On 01.07.20 22:01, Ruslan N. Marchenko wrote: > Am Sonntag, den 14.06.2020, 13:05 +0000 schrieb XEP Editor Pipeline: >> Version 0.1.0 of XEP-0440 (SASL Channel-Binding Type Capability) has >> been released. >> >> Abstract: >> This specification allows servers to annouce their supported SASL >> channel-binding types to clients. >> > This describes advertisement semantic however it does not solve the > main problem which channel binding mechanism is trying to solve and > which is more or less broken currently - integrity and confidentiality. > > I've tried to implement that and immediatelly stumbled upon gs2_flags - > how to handle _no-match_ case? As per [5802] client needs to send y > when it thinks server does not support binding, but client does support > it. > > What to do when I can bind tls-server-end-point and server can bind > tls-unique? […] If I send n, - that's a downgrade,
I am not sure if this is a downgrade attack (at least a full-blown), or,
if it is, if it. Without xep440 the client would have send 'p' in the
case you described, with a channel-binding type not supported by the
server and hence SASL authentication would fail.
We could say xep440 modifies the semantic of the 'n' value of the
gs2-cbind-flag from
"n" -> client doesn't support channel binding.
to
"n" -> client doesn't support any channel binding announced/supported by
the server.
Maybe there are other options, like extending the gs2 header with a flag
that explicitly states that the client believes that there are no mutual
supported channel-binding types by client and server.
But right now, I lean towards explicitly stating in xep440 that the
semantic of 'n' is modified in the way I mentioned above.
Happy to hear more voices on this. :)
- Florian
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