Stalemate in Sudan as neither North nor South can make decisive move –
By Nanne op’t Ende



May 16, 2012

Soldiers from the SPLA-North surround a grenade launcher captured from
the Sudan armed forces in the Nuba mountains.

The tactical calculations in the conflict between North and South
Sudan are staggeringly complex but they have one thing in common:
neither party has the slightest consideration for the wellbeing of the
population. I tend to feel that there is little use for analyses when
the men in charge are so determined to wear each other out at any
cost.

Alex de Waal’s conclusion that the parties are unable to compromise
seems to be about the only sensible thing to say. The other issues he
mentions follow from this inability to co-operate and compromise. Both
parties have operated under the assumption that the other side would
eventually try to get the upper hand – and rightly so: Khartoum and
Juba constantly look for slight advantages on the ground, with public
opinion, in the international arena.

To discuss both parties’ rationale in the conflict is pure
speculation. If I were to give it a shot my analysis would run along
the lines of a mutual expectation with the NCP and the SPLM that the
other side will, sooner or later, crumble and lose the ability to
continue its rule.

At the time of signing the CPA, the NCP might have believed it would
be better to leave the South to its own devices for a while and
concentrate on reinforcing its grip on the North. Knowing that the
South Sudan government would depend entirely on oil revenue while the
existing pipelines run through the North and estimating that an
alternative (up-hill) line to Kenya would be too expensive, the NCP
calculated that the SPLM would rather contribute to the North’s
economy by paying high oil transport fees than risk being cut off from
any revenues at all.

The NCP probably also figured that fear of revenue loss combined with
the fear of losing too much credit internationally could refrain Juba
from taking action when the Sudan Armed Forces would try to deal with
the remaining SPLA forces in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. After all,
that is an internal affair. Furthermore, the NCP might have thought
that, with its obvious lack of development and human resources and all
the ensuing problems of corruption, popular discontent and tribal
conflict, the South might well implode within a few years.

The SPLM in its turn might have believed that being the ruling party
of an independent country with large proven oil reserves would secure
substantial sums in foreign investment and strengthen its position in
the international arena. China in particular would no longer be so
eager to defend Khartoum, while the United States, for a host of
reasons, would be happy to continue its support to Juba.

Knowing that the government in Khartoum had become entirely dependent
on oil revenues that were now severely reduced, the SPLM figured that
the NCP would be in a tight corner economically, no matter what. Add
to this the enormous and continuing cost of fighting the armed
opposition in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and it would be
only a matter of time before the NCP government would collapse.

In this line of reasoning it is entirely logical not to budge on
transport fees and to give covert support to opposition groups across
the border. If you can’t win the war, try to win the peace. Whatever
the exact calculations were on either side, the peace obviously has
not lasted long enough yet for one of the parties to collapse.

In the North, the Sudan Armed Forces defeated SPLA forces in Blue Nile
rather decisively and managed to hold on to the large towns in South
Kordofan. The rebel movements from Darfur, though still active, seem
unable to make any progress in the West. The NCP government is in dire
need of foreign currency but so far it shows no clear signs of losing
its grip on power.

In the South the SPLM faces strong criticism over corruption,
nepotism, tribalism and incompetence but the internal division of the
South is nowhere near the level of 1991, when a rift in the movement
nearly caused its demise. The SPLM government seems to be in firm
control, even though it has a serious budgetary problem since the
North provoked it into shutting down oil production.

There is little chance that the NCP and the SPLM will actually
compromise on anything. This is a serious game of poker: which country
will run out of chips first?  I guess that beyond today’s horizon all
kinds of other calculations are being made for the event of full scale
war: who will let himself be provoked into continuing his advance
beyond the border areas? Who can count on support from his allies? Who
can sustain a prolonged military campaign when the financial resources
are all but depleted? Is there any chance the international community
will intervene?

I see no reason why either side would now be in a better position to
defeat the other than seven years ago when they signed the CPA. They
both used the oil money to build up their respective armed forces.
Perhaps Juba has the better fighters, but Khartoum has the fighter
jets. At the same time I think neither party is comfortable with
letting time alone decide who might win the peace. So they up the
ante. Sudan continues to harass South Sudan along the borders, South
Sudan shuts down the wells.

Personally I think it is clear Khartoum has the greatest contempt for
the people, bombing civilian areas day in day out, with al Beshir
calling the SPLM ‘insects’ and Haroun telling his troops in South
Kordofan to ‘hand over the place clean’ and ‘make no prisoners’. It is
evil, I have no better words for their conduct. Meanwhile Juba seems
to gamble recklessly with the future of millions of citizens of a new
nation… what to make of that?

All I know for sure is that the population is the party that is
certain to lose, and for the most part they are not even allowed to
play.

Nanne op’t Ende is the author of Proud to be Nuba and long-time
commentator on South Kordofan.

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