Greek troops in FYROM to harvest rebels' arms
Guerrilla chief promises National Liberation Army will hand over 2,500 weapons but Skopje fears there are more than 85,000; Nato official expects ethnic Albanian insurgents could easily re-arm
By George Gilson
NATO embarked on its latest foray into a Balkan country on
August 22, beginning a one-month mission to disarm ethnic Albanian rebels in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in an attempt to avert civil
war...
The latest Nato intervention is fraught with dangers - notably thepossibility that all or some of the Albanian rebels are making an insincereshow of conciliation in order to resume fighting later with the moralauthority of frustrated peacemakers
BY JOHN PSAROPOULOS
 |
MANY Greeks and other Europeans like to claim that Nato has some sort of interest in keeping the Balkans in a state of flux, so that it can maintain a role for itself in the post-Cold War world. Under this logic, Nato relishes entering the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and placing its finger into another Balkan pie.
To support this position is, of course, to forget that Western governments run enormous financial and political risks in committing troops to the Balkans. They can ill-afford the political cost of casualties, especially. Then US president Bill Clinton bombed Yugoslavia for over three months, but did not dare respond to Milosevic's challenge to fight a ground war against the Serb army.
Current US President George W Bush has now allowed Britain to take the lead in Operation Essential Harvest, presumably unwilling to commit the US to another high-profile Balkan operation.
It is also to forget that Greece is a Nato member, contributing to the decisions that lead to Nato operations in the Balkans. In 1999, Greece distinguished itself from its Nato partners by honouring the letter of its Nato obligations but not participating in the bombardment of Yugoslavia, an action with which the vast majority of Greeks fundamentally disagreed.
On August 22, however, Greece agreed to commit troops to Operation Essential Harvest.
But the real ignorance in the theory comes from forgetting Greece's complicity in turning Yugoslavia into the mess it is today.
On December 16, 1991, the European Union's foreign ministers voted to unilaterally recognise Croatia and Slovenia. It was a German-inspired initiative, consistent with Germany's desire to proselytise emerging eastern European nations, building itself into the centre of tomorrow's European Union. It was also the definitive catalyst in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, signalling that Europe tolerated, nay encouraged, the carving of weak ethnic states out of the regional powerhouse that was Marshall Tito's creation.
Greece voted in favour, (although then foreign minister Antonis Samaras later hypocritically attacked the Mitsotakis government for instructing him to do so). The reason: Greece had cut a deal with the US - appeasement of Germany in return for non-recognition of the Yugoslav state of Macedonia as the Republic of Macedonia.
The deal was clearly not worth it. Greece has failed utterly to force a change of name. Skopje has skilfully used its weakness as a strength, arguing that it used up all its credibility to make constitutional changes for the Albanian rebels; it could not muster the credibility to make chaanges for the Greeks as well. Greece would today be grateful for the adoption of a composite name such as Nova (new) or Gorna (northern) Macedonia. In any case, Greece can consider itself partly responsible for the steaming Balkan mess.
Of course, the latest Nato intervention is fraught with dangers - notably the possibility that all or some of the Albanian rebels are making an insincere show of conciliation in order to resume fighting later with the moral authority of frustrated peacemakers. This is a risk Nato has decided to accept.
Still, Greece should be grateful for the latest Nato intervention. Greece, especially, has much to lose from an outbreak of full-scale civil war in FYROM. It would frighten away skittish tourists, who contribute 15-20 percent of Greece's GDP (they brought $5 billion in 1998). It would jeopardise or destroy $300 million worth of Greek investments in FYROM over 10 years.
A flood or refugees would settle in tent cities just inside Greece's northern border, incurring costs and possibly destabilising the northern regions. Should the war go in the NLA's favour, it could stir up patriotic sentiment among Greece's large Albanian population. A new war in the Balkans would strengthen the avenues of black trade in guns, drugs, cigarettes and women that cross Greece and have proven so expensive in tax evasion and law enforcement costs.
The war's effects to the north, of course, would be catastrophic, destabilising Kosovo and perhaps even Bosnia, where tens of thousands of Nato troops are based. This is what Nato Secretary General George Robertson meant when he said that "the risks of not sending them [troops] are far greater" than the risks of sending them.
In the mid-1990s, Yugoslavia's civil war had all the ingredients of a tinderbox capable of sparking world war. Germany stood staunchly behind the Croats and Slovenes whose secession from the federation it had so disastrously precipitated in 1991. Russia backed the Serbs, who were duly vilified by th e West. Iran and Afghanistan openly armed and trained the outnumbered Muslims, hoping to garner Islamic and Arab support as protectors of the world's most publicly prosecuted Muslim minority after the Palestinians.
The rest of the world was more or less divided up among the three camps, based on religion, culture or politics. (Greece clearly favoured the Serbs, aggression, rape and pillage notwithstanding). In 1914, such an alignment was enough to set a world war into motion. It is to the world's credit that it has now learned to try and dampen the kindling before it ignites the surrounding material.
But the world has failed to learn other valuable skills: how to demonstrate
the virtues of non-ethnic or federal states. The US is trying, in Cyprus, in
Northern Ireland and in the Balkans, to encourage federal states modelled on
itself. In theory, government can be administered by a federal bureaucracy,
while multi-culturalism is guaranteed through tolerance.
ATHENS NEWS , 24/08/2001 , page:
A02
Article code: C12924A021
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