Darfur Armed Opposition Groups and Coalitions
At the military level in the field, all the Darfur rebel factions are
cooperating, exhibiting a pragmatic survival instinct that is rallying
the disparate militias against their common enemies. The Sudanese
government has stepped up hostilities since early 2011, focusing on
the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) stronghold of Jebel
Marra and the Zaghawa-held areas of North and South Darfur such as
Shangal Tobaiya, where SLA-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) draws strength.
Minawi's about-face and rejection of the Abuja Agreement in December
2010 pushed him back into rebellion, triggering a new cycle of
violence as the government pursued his forces and their affiliated
ethnic populations. Beginning in December, North Darfur Governor Osman
Kibbir launched an offensive against towns where SLA-MM had a
presence. First the rebels were targeted, but then the focus shifted
to the Zaghawa population. The Government of Sudan (GoS) armed and
encouraged non-Zaghawa ethnic groups living with the Zaghawa to expel
them, with exhortations to reclaim their land from 'the new settlers'.
Much of the new displacement in Darfur in March–June 2011 was a result
of this purge and the indiscriminate aerial bombardment of Jebel
Marra. A particularly egregious case of anti-Zaghawa killing occurred
in Abu Zerega, close to the North Darfur capital of al Fasher. The
perpetrators, as in other attacks on Zaghawa, were non-Arab militias,
specifically Tunjur and some Birgid. These fighters even attacked
Zaghawa members of a government investigative committee on a
fact-finding mission to the area. Both SLA-MM and SLA-AW fought
against government forces around these towns, capturing vehicles,
arms, and ammunition. Among the displaced, many of those of fighting
age joined the SLA-MM rather than move to IDP camps.
SLA-AW has settled in Kampala, Uganda, after being all but expelled
from its longtime base in Paris. Ugandan officials say publicly that
support for SLA-AW is motivated by ideology (Abdul Wahid Mohamed al
Nur was formerly a Sudan Communist Party adherent), but confidentially
they admit that it is a tit-for-tat response to the GoS's perceived
support for the Ugandan rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). GoS
sources firmly deny government support for the LRA and argue that
Uganda's real goal in aiding SLA-AW is a dominant relationship with
the new Republic of South Sudan. Ugandan assistance to SLA-AW is, in
any case, extremely limited, mainly confined to hosting the rebel
group in Kampala.
The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) has announced a form of rapprochement,
if not unity, that brings its former secretary-general (Minni Minawi)
and its chairman (Abdul Wahid) closer than they have been since the
split. SLA-Mother (also known as SLA-Abu Gasim), led by Abu al Gasim
Imam al Haj, a signatory to the Abuja Agreement, has also entered into
alliance with SLA-AW. A former governor of West Darfur and state
minister, Abu al Gasim defected from the government to rejoin his
former comrades on 20 May 2011.
On 3 October 2011, the Sudanese Bloc to Liberate the Republic (SBLR)
announced it was joining the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). SBLR
leader Magoub Hussein, formerly a member of the Liberation and Justice
Movement (LJM), was relieved of his post as vice chairman for
political and media affairs on 14 July 2011 after he was accused of
negotiating a separate track with the GoS in Doha.
On 13 November, SLA-MM, SLA-AW, JEM, and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement-North (SPLM-N) formed a coalition named the Sudan
Revolutionary Front (SRF). While aspiring to be a unified political
structure, the SRF is, at this stage, more a coalition of military
forces with broad agreement on a political vision. Whether it becomes
more than just a loose political and military affiliation remains to
be seen. Its main platform is the need for a geographically
comprehensive peace process and the further unification of all
Sudanese opposition forces.
The Darfurian components of the SRF have pledged not to enter into
armed hostilities with the LJM, a signatory of the Doha Document for
Peace in Darfur, allaying fears of a repeat of the intra-Darfurian
fighting that characterized the period following the partial signing
of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006.
The SRF alliance survived the killing of JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim
on 25 December 2011. On 20 February 2012, the SRF announced its new
leadership structure. Malik Agar and Abdul Aziz al Hilu, both SPLM-N
leaders, were named chairman and deputy chairman respectively. The
leaders of the three constituent Darfur movements—JEM, SLA-MM, and
SLA-AW—were each given a vice-presidency. The Darfur movements
contested Agar’s leadership but with the backing of the Government of
South Sudan (GoSS), now crucial to the Darfur movements and the SRF,
his mandate was secured.
Some forecast that JEM will draw closer to other SRF members and also
adopt a more flexible position on negotiations with the GoS in the
wake of Khalil Ibrahim’s passing. This analysis derives from JEM being
weaker now, and also because Khalil Ibrahim was a controversial figure
for South Sudanese members of the SRF due to his Islamist past. Khalil
Ibrahim also regularly took strong positions against negotiating with
the GoS, and his attitude was not shared by the whole of JEM. One JEM
faction, known to be more Darfur-centric, saw the Doha negotiations as
a missed opportunity for the movement. This view may become more
ascendant within JEM now.
Click here for information on the 2011 turmoil in Libya and the Darfur conflict.
Updated 29 February 2012
Click here for information on the following specific groups and coalitions:
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and splinters
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Democratic JEM
SLM-General Leadership
Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) and splinters
Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW)
SLA-Historical Leadership/Command
SLA-Khamis Abaker (SLA-KA)
SLA-Juba
SLA-Mainstream ('General Line')
Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) and splinters
SLA-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM)
Democratic Sudan Liberation Movement (DSLM) ('SLA-Carabino')
SLA-Unity
Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM)
Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM)
Other
Freedom and Reform Movement (FRM)
Click here for information on Chadian armed opposition groups
operating in Darfur and Eastern Chad.
Relevant Tables, Maps, and Summaries
Map of Armed Groups in Darfur, May 2010 (from UNAMID)
Table showing areas of control of Darfur armed opposition groups
Darfur-based Chadian Groups, September 2009 (from HSBA Issue Brief 15)
Table of Chadian armed opposition groups operating in Darfur
Refugee and IDP Camps in Darfur and Eastern Chad (from HSBA
Working Paper 15)
Map of camps circa 2008
Chadian Armed Groups, February 2008 (from HSBA Issue Brief 9)
Table of Chadian armed opposition groups as of February 2008 and
their recent histories
Darfur-based Militia-Rebel Agreements, 2005-07 (from HSBA Working Paper 17)
Summary of peacemaking attempts by militias and rebels outside the
official peace process
Hamdan's Areas of Control, Darfur, 2007-08 (from HSBA Working Paper 17)
Map showing Mohamed Hamdan's ('Hemeti') areas of control in Darfur
Darfurian Rebel Groups, December 2006 (from HSBA Issue Brief 4)
Table of SLA and JEM factions
Relevant HSBA Publications
Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict,
by Julie Flint, January 2010 (in Arabic)
Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur, by Julie
Flint, June 2009 (in Arabic)
Conflict, Arms, and Militarization: The Dynamics of Darfur's IDP
Camps, by Clea Khan, September 2008 (in Arabic)
The Chad-Sudan Proxy War and the 'Darfurization' of Chad: Myths
and Reality, by Jérôme Tubiana, April 2008 (in Arabic; in French)
Echo Effects: Chadian Instability and the Darfur Conflict, HSBA
Issue Brief, February 2008 (in Arabic; in French)
Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups, by
Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, July 2007 (in Arabic)
Arms, Oil, and Darfur: The Evolution of Relations between China
and Sudan, HSBA Issue Brief, July 2007 (in Arabic)
No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy for
Darfur, HSBA Issue Brief, December 2006 (in Arabic)
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