---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: John Ashworth <[email protected]> Date: Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 11:09 AM Subject: [sudan-john-ashworth] 'Beginning of the end for Bashir?' To: Group <[email protected]>
1. SUDAN: BEGINNING OF END FOR BASHIR? IWPR ICC - AFRICA UPDATE No. 325, July 10, 2012 President under increasing pressure as student protests gather pace, but opposition forces still lack coherence. By Simon Jennings Student-led demonstrations coupled with growing frustration among sections of Sudan’s broader population provide the strongest indications yet of a real push for regime change, analysts say. But opposition forces are still a long way short of being the kind of organised, unified movement that could topple a government. Now in their sixth day, the student protests began in the capital Khartoum on June 17 in anticipation of austerity measures that President Omar al Bashir’s government plans to put in place next week. The cuts include raising taxes, lifting fuel subsidies and cutting the number of government ministers, all in order to reduce the huge budget deficit. Even before the measures come into force, the price of basic items like sugar, fruit, and public transport fares, have risen by as much as 50 per cent this week as fears grow about their impact. As hundreds of demonstrators took to the streets, the security agencies banned three newspapers from publishing and detained local and international journalists. Students have led a number of demonstrations against the government in recent months, but these have been crushed by the security services and never built up enough momentum to threaten the government. (See for example Police Get Tough on Student Protests.) But there are signs that this time, things may not die down that easily. “This is different [from previous protests]. They have very specific slogans about livelihood issues and price rises, and they are talking about the need to topple the government,” Salih Osman, a human rights activist in Khartoum, said. The austerity measures forced the governor of Khartoum State to dissolve his provincial administration on June 20. On top of the street protests, Bashir is facing increasing opposition from within his National Congress Party, NCP, suggesting that his hold on power is slipping. Bashir is wanted by the International Criminal Court, ICC, for committing genocide in the western region of Darfur. The Hague court has also issued arrest warrants for two of his NCP colleagues, Defence Minister Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein and South Kordofan provincial governor Ahmed Mohammed Haroun. “[Bashir] is now totally isolated even within the senior people in his party, not only the normal members,” Hafiz Mohammed, director of the rights group Justice Africa Sudan, said. “This is going to widen as long as this problem continues. Because most of them [NCP members] believe if this problem continues, people will come out and kick them out of power.” Aware of the downward spiral in support for the president among his inner circle, activists are increasingly comparing the demonstrations to those of the “Arab Spring” that swept the Middle East and North Africa in 2011. But the fact that there is no coherent opposition movement and that protests are still largely confined to the student population means there is not yet enough pressure to bring down the government. “The collective opposition needs to be able to represent the whole of Sudan and needs to have a charter, a vision of what a post-Bashir Sudan would look like and what people’s place in it would be,” Dr Mukesh Kapila, who served as head of the United Nations mission in Khartoum in 2003-04, told IWPR . “That kind of manifesto and vision is needed to bring credibility to the opposition and to be able to rally and mobilise people. The [current] opposition to Bashir is necessary but insufficient in terms of effectively opposing him.” The Sudanese state has faced economic crisis ever since it lost 75 per cent of its oil revenue to South Sudan, which seceded in July 2011. The two countries have not reached agreement on revenue from oil deposits that now lie south of the border. Khartoum still has leverage over these reserves, as the crude can only be exported through a pipeline that goes north through Sudan. South Sudan halted oil extraction in January, accusing its northern neighbour of stealing oil from the pipeline. Despite revenue shortfalls, it is thought that the NCP continues to channel as much as 70 per cent of government spending towards its military engagement in armed conflicts in the Nuba mountains, the western region of Darfur, and most recently on the contested border with South Sudan. Up until now, Khartoum has managed to minimise the impact of this military expenditure on the Sudanese economy, and on the lives of people living in Khartoum and adjoining regions. This week’s uprisings mark a moment of realisation among central Sudanese about the economic effects of waging war in their country’s borderlands. “The genie is out of the bottle,” said Omer Ismail, senior policy analyst at the Enough project which monitors conflicts and human rights in the region. “The days of Bashir are numbered.” Unless peace is established in Nuba and Darfur, and relations with South Sudan improve markedly, analysts see little prospect of economic recovery, so it could be only a matter of time before the government is forced out. “Until we have a policy that stops the ongoing war, reduces the spending on security and improves the international relations of Sudan to allow inflow of capital in terms of investment, then we are not going to have a solution,” Mohammed said. Building a credible opposition movement While cracks are starting to show within the regime, Ismail and Kapila agree that the ingredients for a successful uprising are not yet in evidence. “They need a lot of people to stand up and say, ‘we are going to protect this revolution’. I very much doubt these people are there today. However, I think as time goes by, more people are going to step up to the plate,” Ismail said. While people beyond the student population are reportedly beginning to join the demonstrations, it remains unclear whether the protesters can maintain their momentum or develop a solid leadership. “There doesn’t appear to be an individual of status who is a natural coherent force,” Kapila said. “Could such a person arise through opposition processes? Possibly. Or through internal defection within the NCP? Possibly. It’s not clear.” Sudan’s formal opposition parties do not have either the profile or broad support that would place them at the forefront of a successful revolution. Many people doubt that – even if they came to power – forces like the Umma, Democratic Unionist and Communist parties Party would seek radical reforms of the system. “The real question is whether a change in the government will make the real change that we need,” Mohammed said, “because many of these traditional political parties want to change the government but not change the system.” That could change, however, if the economic situation continues to deteriorate and more people take to the streets. At that point, opposition parties might realise they need to get behind the demonstrations. “When they feel change is coming, they will reorganise themselves, because everyone wants to have a piece of this cake. And I am sure they will join,” Mohammed said. Another scenario would be that factions of the NCP itself would help engineer a change, ditching Bashir and others indicted by the ICC in the process. “Some elements of [the current regime] are going to be part of the coming change because they control the hinges of government and business and everything in Sudan,” Ismail said. “Definitely you cannot take them root and branch and throw them away.” Better the indicted president you know…. Sudan-watchers say that while any protest movement has to be home-grown, the international community could play a role by exerting more pressure on the government. For the moment, no obvious successor to Bashir is in sight, so leaders in many western capitals seem reluctant to look to a future beyond the current regime, whatever they think of it. Kapila said the international community must support the process of regime change by at least talking about a post-Bashir Sudan and entertaining the idea of new leadership. This would send the current Sudanese leadership “a very powerful contemptuous signal, diplomatically and politically”, he said, adding that it would also serve as “a rallying call for opposition of all sorts, of civil society and others to be planning and thinking of what the new world is going to look like”. With Bashir and his regime wanted in The Hague there are also compelling arguments for tightening the squeeze on Khartoum by terminating economic and diplomatic relations with Sudan. “[The international community] should stop treating Sudan as if it is a normal country,” said Kapila. “Downgrading ambassadorial relations in an orchestrated way – say, all European Union countries withdrew ambassadors – would send a powerful signal that you cannot do business as usual with a genocidal regime.” The Khartoum regime has survived popular uprisings before now, using brute force and divide-and-rule tactics to disperse opposition. But as it struggles to deal with the harsh economic consequences of engaging in serial military conflicts, and of falling out with South Sudan, the regime’s options appear to have narrowed, and it may not be in a position to swat its opponents so easily. “This thing could die down, and maybe the security services will let people express their frustration and then go home at the end of the day,” Ismail said. “But tomorrow morning when they wake up, the prices of basic necessities will have doubled, salaries are shrinking and [public] services are getting worse. So I don’t think there is a chance for this to die down without a real shake-up of this regime.” Simon Jennings is IWPR’s Africa Editor. END1 2. Sudan: The Economic Roots of Sudan's Unrest BY AARON BLITZ, 18 JULY 2012 allAfrica.com Are President al-Bashir's efforts to diversify the economy too little too late? What started as a student movement against spending cuts in Khartoum a month ago has since spread to other segments of the Sudanese population and country, and developed into broader protests against President Omar al-Bashir's regime. The growing dissatisfaction with al-Bashir undoubtedly has some roots in the president's authoritarian hold on power and oppressive policies, but the main catalyst for the unrest lie in economic issues. In June, al-Bashir's regime announced the gradual phasing out of fuel subsidies coupled with an increase in VAT and other forms of tax in an effort to make up a $2.4 billion budget deficit. Al-Bashir also made cuts at regional and state government levels and slimmed down his cabinet in an effort to reduce spending. The effects have been devastating. Gas prices have jumped by almost 50%, food prices have risen dramatically, inflation reached 30% in May, and the country's currency has been devalued. Backlash of independence The independence of South Sudan a year ago was ostensibly the cause of Sudan's current economic crisis. Sudan has long been over-reliant on its oil resources for government revenue and when South Sudan seceded, the infant nation took at least three-quarters of the nation's oil with it. Oil transportation fees were theoretically going to cushion the loss, but negotiations with South Sudan about the costs of running southern oil through northern pipelines and refineries quickly soured. Earlier this year, South Sudan suspended oil production (which accounts for 98% of its own revenue) indefinitely in protest against the high transportation fees demanded by Khartoum and against Sudan's alleged theft of its oil. This has led to a war of attrition in which both sides have suffered immensely. South Sudan is being superficially held together by foreign donors, although seeing Khartoum's regime weakening will only strengthen its resolve to continue on its current trajectory. The leaders in Juba know they can exact an economic toll on a former adversary as they did when South Sudan invaded Heglig in Sudan, temporarily reducing the production of one of Sudan's most vital oil fields. A short lived boom Sudan's economic woes today can be attributed in large part to its over-reliance on oil. Within the last decade, Sudan's economic growth looked almost unstoppable thanks to an oil boom. But since the country started exporting oil in 1999, it has exhibited the characteristics of a 'rentier state' in which rents derived from oil exports were used to curry favour and prop up the regime. In this process, other sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture (for which Sudan has considerable potential) have been largely neglected. And the regime has left little space for civil society and private industry outside state control. While these rentier state strategies were effective when Sudan had the wealth and resources to keep the centre of the nation well-fed and happy, the loss of oil revenue has proven to be the undoing of this model. When commodity prices plummeted in 2008, Sudan was caught in a downward spiral. Meanwhile, Khartoum continued to face military threats from marginalised regions of the country such as the south and Darfur - while the oil boom forever changed Khartoum's skyline and brought prosperity to the centre of Sudan, many peripheral areas saw little development. Ongoing military and counter-insurgency operations therefore took a heavy economic toll on the regime too. With a standing military of 110,000 troops and its own domestic military industry, Khartoum has continually spent heavily on defence spending. Indeed, even following the economic crisis, the regime has given no indication defence will be subject to austerity measures. While condemnation has been rolling steadily in from around the world at al-Bashir's alleged excessive force and torture of protestors, the regime has taken steps to at least appear to alleviate the economic crisis. Weeks after the beginning of the protests in Khartoum, Sudan signed an oil exploration deal with multiple foreign firms for oil blocks located around the country. This at least suggests foreign investors have confidence in Sudan's stability and al-Bashir's capacity to enforce contracts in the coming years. The government also issued $160 million worth of sukak bonds to raise revenue and opened the continent's largest sugar plant. While the bonds were in all likelihood a kneejerk reaction to try to raise revenue quickly, the opening of the plant could ease Sudan's dependency on food imports. What lies in store The claims of an 'Arab Spring' type uprising in Khartoum have been dismissed repeatedly by President al-Bashir. Nevertheless, the demonstrations could gain further momentum and Sudan continues to face serious economic threats. Sudan has recently taken some steps to develop and diversify its economy but these efforts may be too little too late. If the regime were to fall, al-Bashir's poor human rights record would no doubt be cited as a catalyst. In reality, however, the fall would first and foremost be the result of the economy and regime collapsing under its own weight. Aaron Blitz is a graduate from the MA programme in Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security at the Interdisciplinary Centre (IDC) in Israel. BA from Indiana University. http://allafrica.com/stories/201207190032.html END2 3. Gold last hope for Sudan to avert economic collapse KHARTOUM | Wed Jul 18, 2012 10:46am EDT (Reuters) - In his office in Khartoum's gold market, central bank sales agent Mohamed Adam sips tea and watches while his staff load bundles of cash worth tens of thousands of dollars from the safe into four boxes. The government will use these piles of Sudanese pounds to purchase gold, which it plans to sell for the dollars needed to pay for imports of food and other essentials. "We buy all gold from local traders and people who search for gold," Adam said. Outside his office, gold traders make deals in the busy market in a rundown downtown building, where paint is peeling from the walls. Sudan is looking to expand gold mines and boost production of the metal to help keep the economy afloat. Oil had been the main source of state revenues as well as the dollars needed to pay for imports, but Sudan lost three-quarters of its oil production when South Sudan split off last year. A scarcity of dollars has driven the annual inflation rate to 37.2 percent in June, double the level of June 2011, and officials warn prices will rise further. The country sits on what could be Africa's largest gold reserves, and the government has handed out exploration contracts to more than 600 mining firms to search for gold and other minerals. Khartoum hopes to make up to $3 billion from gold exports this year, double the amount from last year. It made $603 million by the start of April, according to the latest official data. Much of that output currently comes from small, individual miners, lured by high gold prices to seek gold in remote corners of the country. The central bank is now buying up their gold, which in the past was often smuggled abroad. The government estimates that about 250,000 Sudanese search for gold, mostly in the north of the vast Arab African country, where the Nubian desert has been a source of gold since the Egyptian pharaohs. "I always go and buy up gold from local people and sell it to the central bank," said gold trader Jumaa Mohamed Said, who travels every month to a desert area 300 kilometer (190 miles) north of Khartoum. "Sometimes I buy a few grams, sometimes 500 grams, a kilo. I'm always busy," the 25-year old Said said. He brings the gold to Khartoum, where he does business with the central bank. Experts verify its grade before it ends up on Adam's desk. The central bank has appointed three sales agents at the gold market, who buy gold for a little less than the global price, Adam said. But a senior official at an international organization said the agents sometimes pay above the global price to stop other traders from snapping it up for smuggling to Dubai, a large gold market. "The central bank sometimes pays well above market prices," he said, declining to be identified. "It fuels inflation, but they need the dollars from gold exports." BIG POTENTIAL, BIG CHALLENGES The targeted $3 billion in gold revenue for this year is still well below Sudan's 2010 oil revenue of at least $5 billion. But the government hopes it will keep the economy afloat while it seeks a negotiated solution over oil export fees from South Sudan. Khartoum faces a budget deficit of 6.5 billion pounds ($1.4 billion) following South Sudan's independence a year ago under a 2005 peace deal. The finance ministry had counted on export fees paid in dollars by the landlocked new nation, which needs to ship its crude through northern pipelines and the Red Sea port of Port Sudan to get to international markets. But Juba shut off all oil wells in January after talks over export fees failed, and Khartoum started taking some oil to cover what it said were unpaid pipeline dues. Meanwhile, the government is trying to attract more investment as it hopes to boost gold production, which amounted to 33.7 tonnes last year. The mining industry is one of the few areas growing in the economy, in crisis due to the shortage of foreign exchange. Out of the 600 licenses granted for mineral exploration, 88 have gone to large companies. New fields will be opened for investment, the state-linked Sudanese Media Center said last week. "Sudan is right up near the top in Africa in terms of mineral potential," Tucker Barrie, a Canada-based mining consultant knowledgeable about Sudan, said. "Northeast Sudan is very high on the list in Africa to look for gold," he said. "There are going to be discoveries." Companies had long neglected the country amid its civil war and ethnical conflicts, but they are now turning to it as one of the last large unexplored areas in Africa. Last week, Canadian mining firm La Mancha Resources, the biggest player in Sudan, said it had agreed to be bought by a firm owned by Egyptian tycoon Naguib Sawiris. La Mancha said the deal would help it develop the Hassai mine, Sudan's biggest gold mine which is run by the Ariab Mining Co, majority-owned by the Sudanese government and 40 percent by the Canadian firm. "With the influx of cash from a wealthy Egyptian, the company should fair well and keep exploring and developing," Barrie said. Foreign firms face a number of obstacles, however, in dealing with a government desperate for cash. The royalties they have to pay are higher than those of other African countries such as Ghana or Eritrea, which have issued more investor-friendly laws, industry insiders say. "Under pressure they are now reviewing the laws," said Abulrahim Hamdi, a former finance minister. Mining projects in Sudan tend to be expensive because equipment must be trucked in over long distances. Few qualified miners graduate from local universities, and firms tend to rely on large expatriate workforces. A U.S. trade embargo, in place since 1997 over Khartoum's role in hosting prominent Islamists in the past including Osama bin Laden, deters most Western firms and makes life difficult for those that come. Western banks routinely reject project funding in Sudan. While the government hopes for quick cash, Hamdi said many projects would take three to five years to start producing. La Mancha, for example, expects its attributable gold output to fall by some 16 percent this year because the top layer at the main Hassai mine is being depleted after being mined for 20 years. It needs to invest in new technology to drill deeper. Jumaa Mohamed Said, the gold trader doing business with the central bank, said amateur diggers at the field he visits every month face the same problem. "First they just were walking around with metal detectors and discovering gold on the surface. Now people need to drill deeper. It gets more expensive," he said. (Editing by Jane Baird) http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/18/us-sudan-gold-idUSBRE86H0SX20120718 END3 4. Sudanese Journalists March in Protest VoA | Alsanosi Ahmed Last updated on: July 18, 2012 4:15 PM KHARTOUM — More than 100 Sudanese journalists took to the streets Wednesday to protest the deteriorating press freedom in the country. The demonstration follows last week’s closure of the Alahadath newspaper by authorities in Khartoum for publishing several reports about government policies which affect the newspaper industry. The secretary general of the Sudanese journalist’s network, Khalid Saad, called on government officials to stop arresting journalists for doing their job. “The main reason of our strike is [because of] the detention of our colleagues. We want them to be released; they were detained for unknown reasons. A number of our colleagues have [also] been attacked while covering some events.” The protesting journalists were quickly surrounded by police officers in pickup trucks but the demonstration was allowed to continue and no arrests were made. In recent months, Sudan has increased taxes on paper and ink, forcing newspapers to raise prices. In the last six months, prices of newspapers have doubled, and sales have dropped, forcing many newspapers are laying off reporters. Mahjub Mohamed Salih is a veteran Sudanese journalist who has been in the media industry for the past 60 years, said this is the worst environment he has ever witnessed in Sudan. “[The media] is under contentious harassment from the government. The newspapers are at the moment working under direct pre-publication censorship where news items, analysis, comments are withdrawn from newspapers at the last hour. Some papers have closed down by a government order, [while some ] newspapers closed down or [were] confiscated after publication’’. Mahjub says the number of detained journalists by Sudanese security has doubled since last month. Since the student-led protests began over a month ago, more than 20 local journalists have been detained. Three foreign journalists were also detained. Some of them were released after thorough investigations by security officials. The press office at the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service has urged journalists not to report on any protests. But Salih said the old method of censorship has no place in the modern world of the internet. “It is only natural, because the government thinks that these are very limited protests and should not be blown out of context. This policy doesn’t take into consideration that the world is one village, so any attempt to stifle news or make a news blackout will not succeed.” Khartoum says the press in Sudan is relatively free, pointing to the number of newspapers currently in print as evidence. But Sudan routinely falls near the bottom of press freedom rankings in data compiled by organizations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Without Borders. http://www.voanews.com/content/sudanese-journalist-march-in-protest/1419028.html END4 5. Amnesty International: please find attached an Urgent Action on Mohammed Salah Mohammed, a Sudanese student activist who has been detained since 24 June. END5 6. SUDAN OPPOSITION FAILS TO TAKE LEAD ON PROTESTS IWPR ICC - AFRICA UPDATE No. 326, July 15, 2012 Protest participants “aware, angry and hungry”, but formal attempts at consolidate leadership fail to add momentum. By IWPR contributor, Simon Jennings Although leading Sudanese opposition parties came together last week to back the grassroots movement for regime change, the move has so far failed to take the ongoing street demonstrations to a new level. The Umma Party, Communist party, and Popular Congress Party – all part of the National Consensus Forces, an opposition umbrella group – signed the Democratic Alternative Charter, DAC, on July 4. Under the agreement, the three parties committed themselves to efforts to oust the National Congress Party, NCP, of President Omar al-Bashir, and agreed plans for a post-revolutionary government, with a three-year transition period in which current opposition parties will share power before elections are held under a new constitution. Protesters stand firm Demonstrations calling for regime change, which started on June 17 in response to government plans to impose austerity measures on Sudan, have rumbled on in Khartoum and other major towns for the last three weeks. (See Sudan: Beginning of End for Bashir?) Participants have remained defiant although hundreds have been arrested and signs that the government is weakening are hard to spot. Protester numbers increased on June 30 around the planned “lick your elbow” demonstrations – a reference to a speech by presidential adviser Nafie Ali Nafie, who suggested that overthrowing the regime he represented would be impossible. The numbers increased again on Friday, July 6, when hundreds of protestors were trapped inside a mosque in Wad-Nobawi in Omdurman. According to protesters who spoke to IWPR, police stationed outside the mosque fired rubber bullets at people trying to leave. "We were trapped inside for hours and they kept throwing tear gas. It was very strong and some people fainted," a protestor interviewed by IWPR said. As the security crackdown intensifies, activists estimate that as many as 2,000 protestors have been detained. Many have since been released, but will probably face trial. The NCP has denied that any peaceful protesters have been arrested. The arrests may prove counterproductive. A protester in Omdurman told IWPR that people no longer feared the security services, and were coming out onto the streets “because of” rather than in spite of oppression. "People are aware, angry and hungry now, and that's what makes a revolution happen," he said. "I think we will have a million-man protest very soon because the numbers are increasing and protestors are becoming more organised.” It has become a trial of strength in which the resolve of demonstrators like this man is pitted against the regime’s determination to use force to maintain its position – a response that some see as a sign of a regime with few options left. “The detentions are making the street even more angry, [and] a financially bankrupt regime even poorer, as it does very little to address the dire economic situation which was the trigger for this revolution," Dalia Haj-Omar, a member of the Girifna student activist group, said. Osman Hummaida, head of the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, draws similar conclusions. “I think the people managed to break the fear in the last few weeks and there is some sort of sustainability and gaining of momentum,” he said. Government losing both carrot and stick Some question whether the regime can count on the loyalty of its police force over the long term. The police themselves have to live on wages far outstripped by price rises, just like the wider population. "Last week, a police officer told me that, if we continue protesting, they will join us," one protestor in Khartoum said. Another driver of revolution that the government may no longer be able to control is the deteriorating economic situation. After shooting up by 50 per cent even before the austerity package came into force, the prices of basic foodstuffs like bread, cooking oil and onions have risen further by as much as 30 per cent in the last two weeks. “The demonstration is building, because every Friday in terms of magnitude is higher than the Friday before,” said Hafiz Mohammed, director of the advocacy group, Justice Africa Sudan. “The main issue is the real impact of [austerity] measures taken by the government will be felt gradually.” The austerity measures were prompted by severe budget problems in Khartoum, caused by two factors. One of these is the loss of 75 per cent of oil revenues after South Sudan seceded in July 2011. The two countries have been unable to agree on the division of income from reserves now lying south of the border. Khartoum still has some leverage, as the crude can only be exported through a pipeline that runs through its territory. But South Sudan halted extraction in January, after accusing its northern neighbour of stealing oil from the pipeline. The other factor in the spending squeeze is the continuing high level of defence expenditure amid prolonged conflicts around Sudan’s periphery – in Darfur, and more recently in the Nuba Mountains and on the border with South Sudan. Bashir is wanted by the International Criminal Court, ICC, accused of committing genocide in Darfur. The Hague court has also issued arrest warrants for two of his NCP colleagues, Defence Minister Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein and South Kordofan provincial governor Ahmed Mohammed Haroun. Can political opposition play credible role? The three parties that signed the DAC accord presented it as a major step forward, as the first attempt of its kind to build a unified opposition leadership. However, the new alliance is yet to call its own people out onto the streets to join the mainly young, student demonstrators, and they in turn have not hailed it as a leadership they will gladly follow. On social media websites, the talk among young Sudanese activists was that the DAC was drawn up by politicians out of touch with the current situation. "The people that call themselves the opposition have specified a transitional government before they got power,” one typical web posting said. “Their old brains cannot grasp that youth are still revolting to achieve this, they think they can put us under their armpits." Osman Habila, a human rights activist and writer from the Nuba Mountains criticised the DAC for not ensuring the interests of Sudan’s border regions were represented. "The political power in the centre did not engage in serious talks with the marginalised, especially from the Nuba Mountains," he wrote in an article for Sudaneseonline. The parties behind the DAC say they are in talks with armed movements in the border regions. But although these groups have expressed support for the street protests, it is unclear whether they will embrace the opposition parties’ charter. Magdi al-Gizouli, a Sudanese analyst, argues that the opposition is part of the political mainstream and will therefore struggle to reach out to a broader constituency, including underprivileged rural communities. "A successful mass political strike cannot be carried out by the political establishment,” he said, adding that it must happen instead “through an alliance of social forces antagonistic to the NCP's hegemony – organised labour, the fluid mass from informal sector, small-scale farmers, small businesses, professionals and junior civil servants". Anyone seeking regime change must, al-Gizouli said, “bridge the bloody rift between urban and rural struggles in Sudan, and transform the terms of the conflict from one between the centre and the periphery to one between the oppressed majority and the elites of the political establishment". Bashar’s NCP appears to understand the ambivalent position of the opposition parties. This week, it invited two of the opposition parties to discuss a new constitution. “They are doing that deliberately, to try and divide the opposition,” said Mohammed. Opposition parties appear to want regime change with a “soft landing”, rather than all the uncertainties of a radical revolution that might swallow them up. The opposition is “keen to have a change of regime, not a change of system”. Mohammed said. This article was written by an IWPR contributor in Khartoum who asked to remain anonymous, and IWPR’s Africa Editor Simon Jennings. END6 7. [I don't agree with the following article, which comes from a self-proclaimed "anti-imperialist" website ("SAY NO TO THE US NATO WORLD ORDER"). I believe the revolution in Sudan is very much home-grown, and indeed has received very little international support, but I circulate it anyway. John] Sudan: Protests and the Politics of Regime Change by Eric Draitser Global Research, July 19, 2012 The protests that have broken out in Sudan are, on the surface, the manifestation of legitimate grievances. Portrayed in the Western media as a direct response to austerity measures implemented by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, these protests indicate a strong current of dissatisfaction among the people of the country. However, seen from a broader, more critical perspective, the demonstrations are the tangible fruits of a carefully constructed destabilization campaign incorporating opposition political parties, civil society groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Hollywood celebrities and Western financiers. These powerful forces have aligned against the government in Khartoum in order to execute the geopolitical agenda of the imperialist ruling class in the West. The Development of the Protests The immediate impetus for the protests, which broke out in recent weeks in and around the capital of Khartoum, was the announcement of the removal of fuel subsidies. This troubling development, coupled with other austerity measures such as the reduction of government jobs and the devaluation of the currency, were designed to mitigate the effects of soaring inflation in Sudan. However, because of the integral role of fuel prices in the Sudanese economy, the move seemed to spark mass indignation. In a country already dogged by high unemployment and rampant poverty, these difficult decisions inflamed already high tensions throughout the country. Reports from inside Sudan suggest that a small group of female demonstrators gathered outside dormitories at the University of Khartoum and began protesting the fuel subsidy cuts, among other issues. This was the first in what became a series of daily demonstrations against a whole host of grievances. Central among these was the feeling, widespread among particularly young people, that the government in Khartoum was punishing the people while continuing to spend “lavishly” on defense. Many groups directly involved in the protest movement, groups such as Sudan Change Now and the popularized twitter moniker #SudanRevolts, have used the demonstrations as a springboard for a much broader and, it could be argued, more opportunistic agenda, one that is directly in line with the geopolitical interests of the United States and the Western imperialist ruling class: regime change. This is, of course, not to diminish the genuine grievances of many of the demonstrators. Instead, it is important to maintain a critical understanding of the way in which these sort of movements are hijacked or otherwise cynically manipulated through a variety of means by those in the West for whom power and hegemony are the goals above all else. The Wizards Behind the Curtain In order to understand the way in which the protests in Sudan, and movements like them all over the world, are manipulated, influenced, or otherwise controlled by Western powers, we must first examine the major players and the often deliberately obscured connections between them, western intelligence networks, and international financiers. In Sudan, we’ve seen an extraordinary proliferation of western-financed NGOs that have entrenched themselves in the civil society of the country, particularly in an urban center such as Khartoum. Organizations such as Sudan Now and the Enough Project (the latter of which is directly connected to George Clooney, the US State Department and George Soros) indicate the degree to which humanitarian concerns and NGOs are utilized by the US imperialists as cover for their geopolitical agenda. In fact, in the case of Clooney and the Enough Project, we see the presence of John Prendergast, head of the organization and former Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council. His participation, not to mention his close relationship to UN Ambassador Susan Rice, Samantha Power, and the International Crisis Group, should illustrate the degree to which this and other organizations working inside Sudan are either directly or tangentially part of the US intelligence establishment. The Enough Project is also significant because of its ability to sell a Western-constructed narrative of Sudan to an unsuspecting and generally ill-informed public. George Clooney who, along with Council on Foreign Relations member Angelina Jolie, has cultivated an image as a politically progressive humanitarian, is able to construct a particular discourse in the American public’s imagination: Bashir is a monster and the United States must act decisively including possibly using force, to remove him from power. Such a dominant narrative, once entrenched in the public discourse, becomes difficult, if not impossible, to deconstruct. The Enough Project and other humanitarian organizations alone are not the whole story, however. Important players inside the country are also playing an integral role in the attempt at regime change in Sudan. One such important individual is Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, head of the opposition Popular Congress Party (PCP), one of the leading factions within the often-fragmented political opposition. Turabi, a longtime “progressive Islamist”, is not merely a major player in Sudanese politics. In fact, he’s one of the leading “experts” on Sudan with long-standing connections to the US State Department-funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED). In fact, as recently as 2008, Turabi was one of the keynote speakers at the NED in Washington DC where he presented on, among other things, how to bring about regime change in Sudan. Though the usual covers of “democracy promotion”, “transparency”, and other such high-minded abstractions are utilized by Turabi and the NED, these are merely the rhetorical devices used to obscure the obvious goal of such a conference. Turabi’s association with the NED and the US intelligence community is not only significant in demonstrating the role that those institutions are playing in destabilizing Sudan. It also demonstrates the way in which the US imperialists have long-standing ties with so-called “Islamists”, a conclusion made ever more apparent by the ascension of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the deployment of Al Qaeda and other religious militants in Libya, Syria, and elsewhere. In this way, a clearer understanding develops of just how the Western imperialists are able to utilize a variety of means, many of which are “Islamist” in nature, to destabilize regimes they deem to be unfriendly. International Subversion Aside from having to deal with powerful forces engaged in the internal struggles in Sudan, Bashir’s government has also been faced with extraordinary international pressure. Not only has Bashir himself been accused by the ICC (itself an arm of US-NATO power projection) of being a war criminal for his purported role in the conflict in Darfur, he has also watched as the United States and other Western powers fomented a brutal civil war, only to then partition the country, carving out South Sudan, and create the conditions for the current situation. Essentially, Bashir has had to try to maintain his grip on the country in the face of a multi-pronged effort to destroy his regime and the Sudanese state. The conflict with South Sudan has taken a heavy toll on the Sudanese economy. Because of the loss of an estimated 75% of total oil reserves located in the South, inflation has dramatically increased and Khartoum’s revenue from trade with China and other major oil importers has decreased sharply. Additionally, the skirmishes and other armed conflicts between North and South have focused Bashir’s attention to the Abyei Province and other border areas and, consequently, away from other pressing concerns inside the country. This was precisely what the Western powers intended when they began pushing for the partition of the country a few years ago. The imperialist aggression against Libya was an indication to many keen observers that the imperialist ruling class had every intention of completely consolidating control over all of North Africa by removing any vestiges of nationalism and any leaders who might pose a challenge to AFRICOM and the neo-colonial agenda. Gaddafi met his barbaric end at the hands of a vicious lynch-mob or, as they’re called in the West, “freedom fighters”. They and their NTC masters such as Mahmoud Jibril, now the head of the so-called Libyan government, were merely puppets of the West, supported for purposes of economic exploitation of natural resources and to create a safe haven for terrorists to then menace the rest of the region. Likewise, Bashir is on the target list and, without taking precautions, could meet the same fate. What Do They Want? The United States and its western partners have a number of goals in seeking regime change in Sudan. As is the case in so many other conflicts around the world, the main objective is to block Chinese economic development. The Chinese have, for years, been the biggest importer of Sudanese oil and, other than Angola, Sudan was its main supplier on the continent. Aside from oil however, Sudan had become one of the main markets for Chinese economic investment. In fact, by 2002, Sudan was China’s fifth biggest source of revenue and had become a major player in the power generation and other markets. For these reasons, China began to pose a threat to US hegemony in East Africa and, from the perspective of the imperialists, had to be checked. Aside from China, the United States has other geopolitical and economic reasons for destabilizing Sudan. Washington seeks to consolidate control over East and Central Africa and, in order to do so, must eliminate one of their biggest obstacles, Sudan. The US has gone to painstaking lengths to maintain compliant puppet governments in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and elsewhere. In so doing, the US is able to keep Central and East Africa under their thumb, at least to some degree. By destroying the Bashir regime, these imperialists believe they will be able to project US hegemony forward for the foreseeable future and, as a result, secure unfettered access to the wealth of raw materials in the region. There is also an element of opportunism to this plan. The West looks to capitalize on the still viable discursive construct of the Arab Spring as a means to their end. So long as this idea can inspire masses of disaffected youth to take to the streets, the United States and its partners can continue to impose their will in the region. However, as the conflict in Syria has unequivocally shown, without such mythological pretexts, it becomes impossible for the imperialists to achieve their goals. In examining the situation in Sudan, it is important to keep in mind that a critical, anti-imperialist perspective does not mean that one absolves Bashir of any wrongdoing. In fact, it should illustrate the ways in which Bashir and his government have contributed to creating the climate that breeds such protests. However, by analyzing this uprising and investigating simultaneously the positive and insidious forces at work within it, we can begin to apply a broad understanding to the issue and, in so doing, work to prevent the Western imperialist ruling class from destroying yet another sovereign state. Eric Draitser is a frequent contributor to Global Research. Global Research Articles by Eric Draitser http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=31977 END7 ______________________ John Ashworth Sudan, South Sudan Advisor [email protected] +254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile) +211 919 695 362 (South Sudan mobile) +27 82 050 1235 (South Africa mobile) +44 750 304 1790 (UK/international) +88 216 4334 0735 (Thuraya satphone) PO Box 52002 - 00200, Nairobi, Kenya This is a personal e-mail address and the contents do not necessarily reflect the views of any organisation -- -- The content of this message does not necessarily reflect John Ashworth's views. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, John Ashworth is not the author of the content and the source is always cited. You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "sudan-john-ashworth" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.co.za/group/sudan-john-ashworth -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "South Sudan Info - The Kob" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
URGENT ACTION STUDENT ACTIVIST DETAINED, RISKS TORTURE Sudanese student activist Mohammed Salah Mohammed was arrested by men in plain clothes on 24 June in the capital, Khartoum, a few days after he joined peaceful protests. He is being held without charge and is at serious risk of torture and other ill-treatment. Mohammed Salah Mohammed, aged 23, was eating dinner with two friends in the al-Riyadh neighbourhood of Khartoum when about 20 plainclothes security agents came in, beat them up and arrested them. His friends have since been released, but Mohammed Salah Mohammed is still detained. He has not been charged and has not had access to a lawyer. He is at serious risk of torture and other ill-treatment. His family were able to visit him on 14 July in the section of Kober prison run by the National Security Services (NSS). They have said he was shaking, and showed them a bruise on his forehead. Mohammed Salah Mohammed is in particular danger because he suffers from chronic kidney disease and requires medical attention. Mohammed Salah Mohammed is a student at the University of Khartoum's Faculty of Sciences. He is the spokesperson of the Student Democratic Front at the university and the President of the Nubians' regional student association (a group of minority students from the Nubian region in north Sudan). He took part in peaceful protests against the government in the week before his arrest. Please write immediately in Arabic, English or your own language: * Calling on the authorities to release Mohammed Salah Mohammed immediately and unconditionally; * Urging them to ensure Mohammed Salah Mohammed is not tortured or otherwise ill-treated, and that he has regular access to any medical attention he may require and a lawyer of his choice; * Demanding that they stop the harassment of peaceful activists and journalists, and honour their commitment to freedom of expression, as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Sudan is a party. PLEASE SEND APPEALS BEFORE 29 AUGUST 2012 TO: Minister of Interior Ibrahim Mohamed Hamed Ministry of Interior PO Box 873 Khartoum, Sudan Salutation: Your Excellency Minister of Justice Mohammed Bushara Dousa Ministry of Justice, PO Box 302 Al Nil Avenue Khartoum Sudan Salutation: Your Excellency And copies to: President HE Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir Office of the President People's Palace PO Box 281 Khartoum, Sudan Email: [email protected] Salutation: Your Excellency Also send copies to diplomatic representatives accredited to your country. Please insert local diplomatic addresses below: Name Address 1 Address 2 Address 3 Fax Fax number Email Email address Salutation Salutation Please check with your section office if sending appeals after the above date. URGENT ACTION STUDENT ACTIVIST DETAINED, RISKS TORTURE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Inspired by protests throughout the Middle East and North Africa, Sudan has experienced frequent demonstrations since January 2011, calling for political change and an improvement in socio-economic conditions. In response the Sudanese authorities have frequently harassed, arrested and ill-treated peaceful protestors. Since the latest demonstrations began, on 16 June 2012, scores of activists, bloggers and journalists have been arrested and detained in an attempt by the authorities to stifle dissent and reporting on the protest movement, in violation of the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. The protest movement spread from universities in Khartoum and its neighbouring cities Omdurman and Khartoum North to residential areas of the capital as well as provincial towns, including Atbara, Dongola, El Obeid, and Port Sudan. Amnesty International has documented numerous cases of torture and other ill-treatment of protesters by the NSS, in particular since the beginning of the recent protest movement in mid-June 2012. NSS agents have beaten detainees, punching them and using hoses, plastic pipes, sticks and metal bars. The NSS also insulted detainees, deprived them of sleep and made them stand or sit for many hours in direct sunlight, in temperatures of more than 40øC. Name: Mohammed Salah Mohammed Gender m/f: M UA: 216/12 Index: AFR 54/033/2012 Issue Date: 18 July 2012 UA: 216/12 Index: AFR 54/033/2012 Sudan Date: 18 July 2012
