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I think this discussion deserves wider exposure, so I'm forwarding it to
the sssd-devel list.

This pertains to https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/237 - Kerberos
client functionality should be able to use FAST if available


- -------- Original Message --------
Subject: On FAST support in SSSD
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2010 17:19:09 -0500
From: Nalin Dahyabhai <na...@redhat.com>
Organization: Red Hat, Inc.
To: Stephen Gallagher <sgall...@redhat.com>

Stephen, I took a closer look at it, and here's what I can tell you:

 FAST uses a previously-obtained ticket, and an authenticator that's
 built using it, to encrypt AS requests and replies traded between the
 client and the KDC.  This yields a few useful benefits:
  * The entire AS exchange is encrypted: eavesdroppers have to crack the
    armor ticket's key to even figure out who the client of the AS
    request is.  Additionally, as the ticket's key is usually random
    rather than password-based, so dictionary attacks should be harder.
    * If the armor ticket was issued by a KDC whose identity was
      verified, then the AS reply is also verified (for example, the
      armor ticket could have been obtained using PKINIT, in which the
      client can verify the KDC's identity using the KDC's certificate).
  * The client and KDC can jointly select a key which is not based on
    the client's long-term password.
    * The authentication can be performed with a mechanism that doesn't
      yield a key, for example with an OTP token (in the current draft,
      the key used for encrypting the TGT is based on the armor key,
      possibly in combination with the OTP token).

In the implementation we use, when the client software calls
  krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_fast_ccache_name()
to set the location of a ccache containing a suitable ticket, before
calling krb5_get_init_creds_password(), the client uses FAST.  If the
client tries to use FAST and the server doesn't support it, then the
client will treat that as an error and fail to obtain a TGT.

If SSSD already has a credential cache when it goes to obtain a TGT for
a user, this is probably a trivial addition, but I'd suggest it not be
turned on by default.  Hopefully it'd be available as an option for
situations where it's already known that the KDC supports FAST (either
beforehand or out-of-band, most likely).

HTH,

Nalin
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