The protections described in RFC8754 apply to any SRv6 deployment and any SID behavior or flavor. While writing RFC8754 text, there was a great deal of discussion and consideration given to protecting SIDs from misuse, and that resulted in the filtering described in 5.1, SRH filtering was never documented.
Since SRv6 block filtering is still the best way to protect any SID, and it equally applies to CSIDs, this issue appears well closed to me. Thanks Darren On 2023-08-08, 11:01 AM, "spring" <spring-boun...@ietf.org> wrote: Issue #4 reads: In some cases it is possible that the SR policy can be expressed purely with C-SIDs without requiring an SRH. In this case, to allow the SR domain to fail closed, some form of filtering based on the LOC part of the SRv6 SID is required as relying purely on the presence of an SRH will not be sufficient. I would also like to note upfront that it is already possible based on RFC8754 to send packets without an SRH (e.g. one segment encapsulated into outer header) but having C-SIDs makes it applicable to a wider set of use cases. The response from the editors reads: Added text in revision -01 (Sec. 12<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression-05#section-12>) indicating that the SRv6 security model (Sec. 5.1 of RFC 8754<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8754.html#section-5.1>) also applies to the SIDs defined in draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression. The SRv6 security model uses IP address filtering (SRv6 SID block) and does not rely on the presence of an SRH. Please indicate to the list whether you consider this resolution sufficient to close the issue, or have further concerns that should be addressed. If you have concerns, clarity about them is appreciated. This call is open for two weeks, through August 22.
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