Is the Crimea referendum a good model for Africa? - By Richard Dowden
Posted on March 18, 2014 by AfricanArgumentsEditor      

dowden9What would happen if African peoples where given the chance to
vote in referenda to decide which country they wanted to be part of or
if they wanted their own?

The referendum in Crimea is a dangerous precedent reminiscent of the
Austrian Anschluss and the other uprisings in eastern Europe to join
Germany in the 1930s. I used to think that Europe's states had grown
naturally, organically - in contrast to Africa's imposed borders. That
I thought was a major reason for Africa's weak states and small local
wars. Then I read up on the post World War One settlement and
discovered that Europe's borders had been reset by three men: Woodrow
Wilson, the American president, and two Europeans; David Lloyd George,
the British Prime Minister, and Georges Clemenceau, the Prime Minister
of France. As a result of the lines they drew on the map, the tribes
of Europe were reorganised, some freed from foreign rule, some forced
into countries they felt no loyalty to and some displaced and forced
to leave their homes. It was a mess and planted some of the seeds of
World War II.

Africa's arbitrary borders, mostly drawn by people who had never set
foot in the continent, have always been an obvious target for
renegotiation. But Africa's first rulers, who foresaw chaos and
disintegration if the nation states were reconfigured, ruled it out.
"Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State"
was one of the founding principles of the Organisation of African
Unity (OAU), the forerunner of the African Union. Despite all the
wars, internal and external, this principle has been pretty much
adhered to by both presidents and people.

Loyalty to an African state is not always related to the ability of
that state to make the lives of its people better. Patriotism, an
emotional thing, does not take these benefits into account, even in
countries where the majority of citizens are marginalised or oppressed
by the government. Even in the catastrophic recent meltdown of South
Sudan after just two years of independence, no one is advocating
return to rule from Khartoum. In the dying days of Mobutu's Zaire (now
the DRC) I was astonished to find that people felt it to be a great
country. I asked why Katanga, the rich south east province, didn't
secede - as it had in 1960. My suggestion was greeted with shocked
surprise.

The reasons for separation may not be to do with regional identity or
ethnicity. In Eritrea after the defeat of Mengistu Haile Mariam in
1991 I suggested to the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)
that, with the dictator gone, it would make more sense to stay as part
of Ethiopia and benefit from all its resources than to go it alone. My
suggestion was treated with shock. But, I pointed out, the Tigrayans
who now run Ethiopia are your allies and are the same ethnicity as you
Eritreans - you speak the same language, are part of the same culture,
divided only by a colonial border. My Eritrean friends showed they had
serious doubts about my sanity. "Ourselves Alone" had been their
slogan and they would never give it up.

Some other examples: in 1991 the Somalilanders declared they would
never be part of Somalia again, reversing their 1960 decision to join
their fellow Somalis of the former Italian Somaliland (and after WWII
a UN trusteeship) as one country.

Zanzibar and other islands off the East African coast would be a
candidate to split away from Tanzania. The relationship has never been
good since the British forced the merger on newly-independent Tanzania
which led to the massacres of 1964. Zanzibar, its archipelago of
islands and the coastal Swahili area, have a very strong culture and
an unhappy historical relationship with the interior of Tanzania. They
would almost certainly vote for independence. The growth of Islamic
fundamentalism in the region and the prospect of large profits from
newly discovered offshore gas fields will also heighten tensions.

In western Zambia the Barotse people want independence on the grounds
that they were a British protectorate which had an agreement with the
British South Africa Company in the 19th Century, giving it a separate
status to the Rhodesian colony around it. But at independence it was
forced to be part of Zambia. The struggle continues. After all
Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho had the same status and were able to
stay separate from South Africa.

There is also a small group in Uganda that is fighting for
independence on the same basis. A greater threat there is that the
Baganda, the largest ethnic group which occupies the core of the
country, might demand more self governance. Meanwhile their rivals in
Bunyoro are sitting on Uganda's oil. What if the Bunyoro - like the
tribe in northern Britain called 'Scottish' - decide they want all the
benefit from the oil under their feet?

Then there is the north west of Cameroon which used to be administered
by Britain while the rest of the former Germany colony was given to
France. Anglophone Cameroonians have always felt marginalised but
would they really want to join their fellow English speakers across
the border in Nigeria?

And in Nigeria itself the power struggle between north and south, east
and west is still at the heart of politics. The only part that might
want to leave and manage its own affairs is the Ibo east but they
fought a war to do that and lost. I was surprised that when democracy
was restored after 1999 and the Yoruba in Western Nigeria threatened
to secede even though the president, Olusegun Obasanjo, was himself
Yoruba. It was explained to me that he was not giving sufficient
resources to the Yoruba lords and politicians and they needed to
remind him where his ultimate loyalty should lie. They succeeded. The
south west did a lot better in his second term and talk of
independence faded.

Could the north of Nigeria secede? Why should it? As long as Nigeria's
main revenue comes from cheques from oil companies, the north - or
northern Big Men - will get some pay-off from oil. Without it northern
Nigeria, resource-wise, has almost nothing. Secession is not an
option.

There have only been two official changes to Africa's boundaries since
independence; the establishment of Eritrea and South Sudan. Both were
done with the agreement of the mother country. Somaliland's bid for
independence has not officially succeeded because it had no regional
African sponsor to push it through the African Union. Elsewhere the
boundaries have been accepted, although Morocco seized Western Sahara
contrary to international law and, with French and American
protection, has held on to it ever since.

Only Ethiopia - for its own political reasons - gives the right to all
its 'nations' to secede if they want to. That clause was created to
allow Eritrea to become independent. No one else has been allowed to
use it although the Ogaden Somalis would probably prefer to be part of
Somalia or at least have their own separate state. But the very
thought that there is an option available helps to guarantee that the
Ethiopian government delivers development to all its nations.

I cannot draw any clear conclusions about loyalty to state, national
coherence and ethnicity except that it is extremely hard to get right
and there are no clear lessons. Remember - there are only two nation
states in Africa with only one dominant ethnic group. One is Africa's
most successful country - Botswana. The other is the continent's
biggest disaster - Somalia.

Richard Dowden is Director of the Royal African Society and author of
Africa; altered states, ordinary miracles. Follow Richard on twitter
@DowdenAfrica
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5 thoughts on "Is the Crimea referendum a good model for Africa? - By
Richard Dowden"

    Adewale Maja-Pearce says:   
    March 18, 2014 at 10:47 pm

    Northern Nigeria has lots of natural resources (men are dying in
illegal gold mines, for starters), and this aside from its agriculture
and cattle, much of which is consumed in the South. That said, Nigeria
as amalgamated is clearly not working - except for the Northern 'Big
Men', along with their southern counterparts. We are now in yet
another national conference in which the colonial borders are
sacrosanct before anyone has even begun deliberating on our future. It
may be that 50-odd years of independence has bred a notion of
'Nigeria' that is broadly accepted, and with it a willingness to
consider retaining the borders. But on what terms? That the country is
made up of disparate religions, cultures and languages which formerly
ruled themselves as they thought best is widely acknowledged but
truncated by the present arrangement imposed from above - and all for
the oil the Big Men (a severe minority, necessarily perhaps) currently
enjoy.

    As for the south-west wanting to secede in 1999, this is strange
to hear, although it's true that it is the best placed to go it alone,
unlike the 'Ibo east', which needed to take along the oil minorities
if it was to stand any chance of being viable. Ironically, it is the
same Igbos who have the most to lose in any future conflagration
(which the Big Men appear intent on lighting) for reasons to do with
their overcrowded homeland, which also suffers ecological problems. In
Lagos State alone, they are reputed to comprise 40% of the population.

    For myself, I believe we need - and eventually must have - a
confederation of some sort. It will draw on examples from elsewhere
but will be tailored to the specific needs of this awkward entity,
which has no parallel elsewhere. Unfortunately, the current
conference, a replica of the one Obasanjo inaugurated in order to
smuggle in his third-term agenda, is now being put at the service of
Jonathan's second-term (or is it third-term?) agenda.

    And so we go around in circles, evading the issue which Biafra
attempted to pose, only to be crushed by the Big Men who dance to the
tune of those who protect their money, hence the Trojan horse known as
Okonjo-Iweala, whose Harvard education and World Bank credentials
impress so many of our s-called public intellectuals in the pages of
our badly-edited newspapers.

    In the end, of course, it is Nigerians who must solve Nigeria's
problems. One hopes they will do so sooner rather than later but it
appears not given their apparent faith in the latest pow-wow.
    Nigerian says:      
    March 19, 2014 at 2:51 pm

    I don't think ethnic agitations by themselves will force a break
up of African states.

    Issues like youth unemployment, resource scarcity etc will result
in youth restiveness - and the nation implodes from within (like
Mali).

    For larger nations like Nigeria, there is no nation able to put
them back together again if they implode - and we are on that
trajectory.

    If implosion happens, the "big men" will simply take their money
to Dubai or wherever (it will preferable to living in chaos).

    The only thing standing between the "big men" and 50 years of
accumulated anger is the Nigerian Army. And you can see the Nigerian
Army has SERIOUS challenges in the North East (please note: the Niger
Delta Militancy is only dormant).
    A. Kuffour says:    
    March 21, 2014 at 8:57 am

    I have now read one book and three essays by Richard Dowden, and I
can say this: when it comes to Nigeria, you can always count on Dowden
making at least one factual blunder.

    I refuse, at this time, to engage his mostly wrongheaded arguments
about Africa, but I want to point out that Dowden can't seem to resist
putting his foot in it whenever the topic is Nigeria.

    From 2009 when he claimed, 'The only non-northerner to rule
Nigeria has been Olusegun Obasanjo', to 2011 when he claimed, '[U]ntil
Chimamanda Adichie's novel Half of a Yellow Sun there was no written
memory of what happened [during the Nigerian Civil War]', it becomes
even clearer with this latest piece that these falsehoods are his
stock in trade.
    Monte McMurchy says:        
    March 21, 2014 at 4:01 pm

    The Flawed Referendum Process in Crimea
    The free open civic civil social expression of a citizen is of
crucial ordinal importance and an expressive referendum is one civic
electoral instrument type process in which a citizen is able to
advance and express an opinion on a matter of specific importance.
    A National Public Referendum is a social civic public policy
endeavor not to be conducted in haste or when the existent social
political posture is in a state of acute extreme emotional animation
as this state of extreme animated emotion within the citizen decider
may not provide an accurate descriptive reflection of the real
expressive mood in long term prescriptive reflective consideration.
    A period of common pause considered reflection of the question
'put' allowing for full open citizen conversation including social
civic civil dialogue ought to be allowed prior to a referendum type
question/policy being posed and decided. This Crimean Referendum
situation did not allow for this most essential civic civil common
pause reflective timeframe. A Four [4] to Six [6] month time frame to
discuss the question/policy to be decided by referendum would not be
unreasonable as the question being 'put' is a question most ordinal
and fundamental and ought not be decided in emotive haste.
    In my seasoned civic electoral opinion, this Crimean Referendum
Process is constructively flawed in both civic process and in civil
procedure. Therefore this Crimean Referendum should not be considered
as binding upon the citizens of Crimea.
    If Africa were to embark on a similar type/kind of Referendum
process where borders and other artificial impediments can be
moderated/modified; similar civic civil electoral due process
considerations must be instituted allowing full clear objective non
emotive discussion as to the potential ramifications such a
modification will entail. A Referendum detailing fundamental national
issues of concern is not to be entertained lightly.
    Bala Liman says:    
    March 22, 2014 at 1:38 am

    I tend to agree with A. Kuffour in Dowden's current assessment of
Nigeria but disagree with Adewale's remark that only the south west is
a viable nation if Nigeria breaks up. Regarding Dowden's statement
that the north will no be viable so secession is not an option, this
is just the normal flaw in examining everything from an economic
perspective. yes Northern Nigeria might have no oil, but is oil the
only resource? I agree that it will be landlocked and will have to
reassess its priorities if there is no oil to keep it afloat, but that
is not such a bad thing is it?
    Adewale must realise that Nigeria remains viable now because each
region like it or not complements each other and just relying on Lagos
and its growth will not sustain the south west if the country breaks
up. Will Lagos' large revenue base be able to sustain the poorer
states in the region?
    Also a break up will result in a movement of populations across
borders and apart from the north all other areas will experience a
positive net migration which will be a social problem.
    It is quite easy to make sweeping statements about who benefits
and who does not if Nigeria breaks up, but we need to look deeper to
understand that that scenario might just not be beneficial for anyone
or as rosy as it seems.

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