The Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana (Uday) has been the subject of much
debate in the financial markets. The cost of borrowing for state
governments has risen sharply since Uday was launched in November. More
recently, as state governments have tried to raise funds by selling Uday
bonds, they have been blamed by some (incorrectly, as we will see) for
creating a shortage of funds for other borrowers.

As background, readers may recall that Uday was launched to turn around
power distribution companies (discoms), which are generally inefficient
state government monopolies that are struggling financially. One of its key
features is the replacement of high-cost discom debt, which attracts
interest rates as high as 13 per cent, with state government bonds, where
the cost of borrowing was then a much-lower 8 per cent. States could not
have done this unilaterally because they would have breached their fiscal
targets. The Centre then dangled the carrot of providing a temporary
exemption on fiscal targets in return for a commitment from the discoms to
improve operating parameters and also raise power tariffs to bring them in
line with costs.

Seventeen states, adding up to 77 per cent of India’s power demand and 79
per cent of outstanding discom debt, have already agreed to Uday. Of these,
nine states, which together constitute 42 per cent of power demand and 55
per cent of discom debt, have also taken the next step, signing a
tripartite agreement between the Centre, the state government and the
discom, committing to a significant improvement in operations and thus
financial performance.

The agreement commits them to replacing 50 per cent of discom debt with
state government bonds (state development loans, SDLs) in the current
financial year (that is, the year ending March 2016), and a further 25 per
cent in the coming financial year. For these nine states, the quantum that
had to be raised in the current year under Uday came to nearly Rs 1
trillion, which effectively doubled the total borrowing they were earlier
scheduled for in the last three months of the year.

This seems to have surprised many in the bond markets, driving up SDL bond
yields — that is, the market is now only willing to lend to state
governments at a higher cost, as much as six-tenths of a percentage point
more than five months back. The gap between the costs at which the Centre
and the state governments borrow — “the yield gap” — has now widened to
levels only seen at a time of crisis.

This seems unwarranted since we estimate that the increase in the states’
borrowing costs should have been only about half of the increase we have
seen. We use a simple calculation: The quantum of high-cost discom debt
that will be replaced by low-cost SDLs is about Rs 2 trillion, and this
would get added to total state liabilities of Rs 31 trillion. As even
discom debt was implicitly guaranteed by the respective state government,
the blended borrowing costs should remain unchanged. As the market
stabilises, it is possible, if not likely, that the yield gap will narrow,
particularly as the market has not been differentiating between states that
have large Uday-related issuances and states that don’t.

The second concern for the markets — that this sudden jump in bond issuance
by states has caused a shortage of funds for others — is even less
justified, in our view. This whole process is just debt replacement where
the banks that had earlier lent to the discoms get their money back, and
are then free to lend in the economy, or even buy SDLs from the market.
Even the non-banking companies that receive the proceeds of these SDLs may
deploy them in bank bonds, among others things, and these funds thus enter
the market again.

So why is there tightness in liquidity currently, that is, more borrowers
than funds? The main cause for the shortage in funds seems to be a pick-up
in bank credit growth. After nearly 15 months of growing below seasonal
trends, credit has started moving as per seasonality from October onwards,
showing that economic momentum is picking up. Yet, so anchored is the
prevailing consensus on negative-sounding stories that even positive data
points are being “explained” negatively. Until two years ago, tight
liquidity was a common feature in the months of February and March, as
January to March is the strongest period for economic activity in India,
partly due to amenable weather and partly because it’s the fiscal year end.

There has also been some impact from the jump in state government borrowing
even without the Uday bonds. While this information should have been known
to the markets, there was an element of surprise. There is an important
lesson for policymakers here: Given its large borrowing needs, the Central
government issues most of its bonds in the first half of the fiscal year so
as not to crowd out the market towards the end of the year. State
government borrowing, however, is still back-end loaded. This is despite
the fact that this year, state government borrowing, even without the Uday
bonds, is more than 60 per cent as much as Central borrowing. This ratio
was much smaller a few years back. A better-planned borrowing calendar for
the states is becoming a necessity.

So the kerfuffle over Uday bonds should settle as liquidity improves from
April onwards and yields normalise once the bunched-up issuances are behind
us. One hopes that the Rs 1.15 trillion of Uday-related SDL issuances in
the coming financial year are better spaced out so as not to cause market
distortions.

This should also bring market attention back to the near universal adoption
of Uday by states; when the scheme was launched, this seemed unlikely to
us. The discoms, along with the railways, are among the few generally large
and inefficient government monopolies that need reform. Change in the
discoms can be fur-ther complicated by the fact that these are state
government controlled. Under Uday, states have committed to transformative
operational improvements in the next three-four years. The political will
to raise tariffs and improve billing and collection is likely to be tested.
But technological improvements, like in metering and feeder line
separation, should help and the merging of discom losses with fiscal
deficits a few years down the line should improve the success rate.
The writer is the India equity strategist for Credit Suisse.
- See more at:
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-uday-plug-in/#sthash.CpQBHYbW.dpuf

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