STOP NATO: ˇNO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK --------------------------- ListBot Sponsor -------------------------- Start Your Own FREE Email List at http://www.listbot.com/links/joinlb ---------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.reformnato.org/main/New.NATO/not.replacement.htm The Strategic Concept is not a replacement for the North Atlantic Treaty and the United Nations ! By Erin LaPorte FIRST ADDITION - 30 May 2001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "The acknowledged need for reevaluation of the Strategic Concept did not bring into question the two core roles of the Alliance: providing for the collective defense and serving as the institutional forum of the transatlantic link" ( Sperling 1999:12). Introduction There are currently several falsehoods being spread on the Internet by a couple of London-based groups that are - well - not very accurate. Chief among those falsehoods is that NATO's Strategic Concept is a "new NATO Treaty" and a replacement for the North Atlantic Treaty and the United Nations. Second - these groups treat the Alliance's Strategic Concept as if it is a "new" aspect of NATO's organizational function, as well as making the claim that it replaces the Treaty and the United Nations. Third - they treat the creation and ratification of the Alliance's Strategic Concept by the foreign and defense ministers of the Allied nations as if this too was a "new thing" and a "conspiracy." Both the creation and ratification of the first Strategic Concept of the new Alliance by the Allied foreign ministers in December of 1949 are discussed by Lester Pearson in his memoirs (1972). In this first addition, I use the works of several defense scholars to lay these misconceptions and falsehoods to rest. I prove that the Alliance's Strategic Concept is not a replacement for the North Atlantic Treaty. In the first addition, I basically demonstrate the role of the Strategic Concept, its function being a kind of organizational guide as to the tasks of the Alliance, usually reflective of the Alliance's security preoccupations. I very briefly touch upon the United Nations and non-Article Five missions. In the next addition - I will be demonstrating the Alliance's connections to the United Nations, both current and historic. There is much information regarding the deep relationship between NATO and the United Nations. There are many scholars that believe that the NATO Alliance needs to come back to its core functions of collective defense and the "transatlantic link" (1). The main purpose of this paper is as a informational pamphlet, not a position paper - and opinions by myself as to the "rightness and wrongness" of the Alliance's "new roles" in its Strategic Concept are in the Conclusion. NATO's past "strategic concepts" The notion that the strategic concepts of NATO are new and are replacements to the North Atlantic Treaty and the United Nations charter are far fetched notions. NATO has had some kind of a strategic concept from its very beginning. The purpose of the Alliance's "Strategic Concepts" serve as a kind of organizational identity, defineing the Alliance's functions and security tasks - in relation to global political landscape of the times. The Alliance's Strategic Concept - no matter the year drafted 1949 - 1991 - 1999 - are reflections of the security concerns of the North Atlantic Alliance at the time- be it actions and perceived threats from the Soviets, or perceived, indirect threats and UN peacekeeping missions. It is no replacement for NATO's core functions of collective defense and the linking of the Atlantic area through the "transatlantic link." These are the basic functions of the North Atlantic Treaty (Thomas 1997, Powaski 1991, Chilton 1995, Sperling 1999). In his memoirs, Lester Pearson (1972) describes the "strategic concept for the defence of the North Atlantic area - as a four year defense plan." This first Strategic Concept was created at the first meeting of the foreign ministers of the 12 member countries in December of 1949. Pearson writes that even back in late 1949, integration of defense forces, the necessity for cooperation - and flexibility - were part of the strategic concept. Having been signed by Truman in 1950 - the first Strategic Concept of the young Alliance provided for the strategic guidance for each Ally, the tasks it would undertake, depending on the Ally's capabilities and location (Powaski 1991). During the period of the late 50's and 60's, the main strategic concepts were the "shield," multilateral forces - and flexibility. There was the Harmel Report and the Alliance's policy of détente - dialog and defense - of the late 60's and 70's. Also included in NATO's conceptions is the use of nuclear weapons and disarmament treaties. (Thomas 1998, Yost 1998). In June of 1991, along with the four core security functions of the Alliance - a stable security environment for the Euro-Atlantic area, preserve the strategic balance in Europe, deter and defeat aggression against any Alliance member, provide a "transatlantic" forum for consulation - was meeting indirect threats from the eastern and southern perimeter of the Alliance. Also included were the notions "cooperation and partnership" with former Warsaw Pact adversities (Sperling 1999, Thomas 1998). In 1997 - the Alliance then announced at its Madrid Summit that it was going to review its "New Strategic Concept" in light of still rapidly changing events in Europe. (Sperling 1999). "The acknowledged need for reevaluation of the Strategic Concept did not bring into question the two core roles of the Alliance: providing for the collective defense and serving as the institutional forum of the transatlantic link" ( Sperling 1999: 12). Lastly - the notion that the Alliance's Strategic Concept is a replacement for the North Atlantic Treaty and the United Nations by being voted on by the Allied country foreign and defense ministers to avoid public debate is poppycock! While I would be the first to state that the public should be allowed some input in a democratic fashion - this is how the Alliance's Strategic Concepts are fashioned. There was a study group - the Strategy Review Group - that drafted the Strategic Concept of 1991 - and included cooperation, as well as dialogue and defense. The approval of the Strategic Concept by the foreign and defense ministers of Allied nations has been the procedure since the first NATO Strategic Concept in December 1949. ( Yost 1999, Pearson 1972). Perhaps it is better for the Alliance's Strategic Concept to be formulated by those experts in the military - security field. . . The Indirect Threats and "non-Article 5 Missions." As demonstrated above, what has changed in the Alliance's Strategic Concept of 1991 is its willingness to get involved in "non-Article Five missions," that is, missions that are considered and indirect threat to an Alliance member. But - the idea of the Alliance responding to "indirect threats" to the security of a near by member is also not a new concept. The NATO's peacekeeping operations, according to Chilton (1995), are under arrangement with the United Nations and there is no need to amend or toss out the North Atlantic Treaty. Chilton asserts that Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF's) can be used for peacekeeping activities under the United Nations under Article 6 of the Treaty. These would be carried out on a "case by case" basis by "coalitions of the willing." The notion of the "global NATO" - and that idea was proposed - draws negative reactions from NATO Europe. Most rational observers cite that there would enormous difficulties with the notion of a "global NATO." For one - interventions be on Europe could only be done with joint interests and consensus- and could prove counterproductive and damaging to the Alliance. NATO is an organization that requires consensus - and one would be hard pressed to find an out-of Europe military action where all 19 members were in agreement. An action - such as the Gulf War - would more likely be made up of NATO and non- NATO coalitions. "NATO going global" is not going to happen anytime in the near future (Yost 1999). In fact - states David Yost - the more NATO is enlarged, the more remote the idea of a "global NATO" becomes. Conclusion The NATO Alliance's "Strategic Concept" is nothing new for the Organization and the Organization has had a "strategic concept" in some form since the first foreign ministers' meeting, 8 months after the signing of the Treaty. The Strategic Concept is a type of operational document, defining the Organization's tasks to meet its perceived needs and a kind of organizational "self identity" for the Alliance. The Strategic Concept is reflective of the security concerns of the times in which it is written and is not a replacement for the North Atlantic Treaty, let along the role of the United Nations. The Strategic Concept of 1999 retains the core function of the North Atlantic Treaty: collective defense of the Atlantic Community ("transatlantic link" ). The creation and ratification of the Strategic Concept by "study groups" and the Allied foreign and defense ministers is not nothing new and not a "conspiracy!" Many believe that, including myself, that the Alliance needs place more emphasis on the collective defense of the Atlantic Community ("transatlantic link") than on United Nations peacekeeping and like operations. NATO needs to come home! The growing threat from the Communist Chinese - who have declared both America and her Allies as "the enemy" (2) - needs to be countered by a strong NATO, rededicated to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples." David Yost (1999) devotes many pages to the concern that the Alliance places TOO MUCH emphasis on "peacekeeping" at the costly expense to collective defense. While the bombing of Yugoslavia was not with the approval of the United Nations Security Counsel and a breach of the North Atlantic Treaty (3)- this action by itself cannot be used to state that the Alliance has now placed its Strategic Concept before the Treaty and the United Nations. The evidence is overwhelmingly against the above notion and is a utter falsehood! What was offensive to me -personally - was that the immoral leadership of NATO, in Clintonist hypocritical style, carried on the bombing of Yugoslavia on it 50th anniversary. This action was classical Clinton Administration hypocrisy at work - not a statement of NATO as an organization. To place in the 1999 Strategic Concept the idea that "no country is our enemy," while bombing Yugoslavia - is not a flaw of NATO as an organization - but is Clintonist hypocrisy at work. The bombing of Yugoslavia and occupation of Kosovo are the manifestations of abuses by the NATO leadership, as well as Clinton, of some new and old concepts regarding NATO's role as the defender of the Atlantic Community and its role in the post-Cold War world. It is nothing more than that! Read the Strategic Concept of 1999 for yourself! http://www.reformnato.org/main/natobriefs/99stratcncpt.htm -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Notes: 1. "Transatlantic link" - like "western security community" - has been noted to be the names that the "military-strategic studies" people have reduced the Atlantic Community to from the grandeur envisioned by the North Atlantic Treaty's creators. 2. Bill Gertz (2000) in his book, The China Threat, (Regnery Publishing: Washington D. C.), describes how China is targeting America and "the West" and is stationing Chinese troops in the Panama Canal area. With China in our hemisphere, NATO needs to stop all this "peacekeeping first" foolishness in Eastern Europe and come home! 3. Not only did the bombing of Yugoslavia breach the North Atlantic Treaty - it was a breach of just about every single idea and value that went into the creation of the Treaty and the Atlantic Community, as well. This - by no means - indicates that the North Atlantic Treaty is dead! References: Common, Collective or Combined? Theories of Defense Integration in the European Union. Patricia Chilton. In The State of European Union: Building a European Polity? Rhodes, Carolyn and Sonia Mazey, eds. (1995) Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO. Sperling, James (1999) Two Tiers or Two Speed: The European security order and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO. Manchester University Press: New York, NY. Pearson, Lester, (1972) Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Honourable Lester Pearson. Munro, John A and Alex I. Inglis, eds. U. of Toronto, CA. Powaski, Ronald E. (1991) Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism and Europe: 1901-1950. Greenwood Press: New York, NY. Thomas, Ian Q. R. (1997) The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination. Rowman & Littlefield: New York, NY. Yost, David S. (1998) NATO Transformed : The Alliance's new roles in International Security. 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