RACHEL'S ENVIRONMENT & HEALTH NEWS #792
http://www.rachel.org
May 27, 2004
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Fiery Hell On Earth, Pt. 1
For some time now, I have been searching for answers to a deeply
perplexing question: Why is the United States promoting the spread of
atomic bombs worldwide?
By "atomic bombs" I mean the kind that turned Hiroshima and Nagasaki
into a fiery hell in 1945 -- A-bombs made from plutonium (Nagasaki)
or "enriched" uranium (Hiroshima).
In this series, I will briefly examine the facts, then consider some
of the possible reasons why the U.S. might favor the proliferation of
atomic weapons worldwide.
In at least four different ways, the U.S. is refusing to limit -- and
in some cases is actively promoting -- the spread of atomic bombs
around the globe.[1]
(1) The U.S. is helping foreign nations acquire nuclear power plants,
which everyone acknowledges have provided the basis for A-bomb
programs in India, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea and, during
the 1980s, in Iraq.[2] In the hands of a willing nation, nuclear
power equals nuclear weapons.
(2) The U.S. is dragging its feet in achieving its stated goal of
preventing theft of nuclear weapons within the former Soviet Union.[1]
(3) The U.S. is failing to retrieve 35,000 pounds of weapons-grade
uranium that the U.S. loaned or gave to 43 countries during the past
50 years. A crude but effective A-bomb requires 110 pounds (50 kg) of
enriched uranium.[3]
(4) President Bush has ordered a fundamental shift in U.S. nuclear
weapons policies, initiating what the New York Times calls "the
second nuclear age."
These new policies entail (a) creation of a new class of smaller
nuclear weapons, (b) guiding small A-bombs to their targets from
outer space, (c) reducing the time it takes to launch a nuclear
strike, and (d) a new policy of pre-emptive first use of nuclear
weapons even against non-nuclear states.
"It is precisely these kinds of provocative new weapons capabilities
-- at a time when the administration seeks to prevent proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction elsewhere -- that worries even hawkish
Republicans," says James Sterngold of the San Francisco Chronicle.[4]
Let's examine each of these four developments in more detail:
I. Nuclear power = nuclear weapons
The U.S. is urging -- and subsidizing -- foreign nations to build new
nuclear power plants to generate electricity, while acknowledging
that every nuclear power plant certainly provides the stepping stones
to A-bombs.
For example, when Vice-President Dick Cheney visited China in April,
2004, he was promoting the sale of Westinghouse nuclear power plants
to the Chinese.[5] Current U.S. policy restricts the export of
nuclear technology to China but the Bush administration is expected
to lift those restrictions in September. The immediate beneficiaries
will be Westinghouse and General Electric.[6] China has already
announced plans to build 32 nuclear power plants, and to export the
technology to other countries. For example, China has said it intends
to help Pakistan build two large nuclear power plants capable of
producing plutonium.[5]
Within the U.S. itself, in recent months two corporate consortiums
have proposed building new nuclear power plants.[7] President Bush is
an enthusiastic supporter of nuclear power.
But nuclear power plants always carry an unspoken danger. For nations
that want to build A-bombs, nuclear power provides the basis for all
that's needed in the way of technology, opportunity and know-how.
No one disputes this view -- the "nuclear club" has been able to
expand only because the spread of nuclear power plants has been
encouraged and subsidized. Why does the U.S. continue down this path?
As the New York Times wrote recently, "'If you look at every nation
that's recently gone nuclear,' said Mr. [Paul] Leventhal of the
Nuclear Control Institute, 'they've done it through the civilian
nuclear fuel cycle: Iraq, North Korea, India, Pakistan, South Africa.
And now we're worried about Iran.' The moral, he added, is that atoms
for peace can be 'a shortcut to atoms for war.'"[8]
The Times goes on, "Today, with what seems like relative ease,
scientists can divert an ostensibly peaceful program to make not only
electricity but also highly pure uranium or plutonium, both excellent
bomb fuels."[8]
And: "Experts now talk frankly about a subject that was once taboo:
'virtual' weapon states - Japan, Germany, Belgium, Canada, Brazil,
Kazakhstan, Taiwan and a dozen other countries that have mastered the
basics of nuclear power and could, if they wanted, quickly cross the
line to make nuclear arms, probably in a matter or months."[8]
Experts call crossing that line "breakout."
Other nations thought to have the know-how (though not necessarily
the inclination) to cross the breakout line include Egypt, Syria,
Nigeria, and South Korea.
The U.S. is on record as vigorously opposing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. However, U.S. actions to prevent proliferation are
half-hearted and contradictory at best.[1,9] For example, when U.S.
allies break all the rules and export A-bomb technology, the U.S.
looks the other way. Earlier this year, the world was rocked by news
that Pakistan's chief nuclear engineer, Abdul Qadeer Khan, had sold a
"complete package" of A-bomb technology to Libya, to North Korea, and
probably to Iran. The "complete package" included enriched uranium,
centrifuges for making more enriched uranium, and one or more designs
for A-bombs.[10] Dr. Khan even maintained a telephone support hotline
for his A-bomb customers. It was a good business -- Dr. Khan
reportedly received more than $100 million from Libya alone.[11]
When Dr. Khan's international smuggling network was discovered, the
President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, forced Dr. Khan to
retire as head of Khan Research Laboratories, then turned around and
gave him an official pardon, lavished him with praise and gave him
the title "special adviser" to the president.[10] According to the
New York Times, "...some former and current American officials say
there was considerable evidence that General Musharraf was turning a
blind eye to Dr. Khan's activities, which they say may have involved
parts of the Pakistani military."[12]
The Bush administration did nothing. "Although Mr. Bush has vowed to
pursue and prosecute those who spread nuclear weapons technology, the
administration did not criticize Mr. Musharraf when he decided to
pardon Mr. Khan, who ran what now appears to be one of the largest
nuclear proliferation networks in the past half-century."[10]
Did Dr. Khan provide bomb-grade uranium and nuclear know-how to Al
Qaeda? "It's mystifying that the administration hasn't leaned on
Pakistan to make Dr. Khan available for interrogation to ensure that
his network is entirely closed," writes New York Times columnist
Nicholas D. Kristof. "Several experts on Pakistan told me they
believe that the [U.S.] administration has been so restrained because
its top priority isn't combating nuclear proliferation -- it's
getting President Pervez Musharraf's help in arresting Osama bin
Laden before the November election," Kristof writes.[13]
Pakistan was not the only U.S. ally involved in selling A-bombs to
Libya, North Korea and Iran. Dubai in the United Arab Emirates served
as the "key transfer point" for all the technology Dr. Khan was
selling. Just as the Cayman Islands are known for laundering drug
money, Dubai is known for laundering black-market products like
A-bomb parts.[14]
When President Bush learned of Dubai's role in Pakistan's atomic
shopping mall, he again did nothing. As the scandal was breaking in
March, 2004, the Times reported that Lockheed Martin was proceeding
with the sale of 80 F-16 fighters to Dubai -- apparently a reward to
a trusted and valued ally.[14]
Even when wealthy, technically-savvy governments play strictly by the
rules, the civilian nuclear fuel cycle has proven impossible to
control. For example, the Japanese acknowledged earlier this year
that they have lost 435 pounds of plutonium -- enough to make about
25 nuclear bombs as big as the one that wiped out Nagasaki in 1945.
They know they produced it but they have no idea where it went.[15]
So long as the U.S. continues to promote nuclear power for itself and
its allies, the fiery hell on earth draws ever closer and more vivid.
I used to think this problem of "nuclear weapons proliferation" was
the "Achilles heel" of nuclear power -- the uncontrollable problem
that would finally convince the world to stuff the nuclear power
genie back into the bottle and never let it out again.
I am now wondering whether I had it exactly backwards: perhaps
nuclear weaponry is the main appeal of nuclear power -- both to those
who are buying it AND to those who are selling it. (More on this in
Part 3.)
II. Turning a Blind Eye to Loose Soviet A-Bombs
The U.S. has continually failed to secure nuclear weapons left over
from the cold war in countries of the former Soviet Union. As the New
York Times reported in March 2004, "The bipartisan [U.S.] program to
secure weapons of mass destruction is starved for funds -- but Mr.
Bush is proposing a $41 million cut in 'cooperative threat reduction'
with Russia."[13]
"I wouldn't be at all surprised if nuclear weapons are used over the
next 15 or 20 years," Bruce Blair, president of the Center for
Defense Information, told the New York Times recently, "first and
foremost by a terrorist group that gets its hands on a Russian
nuclear weapon or a Pakistani nuclear weapon."[13]
There are an estimated 15,000 nuclear weapons in the countries of the
former Soviet Union -- 7,000 of them strategic weapons plus an
estimated 8,000 tactical weapons.[3] Strategic weapons are the big
ones capable of incinerating whole cities. They are covered by
disarmament treaties and so have been pretty well inventoried. They
are also physically large and protected with several layers of
elaborate codes and anti-detonation devices. It would be extremely
difficult to steal one and set it off.
But tactical nuclear weapons are a different story. "The most
troublesome gap in the generally reassuring assessment of Russian
weapons security is those tactical nuclear warheads -- smaller,
short-range weapons like torpedoes, depth charges, artillery shells,
mines. Although their smaller size and greater number makes them
ideal candidates for theft, they have gotten far less attention
simply because, unlike all of our long-range weapons, they happen not
to be the subject of any formal treaty," says the New York Times.[3]
The commonly-used estimate of 8,000 tactical nukes is "an educated
guess," says the Times. Other estimates range from a low of 4,000 to
a high of 32,000 tactical A-bombs. Even the Russians don't seem to
have a reliable inventory.[3]
"The other worrying thing about tactical nukes is that their anti-use
devices are believed to be less sophisticated, because the weapons
were designed to be employed in the battlefield. Some of the older
systems are thought to have no permissive action links at all, so
that setting one off would be about as complicated as hot-wiring a
car," says the Times.[3]
But stealing a nuclear weapon may not be the easiest way for a
terrorist group to join the nuclear club.
Bill Keller, who wrote the eye-opening article, "Nuclear Nightmares"
for the New York Times magazine two years ago, says, "The closest
thing I heard to consensus among those who study nuclear terror was
this: building a nuclear bomb is easier than you think, probably
easier than stealing one."[3]
III. Sluggish Response to Weapons-Grade Uranium
So the third way that the U.S. is promoting the spread of atomic
bombs is by failing to retrieve the weapons-grade enriched uranium
that the U.S. sent abroad during the past 50 years.
Here is the opening paragraph from a New York Times story March, 7,
2004: "As the United States presses Iran and other countries to shut
down their nuclear weapons development programs, government auditors
have disclosed that the United States is making little effort to
recover large quantities of weapons-grade uranium -- enough to make
roughly 1,000 nuclear bombs -- that the government dispersed to 43
countries over the last several decades," including Iran and
Pakistan.[16]
Why would President Bush fiddle around in the face of a threat as
serious and obvious as this one?
--Peter Montague [To be
continued.]
======
[1] This newsletter was written before the New York Times
editorialized as follows on May 28, 2004:
"While the Bush administration has been distracted by the invasion
and occupation of Iraq, it has neglected the far more urgent threat
to American security from dangerous nuclear materials that must be
safeguarded before they can fall into the hands of terrorists. That
is the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from a new report that
documents the slow pace of protecting potential nuclear bomb material
at loosely guarded sites around the world.
"The report -- prepared by researchers at the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard -- does not directly blame the invasion of Iraq
for undermining that effort. It simply notes that less nuclear
material was secured in the two years immediately after the 9/11
attacks than in the two years before....
"The most plausible explanation is that the administration has
focused so intensely on Iraq, which posed no nuclear threat, that it
had little energy left for the real dangers. Indeed, the Harvard
researchers said that if a tenth of the effort and resources devoted
to Iraq in the last year was devoted to securing nuclear material
wherever it might be, the job could be accomplished quickly."
[2] In early June, 1981, Israel bombed a nuclear power plant under
construction in Iraq, asserting that Iraq intended it for making
A-bombs. See Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan Asserts Israel Had Cause To
Mistrust Iraq: Senate Panel Not Convinced," New York Times June 17,
1981. pg. A1.
[3] Bill Keller, "Nuclear Nightmares," New York Times May 26, 2002.
[4] James Sterngold, "A new era of nuclear weapons: Bush's buildup
begins with little debate in Congress," San Francisco Chronicle Dec.
7, 2003.
[5] H. Josef Hebert, "Cheney to shop Westinghouse nuke technology to
China," Salt Lake City (Utah) Tribune April 10, 2004.
[6] Reuters, "Asian countries in race for nuclear power," Economic
Times [of India] April 11, 2004.
[7] "A 2nd Consortium Wants a Reactor," New York Times April 1, 2004.
[8] William J. Broad, "Nuclear Weapons in Iran: Plowshare or Sword,"
New York Times (Science Section) May 25, 2004.
[9] "Editorial: Half a Proliferation Program," New York Times Feb. 16, 2004.
[10] David E. Sanger, "U.S. Widens Its View of Pakistan Link to
Korean Arms," New York Times Mar. 14, 2004.
[11] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Pakistani's Nuclear
Earnings: $100 Million," New York Times Mar. 16, 2004.
[12] David Rohde and Talat Hussain, "Delicate Dance for Musharraf In
Nuclear case," New York Times Feb. 8, 2004.
[13] Nicholas D. Kristof, "A Nuclear 9/11," New York Times Mar. 10, 2004.
[14] Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, "OpEd: Nukes 'R' Us," New York
Times Mar. 4, 2004.
[15] Bayan Rahman, "Japan Loses 206 kg of Plutonium," New York Times
Jan. 28, 2003.
[16] Joel Brinkley and William J. Broad, "U.S. Lags in Recovering
Fuel Suitable for Nuclear Arms," New York Times Mar. 7, 2004.
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