2.6.27.58-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us 
know.

------------------

From: Tavis Ormandy <tav...@cmpxchg8b.com>

commit 462e635e5b73ba9a4c03913b77138cd57ce4b050 upstream.

The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the
vdso) skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local
attacker to bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting
the available pages for special mappings.

bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, and although I don't think this can
be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not to have
the security check.

  $ uname -m
  x86_64
  $ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
  65536
  $ cat install_special_mapping.s
  section .bss
      resb BSS_SIZE
  section .text
      global _start
      _start:
          mov     eax, __NR_pause
          int     0x80
  $ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o 
install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
  $ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping 
install_special_mapping.o
  $ ./install_special_mapping &
  [1] 14303
  $ cat /proc/14303/maps
  0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                                  
[vdso]
  00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665                            
/home/taviso/install_special_mapping
  00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0                                  
[stack]

It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to
4096.

Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <tav...@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <k...@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Robert Swiecki <swie...@google.com>
[ Changed to not drop the error code - akpm ]
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmor...@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w...@1wt.eu>

---
 fs/exec.c |    5 +++++
 mm/mmap.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

Index: longterm-2.6.27/fs/exec.c
===================================================================
--- longterm-2.6.27.orig/fs/exec.c      2011-01-29 11:22:46.000000000 +0100
+++ longterm-2.6.27/fs/exec.c   2011-01-29 15:36:13.479064083 +0100
@@ -257,6 +257,11 @@
 
        vma->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
        vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
+
+       err = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
+       if (err)
+               goto err;
+
        err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
        if (err) {
                up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
Index: longterm-2.6.27/mm/mmap.c
===================================================================
--- longterm-2.6.27.orig/mm/mmap.c      2011-01-29 11:22:46.000000000 +0100
+++ longterm-2.6.27/mm/mmap.c   2011-01-29 15:38:47.368066702 +0100
@@ -2253,6 +2253,7 @@
                            unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
                            unsigned long vm_flags, struct page **pages)
 {
+       int ret;
        struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 
        vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -2269,14 +2270,21 @@
        vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
        vma->vm_private_data = pages;
 
-       if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
-               kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
-               return -ENOMEM;
-       }
+       ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
+       if (ret)
+               goto out;
+
+       ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+       if (ret)
+               goto out;
 
        mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
        return 0;
+
+out:
+       kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+       return ret;
 }
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(mm_all_locks_mutex);


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