http://www.MediaLens.org/alerts/030603_Basic_Benevolence.html

MEDIA LENS MEDIA ALERT

03rd June 2003

Basic Benevolence - An Extract From Web Of Deceit By Mark Curtis

Introduction

Mark Curtis first came to our attention with his extraordinary book, 
The Ambiguities of Power - British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (Zed 
Books, 1995). Using formerly secret government documents, Curtis 
demolished many of the myths surrounding British foreign policy.

In 1953, for example, Britain sent a cruiser, two frigates and seven 
hundred troops to its colony, British Guiana, and overthrew a 
democratically elected government, the People's Progressive Party 
(PPP). The Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons explained in 
October 1953 that the PPP was "part of the deadly design to turn 
British Guiana into a totalitarian state dominated by communist 
ideas," such that Britain was "faced with part of the international 
communist conspiracy".

Curtis revealed, however, that privately the British government's 
Commonwealth Relations Office stated in September 1953 that the PPP 
"was in fact elected to power on a mildly socialist programme, the 
implementation of which would have been in general of great value to 
the territory". The PPP's programme was, it noted, "no more extreme" 
than that of the British Labour party: "It contains none of the usual 
communist aims and it advocates industrial development through the 
encouragement of foreign capital."

No matter, the propaganda paved the way for military intervention in 
pursuit of a ruthless hidden agenda. In 1964, The Latin American 
Bureau reported that, with the PPP out of the way in British Guiana, 
the sugar transnational Bookers was assured of "a remarkable degree 
of control over the economy, both through its dominant position in 
the sugar industry and through its interests in fisheries, cattle, 
timber, insurance, advertising, and retail commerce".

In his foreword to Curtis's latest book, Web Of Deceit - Britain's 
Real Role in the World (Vintage, 2003), John Pilger writes:

"Mark Curtis's brilliant, exciting and deeply disturbing book unwraps 
the whole package, layer by layer, piece by piece. Not since Noam 
Chomsky's Deterring Democracy, has there been such a disclosure, 
whose publication could not be more timely."

Curtis demolishes the rhetoric behind the US-led invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, revealing how they fit a pattern, not of 
humanitarian intervention, but of control of 'Third World' natural 
resources and markets through the installation of US-friendly 
'democratic structures'.

No one who reads 'Web of Deceit' can doubt that Tony Blair has long 
been "duping" the British public. At the Labour party conference in 
2001, Blair declared:

"I tell you, if Rwanda happened again today as it did in 1994, when a 
million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a moral 
duty to act."

The media reported Blair's words without challenge, omitting to 
mention that the British government had +contributed+ to genocide in 
Rwanda, as Curtis points out:

"Britain used its diplomatic weight to reduce severely a UN force 
that, according to military officers on the ground, could have 
prevented the killings. It then helped ensure the delay of other 
plans for intervention, which sent a direct green light to the 
murderers in Rwanda to continue. Britain also refused to provide the 
capability for other states to intervene, while blaming the lack of 
such capability on the UN."

This information is publicly available, but mainstream media and the 
academic community have simply chosen to look the other way.

Similar subservience to power can be seen regarding the murderous war 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), costing some four million 
lives. Curtis notes:

"Britain sold arms to Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, who intervened to 
support the DRC regime, at the same time as supplying Uganda and 
Rwanda, who were fighting the DRC and its allies."

The International Institute for Security Studies in South Africa has 
commented on the impact of British greed: "Britain is inflaming the 
situation by arming both sides."

Such awful examples - which represent the norm, not exceptions - do 
not fit the exalted image of benign states wielding power in the 
defence of "all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and 
freedom" (Bush), or in order to uphold "values of justice, tolerance 
and respect for all regardless of race, religion or creed" (Blair).

We know only too well what a difficult and vitally important 
achievement it is for Mark Curtis to publish such an honest piece of 
work via a mainstream publisher. We strongly urge you to buy this 
book - a must-read, if ever there was one - and so support a rare and 
precious voice of dissent in our society.

Best wishes

David Edwards and David Cromwell
Editors - Media Lens

THE CONCEPT OF "BASIC BENEVOLENCE"

By: Mark Curtis

The ideological system promotes one key concept that underpins 
everything else - the idea of Britain's basic benevolence. Mainstream 
reporting and analysis usually actively promotes, or at least does 
not challenge, the idea that Britain promotes high principles - 
democracy, peace, human rights and development - in its foreign 
policy. Criticism of foreign policies is certainly possible, and 
normal, but within narrow limits which show "exceptions" to, or 
"mistakes" in, promoting the rule of basic benevolence. Government 
statements on its always noble intentions are invariably taken 
seriously and rarely even challenged, let alone ridiculed. These 
assumptions and ways of reporting are very deep-rooted.

Thus Guardian editors can write of "Britain's reputation as both a 
respecter and champion of human rights". One of its regular 
columnists can write that "the foreign policies of democratic states, 
beyond the basic requirement of ensuring physical security, are now 
based firmly on two pillars - trade advantage and human rights". In 
their book on the New Labour government, two Guardian writers can 
refer to Blair as "a high minded champion of human rights". 
Similarly, an academic can write of "Britain's commitment to third 
world development" - a fact, requiring no justification. The list 
could go on, and cover the entire mainstream.

Indeed, it is only we who are benevolent. As the New Statesman's John 
Lloyd has written: "the defence of human rights - or more accurately, 
the aggressive promotion of human rights in an arena, such as Kosovo, 
where they are being brutalised - is a posture confined to the rich 
and secure world".

Beneath this overarching concept of basic benevolence stands a set of 
pillars - key strategies promoted by the elite that are assumed to 
contribute to Britain's benevolent role in the world and promotion of 
high principles. These strategies make up the single ideology on 
which there is consensus across the elite, as outlined in chapter 13 
- such as strong support for the US, in the context of a special 
relationship, promotion of global economic "liberalisation", support 
for key elites, and a strong military intervention capability. 
Reporting and analysis that fall outside this construct - and 
certainly that directly challenge it - will tend to get excluded.
 
The ideological system gears into particular action during war, 
providing justification for the government's resort to force and 
backing its (always noble) aims. In war, the public is in effect 
actively mobilised by the various components of the elite in support 
of state policy. Television news functions even more extremely 
ideologically at these times, in practice usually abandoning any 
pretence of objectivity and acting simply as the mouthpiece of the 
state, though trying to preserve a facade of independence. Only 
rarely is real dissent possible in such crises in mainstream 
newspapers and never on television.
 
Consider how the media supported the Blair government during 1999 in 
mobilising the nation to bomb Yugoslavia supposedly in defence of the 
highest humanitarian values. This was no easy task since it soon 
became clear to any independent onlooker that it was the NATO bombing 
that precipitated, rather than prevented, the humanitarian 
catastrophe. At the same time, as noted in chapter 7, our allies in 
Indonesia were engaged in atrocities in East Timor similar to those 
of Milosevic; while a few months later the same values were still 
relevant as Putin's Russia was committing crimes in Chechnya greater 
in scale than those of Milosevic in Kosovo. But in these cases the 
values that provided the pretext for bombing Yugoslavia needed to be 
buried. After a few obvious parallels were drawn between the 
situations in the media, the previous humanitarian pretexts used for 
Kosovo were indeed safely forgotten in these other conflicts.
 
Criticism in the mainstream of British wars tends to be restricted to 
the tactics used to achieve the assumed noble aims, and whether the 
government has chosen the right strategy to discharge its high 
nobility or whether it will make "mistakes".

The debate in the mainstream on bombing Yugoslavia over Kosovo, did 
involve argument over whether it was a "just war" or not; but both 
sides of this debate generally accepted that the government was 
seeking to achieve its stated humanitarian aims. That the government 
may have been acting out of other motives entirely was almost never 
questioned, despite the evidence.

The same goes for much media coverage of Iraq. Most reporting assumes 
that British aims are basically benevolent - the more regular 
criticism is whether government strategy is the right one to achieve 
noble objectives. This contrasts with reporting on US policy, where 
US aims of controlling Iraqi oil, or of installing an undemocratic, 
pro-US regime, are more openly discussed than British involvement in 
the same. This said, media reporting on Iraq in 2002/3 has involved 
many more dissenting views than was the case over the bombing of 
Yugoslavia. The reason is that there is no elite consensus on war 
with Iraq, which is rather being promoted by a small band of people 
around the prime minister. Many parts of the establishment are 
opposed to war (for tactical reasons to achieve British objectives, 
not for moral reasons, which are irrelevant to them). Therefore, the 
media framing can be much wider and include many more critical voices.

The Guardian's coverage of the war in Afghanistan was a real 
exception to normal reporting, in that a series of comment pieces 
over several months put various critical perspectives and exposed 
much of the reality of the war and its motives. This unusual 
occurrence was due to one comment editor, Seumas Milne, who allowed a 
diversity of views - evidence in fact of how individuals can help 
change even well-established systems. This did not, however, stop 
some other reporters from toeing the state line in numerous cases 
elsewhere in the newspaper.

It is interesting to note that there is only one British military 
intervention over the past fifty years that has been severely 
criticised and government motives questioned in the mainstream - the 
invasion of Egypt in 1956 (usually called the "Suez crisis" or 
"fiasco" in the ideological system). Since there are many horrible 
British interventions worthy of attention and condemnation, with 
effects worse than in Egypt in 1956, why is this singled out for 
criticism? The reason is obvious - Britain lost. It therefore 
deserves a lot of soul-searching within the elite. Other 
interventions where we successfully blasted the nips deserve no such 
criticism, since we won, therefore what could possibly be the problem?

A leading US analyst of the media and foreign policy, Edward Herman, 
has said that "it is the function of experts and the mainstream media 
to normalise the unthinkable for the general public". This role 
sanitises quite terrible policies and presents them as "normal", 
current examples of which include hundreds of thousands of deaths in 
Iraq through sanctions, war crimes in Yugoslavia and mass civilian 
deaths in Afghanistan. When presented in the mainstream media, none 
of these outcomes tend to elicit the horror they deserve; all are 
normal.

The French philosopher Jean Guehenno has said that "the worst 
betrayal of intelligence is finding justification for the world as it 
is". But this is often the role played by experts, to explain the 
everyday as normal, justifiable, requiring little change, but rather 
"stability" and few upsets to "world order" unless controlled by us. 
In fact, the everyday is a horror for many people - the half of the 
planet that lives in absolute poverty, as well as the victims of 
torture and repression in the US and British-backed client states, 
for example.

Elites throughout history have presented their policies as in the 
natural order of things, which helps to obscure the pursuit of their 
own particular interests. An important aspect of the ideological 
system is rendering a single view dominant or "natural", presenting 
current policies as inevitable, and undermining the possibility of 
alternatives. "Globalisation" is presented by elites as such a 
natural phenomenon, and critics ridiculed as Luddites who cannot stop 
the inevitable march of history. These curiously Marxist, determinist 
views mask the elite's goal under globalisation of promoting total 
global economic "liberalisation" - a far from inevitable outcome, but 
a strategy chosen by the liberalisation theologists of New Labour, 
and their allies among the transnational elite.

If the current horrible policies are "normal", the alternatives are 
"unthinkable". Even to mention the indictment of Tony Blair for war 
crimes, to oppose British cooperation with the US because it is a 
consistent supporter of human rights abuses overseas, or even to end 
arms exports is "unthinkable" in the mainstream and would invite 
ridicule.

Take the Guardian's Ian Black, who writes that a key aim of the 
International Criminal Court is to avoid: "politically motivated or 
frivolous investigations - what one expert calls the 'nutcase 
factor': for instance, of the possible pursuit of [Northern Ireland 
secretary] Mo Mowlam or Tony Blair for crimes against humanity". Only 
"nutcases" could possibly believe Our Leader could ever be guilty of 
crimes against humanity. (One such "nutcase" is former US Attorney 
General, Ramsay Clark, who lodged a complaint against Britain in July 
1999 for war crimes during its assault on Yugoslavia.)

A customary way for the elite to deflect criticism is to term it a 
"conspiracy theory", which is common across the ideological system. 
There is a good reason for it. British elites have built a 
fundamentally secretive political system for which they are minimally 
accountable to the public. As noted in chapter 13, they believe the 
public should have only a marginal say in this system outside 
elections, and - to judge from some of the views expressed in the 
Scott inquiry - neither do they think the public should even know 
what the decision-making processes are. Elites are especially keen to 
deflect criticism exposing how the system works, which is more 
threatening than criticising specific policies (which can be 
dismissed as "exceptions"). The term "conspiracy theory" is often 
deployed once criticism has moved beyond the specific and is closer 
to exposing how the system as a whole works.

My view is that "ordinary people" - and I count myself as one of 
these - generally distrust their sources of information and know, 
ultimately, not to believe what they read or see. This is partly 
because ordinary people, in my view, have a much healthier scepticism 
of those in power than those closer to power or those aspiring to the 
political class. People have little stake in the elite and therefore 
have no reason to trust it.

But I do not believe that people can be aware of the extent to which 
to which they are being misinformed. Foreign policy is different from 
domestic issues, where you only have to spend time in a hospital or 
have a child who goes to school, to know the state of public 
services. But with foreign policy people are overwhelmingly reliant 
on news rather than personal experience, which makes indoctrination 
much easier. Even if people have enough self-defence mechanisms to 
avoid being directly told what to think, it is very likely that the 
media tells them what to think about.

It is not that one cannot discover much about the reality of 
government policy. All the sources I have used in this book are 
public. But you have to make a real effort, and spend considerable 
time, which is simply not possible for most people. It involves 
proactively looking for alternative sources of information, usually a 
variety of different sources, to piece together an accurate picture, 
and then weighing these against mainstream sources.

It also involves what the great Kenyan novelist Ngugi Wa Thiongo has 
called "decolonising the mind". Ngugi was referring to Africans 
needing to free themselves from ideologies often subconsciously 
adopted under colonialism. The British public needs, in my view, to 
do the same thing, and consciously unlearn most of what we have been 
informed about and "educated" on regarding Britain's role in the 
world. This applies not only to the media, but to school and 
university too. Again, these are not easy tasks.

Overall, I believe that people are being indoctrinated into a picture 
of Britain's role in the world that supports elite priorities. This 
is the mass production of ignorance. It actively works against our 
interests, which is precisely why the ideological system is critical 
to the elite, who essentially see the public as a threat.

The basic fact is that anyone who wants to understand the reality of 
Britain's past and current foreign policies cannot do so by relying 
on the mainstream. As the chapters on Kenya, Malaya, British Guiana, 
Iran and others have shown, the reality of British policy is 
systematically suppressed; whole episodes in Britain's history have 
become severely ideologically treated. Interpretations of history 
that accord with the preferences of elites are the dominant ones. 
Given the extent of this ideological treatment of the past, what has 
happened is akin to the destruction of history. The task of any 
independent historian is to reconstruct real-life history, to rescue 
it from a self-serving web of deceit.

This is an extract from Mark Curtis's Web of Deceit: Britain's Real 
Role in the World, published by Vintage. To order the book, telephone 
01206-255777 or go to www.amazon.co.uk. ISBN - 0099448394. Mark 
Curtis can be contacted at [EMAIL PROTECTED] His website is at 
www.markcurtis.info.


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