 3, northern
forces seized the city of Kurmuk in Blue Nile, which had been the
bastion of those forces of the SPLA in the North that refused to
disarm---the SPLA North (or SPLA-N), as they are known. (The SPLA-N's
reluctance to disarm within territories in the North is
understandable: Given the ruthlessly vengeful and militarily
unconstrained regime in Khartoum, unilateral disarming would be
tantamount to suicide for people living in the North but identifying
with the South.) Just after the seizure, Sudanese President and Field
Marshal Omar al-Bashir declared that the northern regime was ready for
war with the South and that it had lost all patience with
"provocation" from Juba---the southern capital.



Withdrawal by SPLA-N from Kurmuk prevented a civilian massacre, but
the attack on the city sent tens of thousands of civilians fleeing
into Ethiopia---adding to the hundreds of thousands of refugees
displaced by military activities that began this summer, when the
northern regime began an assault on the disputed border region of
Abyei. Furthermore, the strategic military consequences of the North's
entry into Kurmuk are ominous. The Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP)
has recently reported that the North's forces immediately began to
expand the airfield outside Kurmuk, which is only about 40 miles from
the border with Upper Nile State in the South.



Assaults by the North on southern territories soon accelerated. On
November 8, in the remote Mabaan region of Upper Nile State, the
Khartoum's bombers killed and wounded more than a dozen people
according to humanitarian sources on the ground. On November 10, the
Khartoum bombed Yida refugee camp in the southern Unity State, home to
some 23,000 civilians. One bomb, which did not detonate, landed next
to a school where 200 children were present. The attack was confirmed
by journalists from Reuters and the BBC, a humanitarian organization
on the ground in Yida, and UN investigators, but the chief army
spokesman for the North and, incredibly, Khartoum's ambassador to the
UN, denied that it took place.



In addition to these direct attacks, Khartoum's proxy war is
accelerating in the South. In the past few months, renegade rebel
forces---almost certainly funded and organized by the North---have
been destabilizing the South by repeatedly attacking civilian targets,
especially in Unity State and Jonglei. Analysis of evidence by the
Small Arms Survey (Geneva) makes clear that these rebel forces have
been heavily armed with weapons of Chinese manufacture, which could
only have come from Khartoum. (A November 16 statement issued by
Chinese and Sudanese officials asserted an increasing and deepening
military cooperation between Khartoum and Beijing.) These so-called
"rebel groups" are nothing more than brutal mercenaries, deployed to
create leverage if negotiations ever begin---or tie up southern
military forces if war expands.



The consequences of the renewed violence of the past months have been
myriad---compounding problems that began to worsen this summer.
Several international aid organizations---including Oxfam---have been
forced to withdraw from the border-state region, particularly Blue
Nile and South Kordofan, where Khartoum has imposed a total embargo on
humanitarian assistance. Since May, perhaps as many as a half-million
people have been displaced by the violence; the number of refugees has
only increased with the recent violence. These people are on the move
as the critical November harvest should be underway. Instead of
consuming cultivated crops, people are relying on reserve food stocks.
(Although, there isn’t much to harvest; the UN's Food and Agriculture
Organization expects the harvests to "fail.")



Productive negotiations between the North and the South seem
increasingly unlikely: Just before a key meeting was to begin in Addis
Ababa last week under African Union auspices, the North balked and
proposed deliberately preposterous and unacceptable terms for oil
revenue sharing. (The South possesses most of the region’s oil
reserves.) This is consistent with past behavior. A June 28 agreement
to resolve the armed hostilities that took place over the summer in
South Kordofan and Blue Nile was renounced by President al-Bashir
three days later. A month later, the Khartoum invaded Blue Nile.



And the world's response to such behavior? There seems a perverse
inability (or cynical unwillingness) to connect these conspicuous
dots. The U.S. special envoy, Princeton Lyman, declares that we have
no cards to play. All we can do is "promote negotiations," Lyman
declared in an interview with Darfur's Radio Dabanga. For its part,
the U.N. indulges in a predictable moral equivalence, urging both
sides to exercise restraint. This facile exhortation does not
acknowledge the restraint the South has already shown in the face of a
year’s worth of cross-border bombing attacks.



The U.S. is not, however, without leverage. And now is the time to respond:



1) Shut down all talk of debt relief for Khartoum: Given the highly
distressed state of the northern economy, Khartoum is desperate for
debt relief. Germany and France have both made gestures toward this.
The U.S. should make it clear it will use all its political power to
prevent debt relief for the North until it makes a just peace with the
parties in Sudan and grants full humanitarian access to all
populations affected by conflict.



2) Keep Sudan on the State Department list of terrorism-sponsoring
nations: The U.S. should keep Sudan on this list until all aerial
bombardments in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Darfur stop. (Removal
from the list requires the State Department to certify that no acts of
terrorism have been committed or supported by a regime on the list for
the six prior months).



3) Make U.S. satellite reconnaissance showing Khartoum's military
actions against civilians public: Using its massive satellite
resources, the U.S. should publicize the scale and nature of
Khartoum’s military actions. Unlike the SSP, the U.S. intelligence
community has no limit on the resolution (pixels per square
centimeter) of its images or weather constraints on its surveillance
capabilities. So far, however, the Obama administration has been inert
in responding to or augmenting the critical findings of SSP.



4) Accelerate defensive arms deliveries to South Sudan, particularly
anti-aircraft weaponry, as well as surveillance and communications
equipment.



5) Use military force to deter the bombing of civilians: The U.S.
should declare that for every military air attack on civilians or
humanitarians, it will destroy (by cruise missile) an aircraft at the
major northern air base in el-Obeid.



What can't be doubted is that if the U.S. and its allies do not
quickly change the calculus guiding decisions being made in
Khartoum---right now---expansion of war is inevitable.



                                             §§§



[Eric Reeves is a professor at Smith College and has published
extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a
decade. He is author of A Long Day's Dying: Critical Moments in the
Darfur Genocide.]




_____________________________
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063

[email protected]
413-585-3326
Skype: ReevesSudan
www.sudanreeves.org

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