Heglig Conflict Revisited: Why did South Sudan withdraw from Heglig (Panthou)?




Written by Thon Agany Ayiei, The New Sudan Vision (NSV),
www.newsudanvision.com



Monday, 22 October 2012 21:28




Introduction

Juba, South Sudan- When South Sudan army, the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army, (SPLA) captured Heglig (Panthou) from the Sudan Armed
Forces (SAF), on April 10th, 2012, South Sudanese were filled with
overwhelming delight. In fact, some youth went on the streets to
celebrate the SPLA victory over SAF in Panthou. On the onset of this
victory and its celebrations, however, the international community
criticized South Sudan for its decision to militarily takeover
Panthou. For instance, the United Nations General Secretary, Ban Ki
Moon, and the United States President, Barack Obama, each made a call
to the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, urging him to
withdraw his army from the oil-rich Panthou.

When in response President Kiir assured South Sudanese that he was not
withdrawing the SPLA from Panthou, the youth once again went on the
streets to support their government’s decision. Some youth even
volunteered to join the army to defend Panthou from being re-captured
by the SAF whose Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Omar Hassan El
Bashire vowed to do so.

Within a week, however, President Kiir reversed his decision and
ordered an immediate unconditional withdrawal of the SPLA from
Panthou, leaving it to SAF. His decision angered many South Sudanese,
especially when Khartoum propagated that its military re-captured
Panthou by force. Then, and even today, South Sudan populace could not
understand why their government could make such a decision when things
seemed to be going in favor of South Sudan at time. International
actors and individuals who were following the Panthou crisis/conflict
were as well puzzled by the South Sudan’s decision to withdraw its
army from the area.

Background

South Sudan seceded from the Sudan in July 2011, following the
referendum on self-determination, in which 99% of South Sudanese voted
for separation. The referendum was part of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) signed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
(SPLM), and the government of Sudan to end a two-decade war between
the two parties. The CPA, signed in January 2005 created a six-year
interim period during which South Sudan remained autonomous, but part
of the whole Sudan which was under the national government leadership.
The national government was made up of both South Sudanese and
Northern Sudanese with President Al Bashir remaining the president,
and the Late Dr. John Garang De Mabior, a Southerner who was then the
Commander of the (SPLA) and the Chairman of the (SPLM), becoming the
First Vice President. The Late Garang was also the president of the
autonomous South Sudan during the Interim period. Also as part of the
CPA arrangement, the South retained its military, the SPLA, while the
North retained Sudan Armed Forces. The two sides contributed equal
military units which together made up the Joined Integrated Units
(JIU) to form the national army.

It was also agreed upon in the CPA that the disputed area of Abyei
would be self-governing during the interim period, and that the people
of Abyei would vote on a separate referendum on whether Abyei would
join the South should the South Secedes, or remain as part of the
North.

Events leading to the SPLA Capturing of Heglig (Panthou)

Sudan and South Sudan have not been very good neighbors since the
South seceded from Sudan in 2011 and even before the secession. For
example, before the referendum on self-determination, Sudan Armed
Forces occupied the disputed area of Abyei by force triggering
military confrontation between the North and the South. The Abyei
conflict ended with the African Union intervention in which the
African Union force occupied the region and providing the roadmap for
the withdrawal of SAF and SPLA forces from the area. Although the
African Union and the United Nations Security council forced SAF and
the SPLA out of Abyiei, the area remains a potential conflict zone
between the two countries up to date.

After the secession of South Sudan, some incidents involving the two
countries proved that the two countries remain bad neighbors if not
enemies. Both sides continuously accused one another for supporting
the rebels fighting their governments. For example, when the Late
General Athor Deng Dut defected from the SPLA and formed a rebel group
to fight against Juba, the government of South Sudan accused Khartoum
of supporting his rebels. Juba also accused Khartoum of supporting
other Southern rebel groups under General Tangginya, the Late Col.
Gatluak Gai, Oliny and General Yau Yau. South Sudan further accused
Sudan of inciting tribal conflict among Southern tribes by arming
tribal youth to fight tribal wars among themselves.

On the other hand, Sudan on many occasions accused South Sudan of
supporting the rebels fighting Khartoum government. For example, when
the former governor of the Blue Nile state, General Malik Agar who
fought alongside the SPLA during the civil war defected and started
fighting the Sudan government, Khartoum pointed a finger on South
Sudan, claiming that General Agar was being supported by Juba.
Khartoum repeated the same accusation when another former governor,
General Adel Aziz of another Northern State, Kordofan, defected and
declared war on Khartoum regime.

When General Malik Agar’s forces, General Abdel Aziz’s forces,
together with the Darfur’s factions joined forces and opened a united
front against the Sudan Armed Forces, Sudan accusation against South
Sudan intensified and Sudan started issuing threats of retaliation
against South Sudan. Khartoum’s threat later materialized when its
forces started attacking the Southern border town of Jau on the ground
and by air claiming that Northern rebels were using it for training
under the protection of the Southern military. It is widely believed
that it were these attacks that escalated to the final showdown
between the SAF and the SPLA at the oil-rich border area of Heglig
(Panthou) which eventually felt to the SPLA.

South Sudan’s Justification for Taking over Panthou

At the initial stages of its occupation of Panthou, South Sudan’s
justification for militarily taking over Panthou was very simple and
straight forward. South Sudan claimed that it attacked and captured
Panthou as a matter of self-defense from the Sudan Armed Forces. The
SPLA explained that SAF was using Panthou as a military base to launch
ground attacks on the SPLA inside South Sudan, therefore forcing the
SPLA to counter-attack and capture Panthou. Refering to the capturing
of Heglig, President Kiir claimed that “This was to ensure the
security of Panthou (Heglig) so that it would not be used as a
springboard for launching further attacks into the territory of the
Republic of South Sudan.”

When the international community blamed South Sudan for occupying the
supposedly Sudan’s Heglig, the government of South Sudan retaliated by
claiming that Panthou initially belonged to South Sudan based on the
1956 border demarcation, and that it was only annexed to Sudan in 1978
after oil was discovered there. And to build a better case, South
Sudan produced a new map of South Sudan that includes Panthou based on
the 1956 borderline. With this tool, South Sudan threatened to take
the status of Panthou to the international court of arbitration.
Following the withdrawal of the SPLA from Panthou, the Minister of
Information in the government of South Sudan, Dr. Marial Benjamin
explained that ‘We… expect that the final status of Heglig and other
disputed areas will be referred to international arbitration on the
final determination of their status.’

The Analysis

South Sudan’s decision to withdraw from Panthou is complex and reminds
me of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Two writers, Graham Allison
and Philip Zelikow, in their book, “Essence of Decision: Explaining
the Cuban Missile Crisis,” wrote:

History offers no parallel to those thirteen days of October 1962,
when the United States and the Soviet Union paused at the nuclear
precipice. Never before had there been such a high probability that so
many lives would end suddenly. Had war come, it could have meant the
death of 100 million Americans and more than 100 million Russians, and
millions of Europeans as well.

The Panthou situation was as serious as that of the Cuban missile
crisis in a way. Just as the United States and the Soviet Union were
at the brink of war during the 13 days the Soviets had their missiles
deployed within the range of the American mainland, there was no doubt
that both Sudan and South Sudan were preparing for a full scale war
during the 10 days the South Sudan army occupied Panthou. On the side
of Sudan, President Al Bashire himself declared that ‘Either we end up
occupying Juba or you end up occupying Khartoum but the boundaries of
the old Sudan can no longer fit us together, only one of us has to
remain standing.’ The President further added that liberating Heglig
would be the first step toward such a destiny. Furthermore, he called
on Popular Defense Forces (a paramilitary group) to help the national
army liberate Panthou and to subsequently capture Juba.

In South Sudan, President Salva Kiir asked all South Sudanese to come
to the defense of Panthou. The government of South Sudan also called
upon the states bordering the North to contribute 1000 young men and
women each to help defend Panthou. On their side, South Sudanese young
men and women volunteered to join the military to fight in Panthou.
The youth was responding to the call by their president who urged all
South Sudanese, and especially the youth to “forget ‘tribal conflicts’
and unite to confront a more pressing danger.”

All these signs from both countries are good indications that not only
were both sides preparing for a full scale war, but for a war that was
going to be very devastating. Had this war took place, both sides were
going to unleash human waves and use all the powerful weapons they had
in hand to capture or defend Panthou. Therefore, looking at the Heglig
conflict, one would be tempted to compare it to the Cuban Misile
crisis to better understand why the government of South Sudan decided
to withdraw its army from the area.

The Cuban missile crisis is very similar to the Panthou conflict in
some ways. First, the Cuban missile was one of its kind during the
Cold War. It was the only event during the cold war that almost
brought the two superpowers of the time, the United States and the
Soviet Union to an all-out nuclear war. Nuclear weapons were never
used in a large scale before and the outcome of an all-out nuclear war
between the two superpowers was estimated to be very devastating as
Allison and Zelikow wrote. In comparison, the Panthou conflict was
inevitably going to lead to an all-out war between Sudan and South
Sudan had South Sudan not withdrawn from the area. This was evidenced
by the fact that both countries were seriously preparing for a full
scale war during those ten days the SPLA occupied Panthou. Therefore,
if such a war materialized, the magnitude of its destruction would
have been unprecedented in the history of the struggle between the
SPLA and the SAF, including during the civil war.

Second, the level of threat the Soviet’s missiles capable of reaching
the United States from Cuba posted could no longer be kept secret from
the American public by the US government; it reached every living
American at the time, thus putting high pressure on President
Kennedy’s government to act decisively and within the shortest time
possible. This was the case with the SPLA capturing of Panthou. All
Sudanese were informed about the capturing of Heglig and demanded that
their leaders do all it takes to re-capture the oil-rich Heglig. To
show how serious the situation was, the Sudanese Minister of Defense
was put under investigation for his failure to defend Panthou and for
failing to re-capture it within the shortest time possible. Therefore,
Al Bashire’s and his entire regime’s reputation and survival rested on
the status of Heglig. So for President Al Bashire and his regime,
re-capturing Panthou was a matter of death and survival and he was
bound to do whatever it takes to regain his reputation by re-capturing
Heglig. This was well spelled out in his desperate threatening
speeches during the conflict, including calling South Sudanese
“insects” that needed to be sprayed.

Finally, it was the Soviet Leader, Nikita Khrushchev who was holding
the key to war and the key to peace during the Cuban missile crisis.
If Khrushchev decided to reject the United States request to remove
his missiles from Cuban, the US would have been left with no other
choice, but to strike the Soviet missiles sites in Cuba, triggering
full war between the two states. But thanks to Nikita Khrushchev, he
choose peace and re-deployed his missiles out of Cuba. During the
Heglig conflict, it was President Salva Kiir of South Sudan who was
holding the key to war and the key to peace. If he decided not to
withdraw his forces from Panthou, Khartoum would have had no choice,
but to try by all means possible to re-take Heglig which would have
meant full scale war between the two Sudans. President Kiir’s decision
to withdraw the SPLA from Panthou undoubtedly defused a full scale war
between Khartoum and Juba.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that when the government of South Sudan made a
decision to withdraw the SPLA from Panthou, the average South Sudanese
was angry, and the ordinary international individuals who were
following the Heglig conflict were puzzled. But looking closely at how
the states survives in real international politics, one may as well
realize that the government of South Sudan then made the right
decision to withdraw its army from Panthou.

Frist and foremost, the people of the two Sudans are tired of war as
they just got out of one of the most destructive wars in Africa, and
returning them back to the same situation they were in less than a
decade ago is something that the presidents of the two countries
always think about when faced with crisis like that of Heglig
throughout the implementation of the CPA. During the Heglig conflict,
president Kiir himself reiterated: ‘I always say we will not take the
people of South Sudan back to war, but if we are being aggressed
[attacked] like this we will have to defend ourselves.’ President Al
Bashire on his side blamed South Sudan for the then looming war,
accusing South Sudanese of choosing “the path of war” and warning that
“war was not in the interests of either South Sudan or Sudan.”
Therefore, as a leader who cares about his people, President Kiir
accepted the fact that he was the only one holding the key to peace
and war and decided to open the door to peace to avoid the unnecessary
suffering of the people of both Sudans.

Second, if President Kiir and his government decided to hold Heglig
and even advance further North and create other fronts as the
President threatened during the conflict that his troops were to be
heading to Abyei if SAF does not pull out, still there was one more
obstacle South Sudan would have faced. Statehood comes with
international responsibilities, and South Sudan then being perceived
as the aggressor by the international community in the Heglig conflict
would have been expected to take full responsibility for taking such
action. Prior to SPLA capturing of Heglig, South Sudan did not have
any concrete claim over Heglig, at least in the eyes of the
international community, and that is why there was no arrangement for
SAF to pull out from the area as was the case in Abyei and other
disputed areas. And as such, South Sudan was clearly the aggressor and
that is why world leaders such as President Obama and regional and
international bodies, such as the African Union and the United Nations
called up on South Sudan to withdraw immediately. Had South Sudan
ignored this call to withdraw from Heglig and continue the war against
the North, this would have been self-suffocation by the government of
South Sudan as this might have resulted in consequences like arm
embargo and sanctions from the international community. At the same
time, such refusal to heed to the international demand would
automatically have given Khartoum an upper hand over Juba in the
international politics as the world would have just sympathized with
Sudan and sees South Sudan as the violator of international laws,
norms and ethics.

Unless one really wanted South Sudan and Sudan to go back to full
scale war and cause unnecessary suffering of the people of South
Sudan, and at the same time creates a bad image for South Sudan in the
eyes of the international community, the decision to withdraw the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army from Heglig was the right decision at
the time. Such a decision defused what would-have been a devastating
war between the North and the South, saving thousands of lives which
would have been lost in such a war.

Overall, Heglig conflict ended in the victory for  South Sudan, both
militarily and politically. Militarily, the SPLA was tested and proved
very strong. The people’s army was capable of executing its national
duty which is to defend the national borders of South Sudan against
external aggression. It effectively destroyed SAF’s units in Heglig
that were launching ground and air attacks inside South Sudan, and as
a result, those attacks have ceased completely. Politically, the
decision to withdraw the SPLA from Heglig when the world begged
President Kiir to do so have created a suitable atmosphere for South
Sudan to maneuver with in the international political environment.
After withdrawing from Panthou, South Sudan was seen as a young nation
that respects international laws, norms and ethics, and this in fact
paved the way for the recent Addis Ababa agreement which resulted in
the cooperation between the two Sudans to resume oil production and to
work on other economic and security arrangements. Thus it is crucial
to understand that state survival needs more than just military power;
it as well needs political maneuvering, and withdrawing from Panthou
was a rewarding political maneuver by South Sudan.

*Thon Agany Ayiei holds an MA in Security Studies from the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and works in Juba. He can
be reached at [email protected] e-mail

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