Sustainable energy production can't happen without sustainable 
agricultural production, and the current industrial agricultural 
system is anything but sustainable, not in any way - perhaps 
particularly not in its massive use of fossil fuels.

With all the talk we've had here about Big Soy, Big Ethanol, the 
likes of Arcgher Daniels Midland, Cargill, Monsanto, and of subsidies 
and what happens to them (soy check-off dollars and biodiesel for 
instance) - what the estimable Albert Krebs refers to as "corporate 
fascism" - this article is of much interest.

For those who're still fooled by the idea that Big is Better and 
that's why it "succeeds" in agriculture, this is a fairly typical 
example of what that success is based on - sheer bullying:

"From the 1930's to the 1960's the free-range system was the popular 
way to raise poultry in the United states. It produced meaty, tender 
birds at a reasonable cost, using a reasonable amount of labor and 
providing valuable fertility to the land. Many farmers raised 
10,000-20,000 birds per year on short-grass pasture ("range"), both 
chickens and turkeys. With the rise of industrial agriculture and the 
development of the confinement broiler barn, this sustainable and 
profitable system was discontinued by means of withdrawing growers 
contracts. Left with no market or processing facilities the practice 
was abandoned within two or three years. However, even though the 
system was phased out here in the U.S., it has continuing popularity 
in Europe, even to the point of having legislated standards. In 
France, in 2000, over 20% of all poultry (90 million birds!) was 
raised using the free-range system."
https://raju.safe-order.net/free-rangepoultry/free-rangepoultryindex2.htm
Back40Books

 From the article below:

>"Most problems on the farms of rural America," Mudd stresses, " can 
>be traced to one fundamental cause. The underlying problem with farm 
>income is concentration. As our input suppliers and the purchasers 
>of our products consolidate, they acquire market power. This market 
>power is leveraged against the farmer when he sells his crop.  . . . 
>Look somewhere else for a scapegoat; it is not the American farmer 
>draining the United States Treasury. The real transfer of wealth is 
>accumulating in Cargill and ADM's bank accounts."

Verily.

Best

Keith



The
Agribusiness
Examiner
July 28, 2003, Issue #273
Monitoring Corporate Agribusiness
 From a Public Interest Perspective

EDITOR\PUBLISHER; A.V. Krebs
E-MAIL: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
WEB SITE: <http://www.ea1.com/CARP/>http://www.ea1.com/CARP/
TO RECEIVE: Send name and address
 

Commentary:
Family Farm Agriculture Battling To Survive Apathy, Policies And Myths
 
Amidst the recent sound and fury over such issues as genetic 
engineering, mad cow disease, the quality, safety and quantity of the 
food we manufacture, etc., etc. the fate of this nation's historical 
family farm system of agriculture is being all but ignored --- by 
both progressives and reactionaries --- considered by many of these 
same folks as simply a relic of a bygone era.

Typical of such cynicism are the remarks made recently by Ken Cook, 
President of the Environmental Working Group who throughout recent 
years has repeatedly demonstrated his lack of understanding of 
agricultural economics. Saying that he was "skeptical that nostalgia 
will be discarded" it was Cook and his organization that compiled 
lists of growers who received subsidies amounting to tens of 
thousands and hundreds of thousands of dollars.

"Gee, it's served them so well," he said in referring to nostalgia 
"usually, that's what they trot out when they're looking for more 
subsidy money."

By focusing so much media attention on the "subsidy question" during 
the debate on the 2002 Farm Bill, Cook's na•vetŽ allowed in large 
measure corporate agribusiness to fashion legislation of the 
corporate interests, by the corporate interests and for the corporate 
interests.

As Keith Mudd, a farmer near Monroe City, Missouri, has pointed out " 
The Environmental Working Group argues that most of the subsidies go 
to the largest of farmers, who in turn use it to buy out their 
smaller neighbors. The truth is that all farmers, regardless of size, 
must use the subsidy just to raise the value received for their 
commodity above the cost of production. In most instances, the cost 
of production is covered and something is left over for living 
expenses. In practically no instance is
anything left over that would be considered a return on investment 
(land and equity).
 
"Most problems on the farms of rural America," Mudd stresses, " can 
be traced to one fundamental cause. The underlying problem with farm 
income is concentration. As our input suppliers and the purchasers of 
our products consolidate, they acquire market power. This market 
power is leveraged against the farmer when he sells his crop.  . . . 
Look somewhere else for a scapegoat; it is not the American farmer 
draining the United States Treasury. The real transfer of wealth is 
accumulating in Cargill and ADM's bank accounts."

Likewise, as Dean Baker and Mark Weisbrot, Co-Directors of the 
prestigious Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington 
D.C. recently pointed out " While many of the agricultural subsidies 
in rich countries are poorly targeted, and in some cases hurt farmers 
in developing nations, it is important not to exaggerate these 
impacts. The risk of doing so is that it encourages policy makers and 
concerned NGOs to focus their energies on an issue that is largely 
peripheral to economic development, and ignore much more important 
matters."

Their comments came in response to a long article by the Editorial 
Board of the New York Times on Sunday, July 20, 2003, "The Rigged 
Trade Game" available at
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0720-03.htm
The Weisbrot and Baker essay was taken from their paper "The Relative 
Impact of Trade Liberalization on Developing Countries," available at
http://www.cepr.net/relative_impact_of_trade_liberal.htm

Both at home and abroad corporate agribusiness's minions have long 
argued that agriculture to be successful must be "industrialized" 
which in turn, they have argued, relies on concentrating resources 
into as few hands as possible.

Agrarian populism at the close of the 19th century clearly recognized 
that condition and thus believed that it was imperative to bring the 
corporate state under democratic control. "Agrarian reformers," 
historian Lawrence Goodwin stresses, "attempted to overcome a 
concentrating system of finance capitalism that was rooted in Eastern 
commercial banks and which radiated outward through trunk-line 
railroad networks to link in a number of common purposes much of 
America's consolidating corporate community. Their aim was structural 
reform of the American economic system."

That effort, which Ralph Nader often points out, is "still the 
country's most fundamental political and economic reform" and laid 
the ground work for the Progressives, Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom 
and later Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal and more recently the 
Great Society. The creative economic and social policies that these 
programs spawned dominated the political and economic scene 
throughout the entire 20th century and thwarted for the most part the 
complete de-structuring of family farm agriculture in the U.S.

It was not until 1996 and the infamous "Freedom to Farm" legislation 
was fashioned by a Republican Congress and signed by a Democrat 
president that corporate agribusiness finally realized their dream of 
robbing family farmers of their nearly last vestiges of that economic 
power first conceived and asserted by the agrarian populists a 
century earlier.
 
Thus, by deifying "cost benefit analysis" at the expense of the 
"common good," corporate agribusiness has all but managed to 
completely annul the positive dimensions of the family farm system 
and eliminate its economic and environmental advantages, particularly 
as they relate to building genuine communities.

As social anthropologists Patricia L. Allen and Carolyn E. Sachs 
point out, any system built upon a foundation of structural 
inequities "is ultimately unsustainable in the sense that it will 
result in increasing conflict and struggle along the lines of class, 
gender, and ethnicity." Corporate agribusiness has become just such a 
system.

Thus, we have arrived at a point where our family farm system of agriculture is
facing its dark night of the soul, standing now on the threshold of 
eradication. Throughout the 1980's we saw an ever mounting number of 
farm bankruptcies, foreclosures, and forced evictions reap a grim 
"human harvest" of suicides, alcoholism, divorce, family violence, 
personal stress, and loss of community.

Continuing through the 1990's to this very day we have witnessed the 
very economic and social fabric of rural America being ripped asunder 
as the control of our food supply is being  seized by the merchants 
of greed whose purpose is not to feed people, provide jobs, husband 
the land, but simply to monetize our natural resources and thereby 
increase their cash flow and reduce their transactional costs in an 
effort to placate their excess-profit-obsessed institutional 
investors.

Thus, in the grand scheme of history the 20th century may well be 
remembered as the
point in the evolution of humanity when those corporations that trade, process,
manufacture, pack, ship and sell the world's food successfully 
removed the culture from agriculture and in the name of "efficiency" 
and in the pursuit of a globalized industrialization of the world's 
food supply reshaped agri-culture into an agri-business.

By attempting to deify their own myopic view of efficiency, however, corporate
agribusiness has brought family farming, the democratic control of 
the people's food supply, and a wholesome and healthy natural 
environment to the brink of global
disaster which unless immediately recognized, confronted and thwarted 
will inevitably lead to worldwide economic, political, social and 
environmental chaos unlike any seen in human history.

For in measuring efficiency in strictly quantitative and economic 
terms, such as is currently being practiced by corporate agribusiness 
and its merchants of greed, the qualitative aspects of an 
agri-culture and a family farm food production structure are rapidly 
being discarded on the scrap heap of history as mere impediments to 
improving the "bottom line" of the unaccountable corporations that 
process and manufacture our food.

And as corporate agribusiness seeks to meta-morphize agriculture from a culture
based upon the traditional family farm system of agriculture into a 
business where capital is substituted for genuine economic, social 
and environmental efficiency, and where expensive technology is 
substituted for labor we see a  standardization of our food supply 
through an industrial manufacturing process based on the creation of 
synthetic foods, such as is now taking place through the use of 
genetic engineering.

Considering those characteristics by which corporate agribusiness has become
identified with and comparing them with the historical 
characteristics of the family farm/peasant system of agriculture we 
begin to see more clearly how corporate
agribusiness is the antithesis of family farm agriculture and how 
incompatible the
two systems are in a democratically structured society.

Whereas family farming/peasant agriculture has traditionally sought 
to nurture and
care for the land, corporate agribusiness, exclusive by nature, seeks 
to "mine" the
land, solely interested in monetizing its natural wealth and thus 
measure efficiency
by its profits, by pride in its "bottom line." Family farmers, 
meanwhile, see efficiency in terms of respecting, caring and 
contributing to the overall health and well-being of the land, the 
environment, the communities and the nations in which they live.

While corporate agribusiness stresses institutionalized organization, 
hierarchical decision making, volume, speed, standardization of the 
food supply and extracting as much production from the land as 
quickly and impersonally as possible, family farmers and peasants 
strive through order, labor, pride in the quality of their work, and 
a certain strength of character and sense of community to take from 
the land only what
it is willing to give so as not to damage its dependability or 
diminish its sustainability.

But the so-called "conventional wisdom" in agriculture historically 
has been that
through the continual substituting of capital for efficiency and 
technology for labor "inefficient" farm operators are eliminated by 
"market forces" while those who survive manage to thrive.

Such "wisdom" also perpetuates the myth that the nation's 
agricultural system is
still dominated by independent family-operated farms and with the 
ever-increasing elimination of "inefficient producers" --- "excess 
human resources" --- we will witness a
never-ending expansion of production to feed the world.

Nowhere has this "conventional wisdom" been more apparent, hoodwinked 
more farmers and become the driving force of a nation's agricultural 
and food policy than in the United States.
 

AS YOU SOW
SO SHALL YOU REAP

Reflecting on some of the numerous efforts in recent history to 
preserve and maintain family farm agriculture by primarily making it 
economically worthwhile for farmers to stay on the land and learn 
from such efforts  can be seen, for example, by the proposed 
controversial "plan" offered by President Harry S. Truman's Secretary 
of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan in 1949.

Designed primarily to provide a more rigid high level price support 
system that would offer greater protection to small farmers and less 
to corporate operators, the Brannan Plan was bitterly debated both in 
Congress and among farmers.

An important section of the Brannan plan was the proposed expansion 
and revision of the list of "basic" commodities for which price 
supports would be mandatory. The ten commodities "of prime importance 
both from the standpoint of their contribution to farm income and 
their importance to the American consumer family" included corn, 
cotton, wheat, tobacco, whole milk, eggs, farm chickens, hogs, beef 
cattle and lambs. Support for nonbasic commodities was to be left up 
to the discretion of the Secretary.

Perhaps the most hotly debated feature of Brannan's program was his 
proposal that a free market set prices, with direct goverment 
"production payments" making up the difference between actual and 
supported prices. To protect against too great an expansion of 
production and huge production payment expenditures the Agricultural 
Secretary would have the power to impose production controls on all 
basic commodities whenever necessary.

Truman's Agricultural Secretary also sought to impose certain 
restrictions and conditions on the receipt of such production 
payments by limiting the size of farms which could receive such 
benefits, encouraging "the family-sized farms" and discouraging 
"development of extremely large-scale industrial farming."

According to the 1945 census, about 100,000 of the largest units --- 
fewer than two percent of all farms  --- were selling products valued 
at nearly one-fourth of all the farm products marketed in this 
country. That was more than was sold in total by two-thirds of all 
our farms, including half of the nation's family farms.

The validity of Brannan's belief in the family farm system of 
agriculture in the United States and its basic economic and social 
value to the rural community in general had already been attested to 
in a landmark study done by a California social scientist Dr. Walter 
Goldschmidt under the auspices of the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics (BAE).

In 1942 the Bureau of Reclamation had expressed justifiable concern 
whether the 160 acre limitation principle in the federal reclamation 
law should be applied to California's burgeoning Central Valley 
Project (CVP). The BAE was enlisted to help and Marion Clawson, a 
staff economist, was placed in charge.

Clwson and Dr. Paul Taylor of the University of California, and the 
Division of Farm Population designed a study to "determine what 
difference does it make to the character of rural life if the farm 
units are large corporate holdings as against family-size units," 
such as provided for in the 1902 Reclamation law?

Dr.  Goldschmidt was given the responsibility of conducting the 
study.A comparative study of Arvin, a town located alongside the 
mammoth DiGiorgio Corporation, long a symbol of California corporate 
agribusiness, and Dinuba, a community surrounded by small family-type 
farms, was undertaken. As Dr. Goldschmidt, now an anthropology 
professor emeritus at UCLA, explains:

"The research plan that was devised from the outset included two 
phases. The first was a detailed examination of the two 
representative communities. From that experience a series of measures 
of community organization were to be devised that would reflect the 
quality of life in the towns, based upon data that could be easily 
attained without questionnaires or interviews.

"Among the items to be considered were everything from the number of 
local business enterprises to the rate of teacher turnovers. From 
this objective data an index was to be formulated that would enable 
some 23 other small towns in the upper San Joaquin Valley to be 
rated."

What the Arvin-Dinuba study revealed has become near legend in the 
argument for perpetuating the "family farm system" of agriculture 
throughout rural America. Dinuba was found far superior to Arvin as 
the quality of life in each community was directly related to the 
inequities in landholdings and directly reflected in the difference 
in the community's economic, political and social stability.

"Large scale farm operations is immediately seen to take an important 
part in the creation of the conditions found in Arvin. Its direct 
causative effect is to create a community made up of a few persons of 
high economic position, and a mass of individuals whose economic 
status and whose security and stability are low, and who are 
economically dependent directly on the few. In the framework of 
American culture, more particularly that of industrialized farming, 
this creates immediately a situation where community participation 
and leadership, economic well-being, and business activities are 
relatively impoverished."

The small-farm community of Dinuba was supporting 62 separate 
businesses with a volume of trade of $4.3 million, while the 
large-farm community of Arvin had 35 established business 
establishments; expenditures for household supplies and building 
equipment were over three times greater in the small-farm community; 
Dinuba had a larger dollar-volume of agricultural production; over 
one-half of the breadwinners in the small-farm community were 
independently employed, while in the large-farm community less than 
one-fifth were so employed: public services in the small-farm 
community were far better; the small farm community had two 
newspapers while the large-farm community had one, and the small-farm 
community had twice the number of organizations for civic improvement 
and recreation.

As applied to a small-farm community the 160 acreage limitation 
principle was also found not only to be justified, but one that 
should be encouraged and supported.

As a postscript to this 1946 study, Isao Fujimoto, a University of 
California - Davis behaviorial scientist professor, and his rural 
sociology students some 31 years later sought to continue the work 
Goldschmidt and his associates had been prevented from completing.

They surveyed some 130 towns in eight San Joaquin Valley counties to 
determine the relationship between the control of land and water and 
the quality of community life.
Comparing three variables --- complexity of town services, scale of 
cropping patterns, and water use --- Fujimoto & Co. confirmed 
Goldschmidt's Arvin-Dinuba findings, namely that areas with 
large-scale farming and undemocratic water districts had noticeably 
fewer towns that provided a smaller range of services while towns 
associated with small-scale family farms had proportionately more 
elementary schools, dentists, pharmacies and medical specialists.
 
While the first phase of the 1946 study was completed and reported 
on, the second, due to the extended controversy surrounding the 
first, was never completed.
Goldschmidt remembers, "I had hoped to calculate a regression curve 
between these two variables [the size of farms measured by gross 
acreage and by Îequivalent' acres, based upon the income potential, 
of diverse crops] but was prevented from making this sophisticated 
analysis. I have recently reexamined these data and have found that 
they revealed a most important relationship . . . It showed that as 
the average size of farm increases, the number of persons supported 
in the rural area and local community declines."

Reaction to the Arvin-Dinuba study was immediate and ominous. 
Repeated efforts were made to block its publication, the study having 
been completed in 1944. When it finally was issued in December, 1946, 
due principally to the efforts of Dewey Anderson, of the Senate Small 
Business Committee and U.S. Senator James E. Murray, committee 
chairman, it was with a quid pro quo that no mention whatsoever be 
made of USDA's involvement in the study.

Efforts, principally by the American Farm Bureau and its allies, were 
made in the press, on the radio, and in Congress to discredit the 
study. As noted earlier, the Goldschmidt study also only exacerbated 
the criticism of the BAE's activities. The BAE, no longer in 
existence, has been called by some agricultural historians the 
one-time conscience of the USDA.

In a September, 1946 The Nation article author Alden Stevens 
suggested that the AFBF was responsible for getting a provision 
written into a USDA appropriations bill which would prohibit any 
further studies similar to Arvin-Dinuba. He also went on to say that 
the study "was used to destroy one of the most honest and courageous 
organizations in Washington, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics."

Goldschmidt, in recent years, recalls, "I wrote a letter to The 
Nation saying that the study was not manifestly responsible for this 
action . . . I am not so sure as I was when I wrote that letter to 
The Nation that the Arvin-Dinuba investigation was not a major factor 
in the curtailment of the BAE and its subsequent demise."

In fact, the USDA's Appropriations Act for 1947 contains the 
following codicil: "That no part of the funds herein appropriated or 
made available to the [BAE] under the heading ÎEconomic 
Investigation' shall be used for state or county land and planning, 
for conducting cultural surveys, or for the maintenance of regional 
offices."
 
In further reflection on the events surrounding this study, 
Goldschmidt now believes that those who sabotaged his expanded 
research into a larger sample of communities knew exactly what it 
would reveal. It was much easier to discount the Arvin-Dinuba 
conclusions than it would have been to dismiss the results of a much 
more comprehensive study.
 
The Brannan Plan's support of a "family farm system" of agriculture 
was not the only drawback to its many enemies who finally managed to 
kill it. The reasons for its defeat
centered primarily on political considerations and the fear by 
Republicans and conservatives that its passage would cement the 
alliance between farmers and labor which only recently had played a 
major role in reelecting Truman in 1948.

And it is here again where we see the all too familiar pattern that 
first emerged in the populist era, later to re-surface during the New 
Deal, and now again evident in the Brannan Plan: whenever farmers and 
labor show genuine signs of building an economic and/or political 
coalition the various "communities of economic interests" that 
dominate corporate agribusiness, including the American Farm Bureau 
Federation react, and react with a sense of foreboding and urgency.

It is no coincidence that these same economic and political forces in 
America which have historically tried to destroy trade and industrial 
unionism are also the same elements that have traditionally and 
consistently seen the major problem facing agriculture as one of 
"excess human resources."

It is also true that the cost of such a plan as the one Brannan 
proposed was unknown, for even he admitted that he couldn't estimate 
the cost any more "than the people who came up with the first 
price-support program involving loans were able to estimate for you 
then."

But, cost was not the conservatives' and Republicans' major reason 
for wanting the plan killed. Rather, the Grand Old Party feared 
Brannan's plan might indeed have a particularly special appeal to the 
farm community in the upcoming 1950 Congressional elections. "That 
the Republicans will fight it is already evident," a New York Times 
report declared, "because as one observer said, Îif the Democrats get 
it through, they are in for life.'"
 

DR. WALTER GOLDSCHMIDT:
WHAT IF ???  . . .
A HALF CENTURY
AFTER "AS YOU SOW"

Half a century ago I was in the town of Wasco, California making a 
study of community life and social organization. The study showed 
that industrial farming creates an urbanized social system. That is, 
where agricultural production is dominated by highly mechanized labor 
with necessarily high capital requirements and the use of large 
amounts of hired labor the result is a social order characterized by 
impersonal social relationships, social class differentiation and 
conflict, and the dominance of monetary over other social values. As 
you sow, so shall you reap. The study was published under the title 
"As You Sow."

This finding was far from trivial, obvious as it may now seem. 
Republicans as well as Democrats have espoused the Jeffersonian 
agrarian philosophy; the Great American Myth is fundamentally 
agrarian and the small town has long been seen as the bastion of 
basic American values.

It is the very heart and soul of our egalitarianism and therefore our 
democratic institutions and central to our values. In this view the 
California situation was seen as an aberration, as had the slavery of 
our southern plantation economy --- over which we fought a major war.

Three years after Wasco, I was asked to provide an answer to a simple 
question: What difference does it make if the farm units are large or 
small? The question was asked as part of the Central Valley Project 
Studies; a research program designed to examine the impact of that 
project and set the basis for policy matters.

The Central Valley Project (CVP) in California was developed by the 
Bureau of Reclamation, and the Bureau operated under a then 40-year 
old ruling that irrigation waters developed (and subsidized) by it 
must be sold to land units of 160 acres or less. The Question 
therefore was: Should this ruling be applied to the beneficiaries of 
CVP?

I initiated a study comparing the two towns of Arvin and Dinuba, one 
representing those communities dominated by large-scale enterprises 
and the other representing the towns where small family-sized 
operations were the rule.

The study showed unequivocally that the town surrounded by the small 
farms was far superior by every measure that I could devise.

Clearly, industrial scale operations exacerbated the social problems 
I found in Wasco. The study was published in 1946 by the U.S. Senate 
Small Business Committee. The research made it clear that the acreage 
limitation ruling should be applied --- at least if we really cared 
about those agrarian values of our cherished national myth.

The results of this study were denied in the halls of Congress and in 
the public media, because the owners of the vast acreages in 
California understandably did not want the acreage limitation applied 
to their holdings. Condemned while we were still in the field, 
vilified and ridiculed both in the media and in Congress when we 
published the results in an attack orchestrated by the right-wing 
Associated Farmers of California, we were prevented from making a 
second, more comprehensive comparative study. We were very nearly 
prevented from publishing our results.

***********************************************

EDITOR'S NOTE: In his classical historical work Ill Fares the Land: 
Migrants and Migratory Labor in the United States, (Little, Brown and 
Company, Boston: 1942) Carey McWilliams writes: "The gentlemen who 
sit in their offices in San Francisco and Oakland and write checks to 
the Associated Farmers are not the men who, wearing the armbands of 
the group, organize mobs to browbeat and coerce agricultural workers. 
They have cleverly stimulated the farmers and townspeople to act as 
their storm troopers. Nevertheless the real headquarters of 
vigilantism in California are to be found on Montgomery Street in San 
Francisco and not in the great valleys of the state."

***********************************************

But the finds were never successfully refuted. The storm over this 
research did not seriously try to invalidate the results, but was 
merely part of a concerted effort to prevent the acreage limitation 
law from being applied to the vast areas served by the project --- 
and in this they were successful.

The result is that when we drive today on the West Side along Highway 
5 and elsewhere in California served by the CVP, we find that either 
there are no communities at all or they are miserable replicas of 
Arvin. We find what I call a green desert, a social desert.

What if the powers that be had accepted the results of the comparison 
of Arvin and Dinuba, and the government had implemented the acreage 
limitation law --- as it should have done --- so that these vast 
areas would have been peopled by small-farm-operators like those in 
Dinuba.

Instead of that green desert, there would be some 100,000 people, 30 
or 40 grocery stores, dozens of furniture and appliance stores, there 
would be high schools with their bands and football teams and who 
knows how many beer joints and mom and pop stores and bowling alleys 
and the like. There would be at least ten Big Macs and TacoBells; 
there would be 40 or so Little League teams with 800 parents 
screaming at the umpires and 170 preachers to remind them that they 
should love their neighbors.

In my "As You Sow" I made other predictions and other 
recommendations. "Farm policy must be formulated in full recognition 
of the growing urbanization of rural society. For the past quarter of 
a century farm programs have been developed in terms of a stereotype 
of rural life which no longer reflects the social reality. It is this 
failure to adjust agricultural planning to the world of today that 
has, more than anything else, spelled out the failure of our vast 
farm program to accomplish its stated ends."

My recommendations in "As You Sow" were that it was essential to 
recognize the industrial quality of farming, which clearly was 
already diffusing throughout the nation, and its urban consequences, 
which meant that the regulations of the Labor Relations Act should be 
applied to the agricultural sector and that unions should not only be 
allowed to develop, but should be encouraged. What was needed was a 
professionalization of the farm worker.

These recommendations were also not followed. Instead, we have had 
the continued exploitation of the farm workers; the increased 
concentration of land ownership in the hands of the few; greater 
difficulties for the small farmer precisely because they were not 
protected from such centralized control of the markets, and all the 
other difficulties that derive from an unregulated industrialized 
agricultural system. We have seen the growth of rural slums and the 
burgeoning of urban ones.

What was taken to be a California aberration turns out to have been a 
harbinger of what was to take place throughout the nation. We have 
seen the disappearance of millions of farms, the increased 
concentration of agricultural control, the disappearance of hundreds 
of rural communities and the small businesses that they supported. 
The independent family farmer is rapidly giving way to the 
industrialized and centralized agricultural enterprise and something 
is going out of the heartland of America.

And out of her heart, as well. The genius of a people, the spirit of 
a culture, lies in the way it makes its living; lies in the relation 
of the work force to the resources and the means of production.

I wrote: "It is my opinion that the most important single factor in 
the formulation of the character of nations is its basic mode of 
production and the way that production is organized. The American 
character was forged in its rural hinterland; the frontiersman 
melding into the freeholding farmer created a pattern consisting of 
egalitarianism, personal independence, the demand for hard work and 
ingenuity, self-discipline, with its ultimate reward in personal 
success."

The independent family farmer operator lay at the heart of this 
quality in American life; not only in his\her operation, but in the 
inspiration for others elsewhere in the economy.

There are two great forces at work that tend to destroy such 
independence of action and hence of spirit. First, there is the need 
for large scale operations in industry that require a high 
concentration of power; this is the technological force. Against this 
there is little that can be done --- it is a kind of technological 
fate. I hasten to add, however, that it is by no means clear that 
such concentration is either necessary nor advantageous when it 
applies to farm production.

Second, there is the power of those who have wealth and positions of 
influence to effect legislation and policy in such a way as to 
enhance that power and wealth. We have already seen that this is the 
force that prevented the application of the acreage limitation law to 
California farm lands. The attacks made on my study of Arvin and 
Dinuba and the continuing efforts to discredit it are cases in point. 
It was also the force that prevented the application of our national 
labor relations laws from being applied to agriculture. This is a 
force against which it is possible to take action.

But it is not easy. The price of liberty is external vigilance. I 
fear that we have been insufficiently vigilant.

Dr. Walter Goldschmidt , Professor Emeritus in social anthropology at 
UCLA is author of As You Sow: Three Studies In The Social 
Consequences of Agribusiness (Allanheld, Osmun & Co. Publishers, 
Montclair, N.J.: 1978). This essay is excerpted from a paper, "What 
If?" presented at a symposium organized by the California Institute 
for Rural Studies and reprinted in the Summer, 1993 issue of 
PrairieFire"s Prairie Journal.
 

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