Intelligence Needs in the Hunt for the LRA






Current efforts to end the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, including
the deployment of U.S. military advisors to East and Central Africa,
are unlikely to succeed if they are not accompanied by substantial
diplomatic, military, logistical, and intelligence support. This
series of LRA issue briefs describes the main obstacles to success and
explains what steps the United States and its partners should take in
their efforts to end the LRA threat.

 By Ashley Benner | Feb 21, 2013

Full Report (PDF)


The Problem



Inadequate intelligence about the LRA: Efforts to apprehend the LRA's
senior leaders and protect civilians from attack lack real-time
intelligence about the locations and activity of the LRA.

There are a number of reasons why real-time intelligence about the LRA
is very difficult to collect.


 •The LRA's vast operating area. The LRA operates in an area that
spans more than 115,000 square miles and stretches across several
countries. This area is approximately equivalent in square miles to
Arizona or Côte d'Ivoire.
 •Too few troops actively pursuing the LRA. The governments of the
LRA-affected countries have provided 2,860 troops to the embryonic
African Union Regional Task Force that has been tasked with tracking
and ending the LRA. The number of troops actively pursuing the group's
senior commanders, engaging with communities about LRA sightings and
activity, and protecting civilians is much lower. Gathering of human
intelligence—information provided by communities, park rangers,
nomadic groups, and others in the region—is especially critical, but
is hampered by the small number of active troops in LRA-affected
areas.
 •  Access. The troops are not able to operate in all of the areas
where the LRA is present—a problem that severely limits their ability
to track the group. The LRA has found safe haven in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and the Kafia Kingi area that straddles the
contested Sudan-South Sudan border. These areas are off-limits to the
Ugandan army—the only force consistently tracking and conducting
offensive missions against the LRA. Recently, the Congolese government
committed troops to work in conjunction with the A.U. Regional Task
Force, giving the effort access to portions of Congo. However, the
effectiveness of this new arrangement remains to be seen. Kafia Kingi
remains outside of the Task Force's operating area, thus, little is
known about the LRA groups hiding there.

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