Normally you have food for thought.  This one blah....got some examples?

Not all examples are in fire protection, because fire disaster data
includes significant outliers or the far area under small asymptotic
tails...
but here goes.


Bangladesh, Libya, many parts of: Africa, Pakistan,
both
rural India and South America.

Spot-drops in maintenance and inspection for Codes and Standards
exists
today in the USA
, though
.   So what is more appropriate, adoption of an expensive code that will
not be fully complied with, or application of a *
lighter*
**
code that if
complied with,
would provide more
risk-
effective protection?
One should naturally ask, 'but h
ow can different clients be allowed to pursue different levels of risk
tolerance?
That is not fair."
 It is argued that different levels of risk tolerance are pursued already,
with more than a few who don't clear the bar
where they are less
blessed with resources.

Regarding lay persons ability to assess their own risk---
the most common mistake experts make is overconfidence in their personal
ability to predict
risk [1].

To say that lay persons/end-users are the last one's capable of assessing
what risk they are and should be exposed to, sounds a bit Orwellian, might
be construed as economic manipulation, and perhaps is a constriction of
civil liberty.  Whether a *lighter* (not Liter) version of building codes
and standards ought to be drafted is certainly debatable (after all, what
are performance based methods for?).  But the devil is in the details, and
while
many jurisdictions accommodate horse-trading of building system components
to achieve a *lighter *degree of protetion, many of those same
jurisdictions will
not compromise on the design of the components themselves... and that was
why this
draft
about *Code/Standard Lite *
was
brewed
.  We certainly have a pool of candidates from the framing committees whom
would be imminently competent to write such *lighter* documents.

There is however, no debate about whether the wisdom of the crowds will be
better than any random individual expert at difficult-to-forecast risk.  A
ccuracy using th
is pluralistic
method is demonstrably superior
to individual assessments
made most
expert
s
.
There are several reasons to include the commons in a closed vote risk
acceptanc
e determination
:

   1.  it avoids the Asch effect (peer pressure) endemic to the consensus
process,
   2. it avoids manipulation by economic interests inherent in the current
consensus process,
   3. it internalizes current externalities (users of *Kiss* and *The
Station* clubs were not asked whether they would accept the risk they were
exposed to).
   4. it avoids the problem presented by the American justice system
whereby jury selection all but ensures we get a quorum chosen by face
-
recognition experts who prefer
jurors for their
pre-existing biases.
Crowd sourcing, by virtue of sample size, cancels out the injustice brought
on by unfounded bias found in cliques.

This is off subject, but it is old information that if we are paid salary
as life safety fire engineers, it is our legal duty to inform citizens of
the fire hazards within buildings
of our responsible charge.
What is new, is a suggestion to inform the public *
a
t
 the sidewalk* of th
e
fire risk *
in a simple format*.  Then, for sure it is the user's decision as to how
best to engage that structure.

This
is
an attempt to debate ideas
in preferenbce to debating
people
(expert people vs lay people)
.  The US residential sprinkler question mentioned is another example,
closer to home, where the core of the debate appeared to be about
he ideas of
risk assessment.  One could say that from the current state of Code
adoption, the experts in fire protection were over confident in their risk
assessment.  Others might say, looking at this same elephant another way,
that the risk assessment was temporarily manipulated by
lobbied-for-economic-interests...and that ultimately good judgment will win
the day on residential fire protection and
subsequent re
allocation of public resources.

Better tools to implement risk assessment
is one of the main points in this debate.
 Possibly a *
lighter* version of Codes and Standards is not a sharp enough tool to be
worthy of creation and consumption.  That is
something the consumers (i.e. the
crowd
out to decide).


This debate is not saying, let us sprinkler the
entire
domain of structures so that 87% + of our built-environment fire problems
are adequately taken care of,
allowing us to
redirect
fire
resources to more pressing issues (e.g. neonatal health care, child abuse,
criminal
-
 and
national
-
election
system
reform, etc.)  although that would be a good thing to do.  This debate is
saying end users should be allowed a voice in choosing which risk they will
be exposed to, and
tools better suited to different levels of
risk assessment could be developed.


To witness, i
n instance
A,
end users will tolerate more risk-exposure-than-allowed by a fully
prescriptive Code solution
when
they don't have enough resource if
:

a]. the
proximity of
to the failure
-
point is transparently shown, a
llowing users a
more accurate self-choice,

b]. transparent risk assessments accurately identif
ies
 mitigations (though
mitigations
short of fully-prescriptive solutions) bringing a known level of risk
reduction (this is where *Light *Codes and Standards come in). and

c]. users
and owners for establishments
such as
in
Santa Maria, Brazil or West Warwick, RI, USA  don't have
(or want to spend)
the resources on full
y
prescriptive compliance.


In instance
B
, end users will demand less risk exposure

because they
don't have
enough
resources
(e.g.
the
citizenry of Fukushima don't have another house or place
to
pick up and
move to
).  G
ranted, this is not a fire protection risk assessment, but it is a valid
case where allowing lay persons a say in the risk assessment would have
generated more buy-in and less litigation tensions, if not an outright
decision to pay for locating the emergency generators on the hill next to
the reactor.  Groundwater in some places of
Fukushima
now presents
Strontium-90 at 30 times the
Japanese
legal limit
; ~ 100,000 persons were displaced.
It is not morally (and probably not legally) correct to inflict abitrary
and capricious (as determined by a crowd source of your choice) losses on
people without giving these people a say in their risk exposure.  It also
could result in public unrest.

Thank you very much for your inciteful comments.  Here is to a more
accurate and appropriate allocation of resources, via engagement of
improved tools and methods in risk assessment.


Scot Deal
Excelsior Fire/Risk Engineering


[1]
http://longnow.org/seminars/02007/jan/26/why-foxes-are-better-forecasters-than-hedgehogs/
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