3.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>

commit 0d0138ebe24b94065580bd2601f8bb7eb6152f56 upstream.

Prevent an arbitrary kernel read.  Check the user pointer with access_ok()
before copying data in.

[[email protected]: s/EIO/EFAULT/]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Zankel <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

---
 arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ int ptrace_setxregs(struct task_struct *
        elf_xtregs_t *xtregs = uregs;
        int ret = 0;
 
+       if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uregs, sizeof(elf_xtregs_t)))
+               return -EFAULT;
+
 #if XTENSA_HAVE_COPROCESSORS
        /* Flush all coprocessors before we overwrite them. */
        coprocessor_flush_all(ti);


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