Have the Tripartite Partners Secured Humanitarian Relief for South
Kordofan and Blue Nile?


Jenn Christian August 2012


Recently, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement-North, or SPLM-N, signed separate memoranda of understanding,
or MOUs, with the so-called “Tripartite Partners” comprised of the
United Nations, the African Union, and the League of Arab States.
While challenges remain, the MOUs are a positive step forward in
securing unfettered access for international humanitarian aid
organizations to conflict-affected populations in South Kordofan and
Blue Nile. According to the U.N.’s estimates, the affected population
numbers over 700,000. The vast majority of these people have been
sealed off from international humanitarian assistance since at least
September 2011. Notably, there are discrepancies between the texts of
the two MOUs. These differences, coupled with the continued lack of a
ceasefire agreement between the government and all militarily active
components of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, or SRF, call into
question the efficacy of the two MOUs. These two caveats temper the
degree to which the two MOUs will be effective in creating an
environment in which the Tripartite Partners and their affiliated
organization will be able to adequately deliver aid to
conflict-affected populations, particularly those in SPLM-N-controlled
areas.
Given the ambiguities that remain in the agreements’ texts, the Enough
Project recommends that the Tripartite Partners, backed by other
international actors, closely monitor the implementation of the two
agreements. In particular, the international community should exert
pressure to ensure that the government of Sudan permits independent,
third-party humanitarian access into the two states. As well,
assessment teams compromised of representatives of the Tripartite
Partners should be deployed no later than August 18, 2012 to all
conflict-affected areas. Finally, pressure should be applied on both
parties to maintain a cessation of hostilities in all
conflict-affected areas—not just those areas where humanitarian
operations are taking place—and to press the government of Sudan to
negotiate a comprehensive ceasefire agreement with the SPLM-N and the
other militarily active components of the SRF.


Critical Discrepancies between the Two MOUs
The government of Sudan and the SPLM-N signed different MOUs with the
Tripartite Partners, the texts of which differ in critical ways,
namely:
•
Degree of Government Control over Humanitarian Operations: The
government of Sudan’s MOU incorporates by reference the nine
principles concerning the delivery of aid to South Kordofan and Blue
Nile, which the government laid out in early July 2012. Among other
things, these principles reiterate the Sudanese government’s
sovereignty and control over any humanitarian aid operations
undertaken in the two states. In contrast, the SPLM-N’s MOU does not
incorporate these nine principles, nor does it explicitly provide for
the government of Sudan’s control over aid operations. Instead, the
SPLM-N MOU contains a reservation articulating its concern that aid
operations in the two states are “dependent on the consent of the GoS
[government of Sudan] on access to the SPLM-N controlled areas.” As
such, the potential for the Sudanese government to invoke sovereignty
to limit humanitarian access,in particular by barring entry to certain
international actors or to limit access to areas that it does not want
to recognize as rebel-controlled territory, remains.
•
Deployment of an Assessment Team: The SPLM-N’s MOU provides for the
deployment, within two weeks of August 4, 2012, of a team comprised of
one representative each from the Tripartite Partners to conduct a
needs assessment in the two states. The government’s MOU, on the other
hand, does not explicitly provide for the deployment of an assessment
team; instead, the MOU provides for a meeting between the government
and the Tripartite Partners to approve a plan of action concerning the
conduct of a field assessment.
•
Duration of the MOUs: The government of Sudan’s MOU expires ninety
days from August 5, 2012, subject to renewal with the approval of the
government and the Tripartite Partners. Alternatively, the SPLM-N’s
MOU does not explicitly expire; however, the cessation of hostilities
provided for in the SPLM-N’s MOU expires one month from August 4,
2012, subject to renewal. As the Tripartite Partners are unlikely to
deliver humanitarian aid absent a cessation of hostilities, the
SPLM-N’s MOU, in effect, may be read as expiring one month from August
4, 2012, subject to renewal.
•
Cessation of Hostilities: In principle, both MOUs provide for a
cessation of hostilities; however, the scope and length of the
cessation of hostilities varies between the two documents. In the
government’s MOU, any cessation of hostilities is limited in scope to
any area in which humanitarian aid operations are underway, pursuant
to prior and agreed upon programs for the delivery of aid. This leaves
open the potential for Sudanese government forces to undertake
hostilities in areas in South Kordofan and Blue Nile in which
humanitarian aid operations are not ongoing. As well, the government’s
cessation of hostilities is not immediate; it is contingent on the
development and implementation of programs for the delivery of aid.
The SPLM-N’s MOU, however, provides for an immediate cessation of
hostilities for a one-month period of time, subject to renewal. The
scope of the cessation of hostilities appears to be the entirety of
South Kordofan and Blue Nile, although this is not explicit in the
SPLM-N’s MOU.
Recommended Steps to Mitigate the Effects of These Discrepancies
In light of the above identified discrepancies as between the two
MOUs, the Enough Project recommends that the Tripartite Partners and
the international community:
•
Remain constantly engaged with the implementation of the two MOUs,
paying particular attention to any indications that the government of
Sudan intends to use sovereignty as a pretext to continue to deny much
needed humanitarian aid to civilian populations in SPLM-N-controlled
areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. In light of the government of
Sudan’s demonstrated pattern of limiting or outright denying access to
international humanitarian aid organizations in Southern Sudan,
Darfur, the eastern states of Red Sea, Kassala, and Gedarif, South
Kordofan, and Blue Nile, the SPLM-N’s reservations concerning the
government’s continued control over international humanitarian aid
operations within Sudan are likely well placed and should be heeded.
•
Immediately take steps to deploy, no later than August 18, 2012,
assessment teams comprised of representatives from the Tripartite
Partners to all conflict-affected areas in South Kordofan and Blue
Nile. These teams should be allowed the opportunity to make
independent assessments of the situation in the two states, free from
interference and biased information from either the government of
Sudan or the SPLM-N. As well, the Tripartite Partners must immediately
seek assurances from the government of Sudan that it will cease
hostilities throughout the two States during the assessment period, so
that the assessment teams may travel securely and unhindered.
•
Exercise concerted diplomatic pressure on both the government of Sudan
and the SPLM-N to remain committed to a cessation of hostilities in
all conflict-affected areas, and not just those areas in which aid
operations are underway. The Tripartite Partners and their affiliated
organizations are less likely to deliver aid into insecure areas where
a cessation of hostilities is not guaranteed or is otherwise unclear.
Efforts must also be made to ensure that both MOUs are renewed upon
their respective expiration dates, so as to ensure the continued flow
of aid.
•
Immediately initiate efforts designed to pressure the government of
Sudan to directly negotiate the terms of a comprehensive ceasefire
agreement with the SPLM-N and the other militarily active components
of the SRF. While the political dynamic between the Sudanese
government and the SRF may not lend itself towards the immediate
conclusion of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement, the international
community must explore ptions to pressure the government of Sudan to
initiate such a process as soon as possible. Absent a comprehensive
ceasefire, the likelihood of continued conflict in the two states will
remain high. This insecurity will, in turn, continue to hamper efforts
on the part of the international community to deliver vital
humanitarian aid to conflict-affected populations within the two
states. Further, continued insecurity will cause even greater numbers
of civilians to flee to South Sudan and Ethiopia, where international
humanitarian aid organizations are already struggling to meet the
needs of over 200,000 refugees.

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