Very simple...If I have an IPSEC router, I can cable the router in and out of the same machine and use this as an encryptor. This is especially true for any manual keyed scenarios. Even with key exchange, I can put 2 boxes on my machine to do this.
On May 26, 2006, at 8:14 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Could you explain it a little bit more? It sounds like a serious issue.All IPSEC routers would fall into this requirement.-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: Next P1619/1619.1 Meeting -> Discussion Doc D0.7 From: james hughes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Fri, May 26, 2006 10:48 am To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: james hughes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Curtis Anderson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "'Gary Calder'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "'Gideon Avida'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,[EMAIL PROTECTED], "'Landon Noll'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "'Serge Plotkin'"<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "'SISWG'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Steven Sletten <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> I am confused by this requirement. All IPSEC routers would fall into this requirement. While I agree that the non-readable ciphertext in a disk drive would be trivial to turn into a low cost generic high speed hardware encryptor, would the same hold for tape? On May 26, 2006, at 7:39 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:To me it sounds like the SCSI proposal will not be exportable. I believe that customer qualification units have to have the read/ write long commands operating so that the drive can be tested (used to test the ECC and stuff on the disc). Government will probably require that theseunits be tracked, but I don't know. Once the drive is qualified, theshipping units can not allow the read/write long commands. Bascially you get test units to see that everything works, and then you get real units that are supposed to work the same way. There is a little bit of trust involved. Don james hughes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent by: [EMAIL PROTECTED] No Phone Info Available 05/26/2006 07:55 AM To Steven Sletten <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> cc james hughes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Curtis Anderson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED], "'Gary Calder'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "'Gideon Avida'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED], "'Landon Noll'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "'Serge Plotkin'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "'SISWG'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject Re: Next P1619/1619.1 Meeting -> Discussion Doc D0.7Before rushing to this conclusion, I am interested in discussing thisfurther.Being able to read the ciphertext can be valuable to certify that thedevice is indeed encrypting the data... If encryption is or is not enabled, how would you know unless you can see the ciphertext? Jim On May 26, 2006, at 6:56 AM, Steven Sletten wrote:The new SCSI encryption proposal (T10/06-172r1) allows decrypting raw (plaintext) data. It also allows reading encrypted data without decrypting it. See the text from Table Y4 of the proposal below . It may be a good idea to add another mode that prevents reading ciphertext or decrypting plaintext. DECRYPTION MODE field values: RAW Data decryption is disabled. If the device server encounters an encrypted block while reading, it shall pass the encrypted block to the host without decrypting it. The encrypted block may contain data that is not user data. DECRYPT The device server shall decrypt all data that is read from the medium in response to a READ(6), READ(16), READ REVERSE(6), READ REVERSE(16), or RECOVER BUFFERED DATA command or verified when processing a VERIFY(6) or VERIFY(16) command. The data shall be decrypted using the algorithm specified in the ALGORITHM INDEX field and the key provided in the KEY field. Steve Sletten james hughes wrote:That in itself can be considered access control. So it is the reading of the ciphertext that needs to be restricted.. This does not say anything about the keys or access control to the plaintext? Comments? On May 25, 2006, at 2:08 PM, Curtis Anderson wrote:All, I'll ask the dumb question: instead of having an encrypting drive implement cryptographically secure access control mechanisms so that it can support the "read long" SCSI command, can we just not support the "read long"? If the only (known) problem is direct access to the ciphertext, then "just say no". Thanks, Curtis-----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of james hughes Sent: Thursday, May 25, 2006 9:06 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: james hughes; Gary Calder; Gideon Avida; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Landon Noll; Serge Plotkin; SISWG Subject: Re: Next P1619/1619.1 Meeting -> Discussion Doc D0.7 Very cool explanation! Wow. Very unexpected.Thanks!On May 25, 2006, at 6:58 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:To get export rights for the Seagate drives, the drive can not allow a way for the encrypted data to be read. If one was to do a normal sector write and then do a read-long command, they could use the drive as a cryptographic co-processor. With tape the encrypted data is also readable, and could be considered a cryptographicco-processor. One difference with tape is that the machines sellin lower quantities and to large customers, for disc drives there is a much higher quantity and it is easy for anyone to get one (go to your local store). An encrypting tape machine is a $10K (I don't know the real numbers) cryptographic co-processor. A disc drive could be a $75cryptographicco-processor. That is why there are export controls on the discdrive. Don james hughes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent by: [EMAIL PROTECTED] No Phone Info Available 05/24/2006 10:57 PM To Gary Calder <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Gideon Avida<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,Landon Noll <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> cc james hughes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED], SISWG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Serge Plotkin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject Re: Next P1619/1619.1 Meeting -> Discussion Doc D0.7 I basically agree what Gary suggests. Sun Microsystems has achieved export approval for several products and I do not remember text thatrequires "access control". The definitions of "Open CryptographicInterface" is indeed an interesting one. I doubt that a disk drivewith encryption but without access control would be considered an "open cryptographic interface". It is my understanding that opencryptographic interface applies to software APIs and chips,not wheresomeone has to open a device to harvest the crypto chip(where accesscontrol can make that difficult).The response about China is correct, but irrelevant to the accesscontrol issue. The way I read this, they will not let it in, period, access control or not. Again. I think that the other storage encryption vendorsshould chimein for both disk and tape. I assume that they are selling internationally! jim On May 23, 2006, at 10:21 AM, Gary Calder wrote:James (all), I have exactly the same concerns as you about the 2nd para in Laszlo's document, where it says that access control is required byauthorities. Even just considering one country, the US, I don'tthink it is as simple as that, here are some references: The up to date US Export Administration Regulations (EAR) database can be found here: http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/ ear_data.html Of the many documents listed, I think these are the most relevant: Part 736 - General Prohibitions http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ ear/ pdf/736.pdf dated 11-09-05 Part 740 - License Exceptionshttp://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/---------------------------------------------------------------- --740.pdf dated 04-28-06 Part 742 - Control Policy -- CCL Based Controls http:// www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/742.pdf dated 5-16-06 (Part 774) Category 5 (Part 2) - Information Security http:// www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/ccl5-pt2.pdf dated 11-18-05What follows is my interpretation of the above docs - I have not read through all of them word for word (life's too short) but Ithink I get the basic gist. Everything that is controlled is listed under an ECCN (Export Classification Control Number). ECCNs 5A002, 5D002, 5E002 and 5A992, 5D992 and 5E992 cover encryption items. Section 742.15 gives a broad outline of the licensing policy covering these ECCNs. For5A/D/E002 an export license is required to all countries, exceptCanada. Further exceptions apply, given under 740.17. In particular, there is this exception: -------------------------------------------- (2) Encryption commodities and software restricted to non-“government end-users.” This paragraph (b)(2) authorizes the export and reexport of items described in §740.17(b)(2)(iii) of the EAR that do not provide an “open cryptographic interface” and that are controlled by ECCNs 5A002.a.1, .a.2, .a.5, or .a.6, or 5D002 to individuals, commercial firms, and other entities that are not “government end-users” and that are not located in a country listed in Supplement No. 3 to this part. In addition, the transaction must meet the provisions of either §740.17(b)(2)(i) or (ii) of the EAR. -------------------------------------------- The relevant ECCN paras mentioned are: ---------------------------------------------- a.1. Designed or modified to use “cryptography” employing digital techniques performing any cryptographic function other than authentication or digital signature having any of the following: a.1.a. A “symmetric algorithm” employing a key length in excess of 56-bits; or a.1.b. An “asymmetric algorithm” where the security of the algorithm is based on any of the following: a.1.b.1. Factorization of integers in excess of 512 bits (e.g., RSA); a.1.b.2. Computation of discrete logarithms in a multiplicative group of a finite field of size greater than 512 bits (e.g., Diffie- Hellman over Z/pZ); or a.1.b.3. Discrete logarithms in a group other than mentioned in 5A002.a.1.b.2 in excess of 112 bits (e.g., Diffie-Hellman over an elliptic curve); a.2. Designed or modified to perform cryptanalytic functions; ... a.5. Designed or modified to use cryptographic techniques to generate the spreading code for “spread spectrum” systems, including the hopping code for “frequency hopping” systems; a.6. Designed or modified to use cryptographic techniques to generate channelizing or scrambling codes for “time-modulated ultrawideband” systems; -----------------------------------------I think this is where the term 'required' has been misconstrued.Essentially this is saying if you have a product covered by theseECCNs, but aimed at end (non governmental) users not located incertain countries, where there is no 'open cryptographic interface', then export is authorized. But if you don't have a product that falls under the license exemptions, you can still apply for a license.742.15 (i)(ii) saysthat applications are treated on a case by case basis - I wouldtake that to mean that even if (say) you had a product that had an 'open cryptographic interface' you might still get a license authorized, depending on the individual application. Now it may be that others on this list have some practical experience of actually applying for a license - I might be prepared to accept that in practice, any product with an 'open cryptographicinterface' operating at the kinds of data rates that hard disksoperate would stand a remote chance of getting a license.My only other experience is with the UK regulations. There is acontrol list which lists a combination of military items classified by the UK, plus a European Commission (EC) list of so-called 'dual-use' items. These are items which are civilian in nature but canhave a dual military application. The list is available here: http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/ file27539.pdf current copy dated 12th April 2006 In this, category 5 covers "Telecommunications and Information Security".In this, you will find similar words as the US EAR regs. Even the use of the same numbers 5A002 and 5D002. Why is that? Infact, its because the US and Eu countries are all signatories ofthe Wassenaar agreement, mentioned in the 1998 survey you quoted. It covers the export of military and 'dual-use' items. This is where you can see where the common text of the US/UK/EU lists cameabout. Everything is documented here: http:// www.wassenaar.org/controllists/index.html (Category 5 part 2).This list does not have the corresponding License Exceptions ormention of 'open cryptographic interfaces' so I have no idea if a similar exception applies to the UK (or EU). I would expect this to be country by country dependent. Of course, many of the *export* regulations are perhaps moot if, as with my company, manufacturing and export of the actual product isdone in the Far East (Taiwan. Korea etc). In that case *import*regulations are relevant. AFAIK, these are much more relaxed. For example, this is the UK position (http://www.dti.gov.uk/ europeandtrade/importing-into-uk/page9728.html):- ------------------------------------------------------------------ --- ------------------------------------------- The majority of goods can be imported into the United Kingdom without the need to apply for an import licence.Currently ILB issues import licences for certain goods mainly toimplement: DTI’s trade policy measures * certain textiles from Belarus, China, Montenegro, North Korea and Uzbekistan * iron & steel For safety reasons * firearms and ammunition * nuclear materials As a result of international obligations * anti-personnel mines * rough diamonds and wood products from Liberia Other Government departments may have their own importrestrictions. For example the Rural Payments Agency (RPA) issuesimport licences for agricultural, horticultural products and certain items of food and drink. Traders importing these products will need to contact them for advice not ILB (for link to RPA website see related links). It is the responsibility of theimporters to ensure that he/she is aware of any restrictions ongoods they wish to import.- --- ---------------------------------------------------- So while the US and UK/EU and other Wasenaar signatories seem to be reasonably aligned in the export policy vis-a-vis encryptionproducts, things are still obviously very country dependent forgranting of export licenses and also imports. I hope at least this gives the insomniacs amongst you some useful bedtime reading. Regards, Gary Calder Oxford Semiconductor www.oxsemi.com james hughes wrote:I would like some references to the claims in the introduction. My reason for asking about such is that it is important that we (IEEE) standardize what is right, not what is politically in vogue at a moment in history. The I in IEEE is for International. Additionally, I am interested in which market? Anyway, references to the claims of this paragraph should be provided.Access control not just can be provided, but it is required bythe export control authorities,Reference?and also by many local authorities,Reference?where storage devices are sold. If the encrypted data is freely accessible, the encryption module can be used as a stand alone, high-speed encryption processor, which is prohibited in many markets.Reference of the regulation and any example of a storageencryption device where the "encryption module can be used as astand alone, high-speed encryption processor" in such a way that it violates a law? I have looked for information on the web about this kind ofinformation. There is a summary done in 1998, but I have foundnothing online more recent. http://www.gilc.org/crypto/crypto-survey.html On May 19, 2006, at 6:16 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:Here is an update of the non-removable secure storage discussion document. It does not contain new information, only editorial and formatting changes, in an attempt to make it easier tounderstand.-Laszlo <Nonremovable Discussions-D07.pdf>