Tuareg rebellion could spark regional violence in Mali, Niger and
Southern Algeria – By Celeste Hicks
March 15, 2012

Thousands of Malians have fled the latest outbreak of violence by Tuareg rebels.
The recent outbreak of violence in northern Mali will have given
governments across the Sahel with their own Tuareg populations pause
for thought. While regional attention has been diverted in recent
years by the threat posed by Islamic militant groups such as Al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram, the Tuareg problem has
never been resolved. With the arrival of thousands of refugees in
neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso and Mauritania, many are
asking if conflict could spread.

In Mali’s case, many seasoned observers knew it was just a matter of
time before the long-standing Tuareg grievances – claims for regional
development and independence – resurfaced. After a peace deal was
worked out following the last rebellion of the ATNMC led by Ibrahim Ag
Bahanga, many of those responsible seemed to simply vanish into the
Sahara desert. Promises to integrate former fighters into the national
army do not seem to have been fully implemented. Some former rebels
apparently turned up to fight on the side of Colonel Gaddaffi in
Libya’s recent conflict, although Gaddaffi’s support for the Tuareg
cause had been as idiosyncratic as his support for any other cause in
Africa. The ferocity of the attacks in January 2012 by the
newly-launched MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) –
numbering several close associates of Bahanga (Bahanga was killed in a
road accident in August 2011) – seems in part attributed to them
bringing back weapons they obtained in Libya.

The situation is further complicated by the fear of involvement of
AQIM, known to operate in the area around the Wagadou Forest in
western Mali. Although the MNLA strenuously denied the accusations by
the Malian government that AQIM had been involved in their operations,
including an attack on Aguelhoc, their new rebellion was hot on the
heels of the shocking abduction of four European tourists in Timbuktu
in November, one of whom was killed when he resisted, and two
Frenchmen in nearby Hombori.  Exactly who carried out these
kidnappings has never been clearly ascertained but the blurring of the
lines only gives the MNLA rebellion a broader and more chilling
context.

On a recent visit to neighbouring Niger, I heard from locals in
Agadez, which has its own large Tuareg population, that they now live
in fear of a repeat of Niger’s own MNJ (Nigerien Movement for Justice)
rebellion, which broke out around the same time as Bahanga’s revolt in
2007. Back then there was much talk of links between the two groups,
and national borders have seldom meant much to Tuaregs who have family
connections across southern Algeria, Libya, northern Niger, Mali and
Burkina Faso. These fears certainly reached a head in September when
one of the erstwhile leaders of the MNJ, Rhissa Ag Boula, was
reportedly seen among the convoy which brought Saadi, the son of
Colonel Gadaffi, to Agadez in northern Niger. And although the numbers
are likely to be small, there is a strong suspicion that some of those
currently in the MNLA in Mali are in fact Nigerien Tuareg.

But Niger’s authorities seem confident. Foreign Minister Bazoum
Mohamed recently said that the chances of a recurrence are slim
because according to him, Niger had handled the aftermath of the MNJ
rebellion better than neighbouring Mali. What exactly could be meant
by ‘better’ is a moot point since many of the locals accused the armed
forces under former President Mamadou Tandja of brutal repression at
the time. But newly-elected president Mahamadou Issoufou seems to have
at least mended some of those broken bridges by bringing several
former rebels into important roles such as Prime Minister (Brigi
Raffini), mayor of Agadez (Rhissa Feltou) and President of the
Regional Council of Agadez (Mohamed Anako), something Mali has not
done to the same extent. Rhissa Ag Boula himself has been appointed an
advisor to the presidency.

It’s difficult to make too many predictions about whether a wider
Tuareg cause, or indeed an eruption in Islamic militant violence,
could be ignited by the actions of the MNLA . It is however clear that
the challenges facing Sahelian governments of bringing security across
such vast and impossible to police borders have been ignored for too
long.

While Mali, in a crucial election year, finally seems to be waking up
to the dangers of not acting sooner to dislodge the AQIM presence on
its soil (thought only to number several hundred), the response of
their army to the MNLA rebellion has only exposed its limitations.
Efforts by France and the US to build up Mali’s armed forces (under
the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative) need time to produce
results; Ecowas and the AU have all issued dramatic statements
condemning the violence, but so far no concrete military support has
been offered. Likewise, the score-card  of the joint military command
known as CEMOC set up between Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger, is
blank.

With a food crisis now emerging across the whole Sahel, which is
estimated to be affecting some 13 million people, it seems there may
be a rare window of opportunity to ensure that some of the increased
international attention on the region can be devoted to finding a
lasting solution to this long-running security crisis.

Celeste Hicks is a freelance journalist with a focus on African
issues. She has a particular interest in the Sahel.

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