TWN have now made available the final and correct version of the paper by Traavik and Heinemann that was circulated last week.
301kb pdf: http://www.biosafety-info.net/file_dir/719762120455431f1a3942.pdf >The paper below is a draft version, the full version with refs will >be available at TWN "in due course". - Keith > > >GM WATCH daily >http://www.gmwatch.org >--- >--- >1.Introduction from GM Watch >2.Genetic Engineering (GE) and Omitted Health Research: Still No >Answers to Ageing Questions >--- >--- >1.Introduction from GM Watch > >The following paper, 'Genetic Engineering and Omitted Health >Research: Still No Answers to Ageing Questions' is highly recommended. > >The paper points out that many scientific questions concerning health >effects of GMOs that were raised 20 years ago still remain unanswered. > >The paper discusses - in remarkably clear and readable terms - the >health hazards related to genetically engineered (GE) plants used as >food or feed, with mention of GE vaccines including si RNA- and >nanobio-technologies. > >Amongst the many points the authors note: > >*very few studies on the possible effects of GE food/feed on >potential animal or human consumers have been published in >peer-reviewed journals > >*a consensus has emerged that the effects observed in some published >studies must be experimentally followed up but THIS HAS NOT BEEN DONE. > >*most of the animal feeding studies performed so far have been >designed exclusively to reveal only husbandry production differences >[eg do animals gain weight satisfactorily on a GE feed compared to a >non-GE feed?] > >*studies designed to reveal physiological or pathological effects are >extremely few > >*these studies demonstrate a quite worrisome trend - studies >performed by the industry find no problems, while studies from >independent research groups often reveal effects that should merit >immediate follow-up, confirmation and extension > >*such follow-up studies have not been performed > >*studies are inhibited by lack of funds for independent research > >*studies are also inhibited by the reluctance of producers to deliver >their GE materials for analysis > >*the transgenic DNA sequences provided by GE food/feed producers >can't be relied on > >*the transgenic DNA sequences provided can differ from the inserted >sequences found in the actual genetically engineered plants > >*transgenic modification techniques can result in either degradation >of the incoming DNA, or insertion of rearranged copies into the plant >DNA > >*some genetic elements in the introduced genetic constructs may act >as "hotspots" for recombination > >*among other rearrangments, rearranged transgenic fragments may be >found scattered through the genome > >*the diffferences between the transgenic DNA sequences given by >producers and the actual inserted sequences found in their products >means that risk assessments made prior to approval do not necessarily >cover the potential risks associated with the products > >*if transgenic DNA and proteins are taken up from mammalian >gastro-intestinal tracts, instead of being degraded during digestion, >this could lead to chronic diseases > >*only two published reports have investigated the fate of >foreign/transgenic DNA in humans > >*the consequences of DNA persistence and uptake represent yet another >area of omitted research > >*some recent publications have demonstrated that foreign DNA and also >proteins may escape degradation, to persist in the gastro-intestinal >tracts and even to be taken up from the intestines and transported by >the blood to internal organs in biologically meaningful versions > >*allergenicity is a major concern with genetically engineered foods > >*tests for allergenicity are usually carried out with bacteria and >not with the versions of the transgenic protein which people are >exposed to, ie the actual protein produced in genetically engineered >plants > >*the Bt-toxins expressed in genetically engineered plants have never >been carefully analysed, and accordingly, their characteristics and >properties are not known > >The authors conclude, "We are left with a high number of risk issues >lacking answers, adding up to a vast area of omitted research, and >this falls together in time with a strong tendency towards corporate >take-over of publicly funded research institutions and scientists." > >2.MAIN TEXT ONLY - REFERENCES OMITTED > >Genetic Engineering (GE) and Omitted Health Research: Still No >Answers to Ageing Questions > >Terje Traavik, PhD, DVM >Scientific Director, GENOK-Norwegian Institute of Gene Ecology >Professsor of Gene Ecology, School of Medicine, University of Tromso, Norway > >And > >Jack Heinemann, PhD >Director, NZIGE-New Zealand Institute of Gene Ecology >Ass. Professor, School of Biological Sciences, University of >Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand > >Introduction. > >Some of the most crucial scientific questions concerning health >effects of GE and GEOs (genetically engineered organisms) were raised >up to twenty years ago. Most of them have still not been answered at >all, or have found unsatisfactory answers. We believe, as Mayer and >Stirling said, "in the end it is often the case that those who >choose the questions determine the answers". Will another twenty >years pass before societies realize the urgent need for public >funding of genuinely independent risk- and hazard-related research? >The time for such investment is now so that a new scientific culture >with working hypotheses rooted in the Precautionary principle (PP) >can discover other, possibly even more important questions of safety. > >In the present article we will mainly confine ourselves to putative >health hazards related to GE plants (GEPs) used as food or feed, with >some brief notes on GE vaccines as well as the novel si RNA- and >nanobio-technologies. This does not mean that we do not recognize the >paramount, indirect threats to public health posed by social, >cultural, ethical, economic and legal issues. > >In the specific context of food or feed safety assessment "hazard" >may be defined as a biological, chemical or physical agent in, or >condition of, food with the potential to cause an adverse health >effect. The hypothetical hazards of whole GM foods, i.e. those >hazards that have been realized so far, fall into a few broad >categories. They are either related to the random and inaccurate >integration of transgenes into recipient plant genomes, uncertainty >with regard to direct or indirect effects of the polypeptide product >of the transgene, or uncertainty with regard to DNA types and >circumstances promoting uptake and organ establishment of foreign DNA >from mammalian gastro-intestinal tracts . > >A number of scientific concerns have been raised in connection with >public and animal health. In the following we will discuss, in some >detail, a few of these. Some of them have been thoroughly discussed >in excellent, very recent reviews . > >Our contribution is based on "gene ecology"; a new, >cross-disciplinary scientific field intended to provide holistic >knowledge based on the precautionary principle . > >Some of the concerns we raise will also be relevant for environmental >risk assessments of GEOs due to the fact that the processes discussed >can take place in an ecosystem at large as well as in the ecosystems >represented by mammalian organisms. > >Do we know that any GE food/feed is safe for consumption? > >For a composite material like food/feed, reductionistic approaches >testing single components in vitro are highly unsatisfactory and >cannot by definition clarify important safety issues. In spite of the >obvious need, very few studies designed to investigate putative >effects of GE nucleic acids or food/feed on potential animal or human >consumers have been published in peer-reviewed journals. A consensus >has emerged that the effects observed in some published studies must >be experimentally followed up. To this day, this has not been done. > >Most of the animal feeding studies performed so far have been >designed exclusively to reveal husbandry production differences >between GEOs and their unmodified counterparts. Studies designed to >reveal physiological or pathological effects are extremely few, and >they demonstrate a quite worrisome trend : Studies performed by the >industry find no problems, while studies from independent research >groups often reveal effects that should have merited immediate >follow-up, confirmation and extension. > >Such follow-up studies have not been performed. There are two main >factors accounting for this situation: The lack of funds for >independent research, and the reluctance of producers to deliver GE >materials for analysis. > >Can we rely on the transgenic DNA sequences given by GE food/feed producers? > >If the transgenic DNA sequences given in the notifications differ >from the inserted sequences found in the GEPs, the risk assessments >made prior to approval of the GEPs for marketing do not necessarily >cover the potential risks associated with the GEPs. > >The most thoroughly studied transgenic events are: > >Bt-transgenic maize Mon810 >Bt- and glufosinate-transgenic maize Bt176 >Glyphosate-transgenic maize GA21 >Glufosinate-transgenic maize T25 (Liberty Link) >Glyphosate-transgenic soybean GTS 40-3-2 > >Even amongst the most thoroughly studied and some of the oldest >commercial GEPs, recent independent work has revealed that the nature >of the rearrangements vary, and deletions (Mon810, GA21, Bt176), >recombinations (T25, GTS 40-3-2, Bt176), tandem or inverted repeats >(T25, GA21, Bt176) as well as rearranged transgenic fragments >scattered through the genome (Mon810) have been reported. > >The transgenic modification techniques are prone to introduce such >rearrangements because exogenous DNA transfer in plants elicits a >"wound" response, which activates nucleases and DNA repair enzymes. >This may result in either degradation of the incoming DNA, or >insertion of rearranged copies into the plant DNA . In addition, the >nature of the DNA constructs used to make transgenic plants may >influence the rearrangement tendencies for a given transgenic event. >Some genetic elements in the constructs may act as "hotspots" and >elicit recombinations at high frequencies. > >While it was earlier assumed that integration of transgenic >constructs took place at random locations in the recipient plant >genome, it has now become apparent that integration sites are >concentrated in or near elements such as retrotransposons (T25, >Mon810, GA21) and repeated sequences (Bt11 maize) , and this poses >additional risks. Firstly, by introducing a new promoter or new >enhancer motifs, transgenic insertions into, or close to, such >elements may lead to altered spatial and temporal expression patterns >of plant genes located close to and even far from, the insert. >Secondly, a strong retrotransposon LTR promoter may upregulate the >transgene expression level. Thirdly, defective retrotransposons may >start "jumping" under the influence of transacting factors recruited >by the insert . All these events may have unpredictable effects on >the long-term genetic stability of the GEOs, as well as on their >nutritional value, allergenicity and toxicant contents. These >putative processes represent areas of omitted research with regard to >health effects of GEOs. > >Are transgenic DNA and proteins taken up from mammalian GIT >(gastro-intestinal tracts)? > >If DNA and proteins from GEOs persist in, and are taken up from >mammalian GIT, this could theoretically, as will be further explained >below, ultimately lead to development of chronic disease conditions. >The fate and consequences of DNA persistence and uptake is, however, >not extensively studied, and therefore represents yet another area of >uncertainties connected to GEPs. > >It has generally been claimed that DNA and proteins are effectively >degraded in mammalian GITs. This has been based on assumptions that >have never been systematically examined. A restricted number of >recent publications have demonstrated that foreign DNA and also >proteins may escape degradation, to persist in the GIT and even to be >taken up from the intestines and transported by the blood to internal >organs in biologically meaningful versions. These findings should not >have come as such a surprise, since scientific articles from the >1990s strongly indicated that this was an area of omitted research, >as stated by a number of reports . > >Briefly summarised, the present conception of DNA persistence and >uptake includes long fragments of ingested DNA. DNA may be detected >in the faeces, the intestinal wall, peripheral white blood cells, >liver, spleen and kidney, and the foreign DNA may be found integrated >in the recipient genome. When pregnant animals are fed foreign DNA, >fragments may be traced to small cell clusters in foetuses and >newborns. The state of GIT filling, and the feed composition may >influence DNA persistence and uptake. Complexing of DNA with proteins >or other macromolecules may protect against degradation. > >So far only two published reports have investigated the fate of >foreign/transgenic DNA in humans. The consequences of DNA >persistence and uptake thus represent yet another area of omitted >research. Extrapolating from a number of experiments in mammalian >cell cultures and in experimental animals, it is conceivable that in >some instances insertion of foreign DNA may lead to alterations in >the methylation and transcription patterns of the recipient cell >genome, resulting in unpredictable levels of gene expression levels >and products. Furthermore, even small inserts may result in a >so-called "destabilisation" process, the end-point of which may be >malignant cancer cells . > >The BSE/new variant Creutzfeld-Jacob's Disease epidemics caused by >the prion proteins painfully illustrated the phenomenon of protein >persistence, uptake and biological effects. > >Two recent publications indicate that this phenomenon may be more >general that realized. A hallmark of prion diseases and a number of >other debilitating, degenerative diseases, i.e. Alzheimer's and >Huntington's diseases, is deposition of "amyloid fibrils". Recent >studies indicate that any protein can adopt a confirmation known as >"amyloid" upon exposure to appropriate environmental conditions. >Whether that is the case for GE food/feed that is already in the >marketplace is unknown. > >The consequences of protein persistence and uptake will vary with the >given situation. Generally spoken there is a possibility that toxic, >immunogenic/allergenic or carcinogenic molecules may gain entry to >the organism via cells in the gastrointestinal walls. The persistence >of the Bt-toxin Cry1Ab in faeces means a potential for spread on the >fields through manure. The ecological effects, e.g. on insect larvae >and earthworms, are at the moment an issue of shear speculation. > >Have the protein contents of GE food been altered in unpredictable ways? > >Transgenes or upregulated plant genes may give rise to toxicants, >anti-nutritients, allergens and, putatively, also carcinogenic or >co-carcinogenic substances. The concentration of a given transgenic >protein may vary according to the location(s) in the recipient host >cell genome of inserted GE construct DNA, and to environmental >factors influencing the activity of the transgenic regulatory >elements, e.g. the 35S CaMV promoter. The biological effects of a >given transgenic protein, e.g. the Cry1Ab Bt-toxin, may be >unpredictably influenced by posttranslational modifications, >alternative splicings, alternative start codons for transcription, >chimeric reading frames resulting from integration into the reading >frame of a plant gene, and complex formation with endogenous plant >proteins. > >The influence of foreign DNA insertion on endogenous plant gene >expression patterns may vary with local environmental factors, the >actual insertion site(s), the number and stability of the inserts, >transgenic promoter effects, methylation patterns of the insert(s), >and post-transformational mutations in the transgenic protein coding >as well as in regulatory sequences. Even a single nucleotide change >may affect the properties of a protein, or it may create a new >transcription factor-binding motif. Detailed studies of these >phenomena under authentic conditions are lacking, and hence we are >confronted with yet another area of omitted research. > >May GE food/feed give allergies? > >One of the major health concerns related to GEPs is that the >transgenic product itself, e.g. a Bt toxin, or changed expression of >endogenous plant genes may result in allergenic compounds. The risk >assessment of allergens often follows an allergenicity decision tree >. These "trees" are based on in vitro tests comparing a limited >number of structures, usually only one, of the transgenic protein >with known allergens. Hence, these comparisons are hopeful that the >protein isolated for the test matches all proteins produced from the >same gene in the GEP. But in fact this is unlikely because >allergenicity tests are usually carried out with bacteria-, not in >planta-produced versions of the transgenic protein. Glycosylation >invariably takes place in plants, but not in bacteria, so this form >of post-translational modification of both the transgenic protein and >endogenous proteins would not be tested. Allergenic characteristics >of proteins, and also their resistance to degradation in the >organism, can be affected by glycosylation. Other protein >modifications may also take place, adding to the unpredictability of >transgenic products . > >Another important question related to allergenicity is whether post >marketing surveillance can provide useful information about allergens >in GE foods. For a number of reasons this is not likely to happen . >Treatment of allergy is symptomatic, whatever the cause may be. The >allergic case is often isolated, and the potential allergen is rarely >identified. The number of allergy-related medical visits is not >tabulated. Even repeated visits due to well-known allergens are not >counted as part of any established surveillance system. Thus, during >the October 2000 Starlink episode, it proved very difficult to >evaluate Starlink (containing Bt-toxin Cry9C) as a human allergen . >An additional reason for this was that the ELISA tests, used by FDA, >that found no anti-Cry9C antibodies in suspected human cases were >dubious because bacterial, recombinant antigens were used instead of >the Cry9C maize versions that the individuals had been exposed to. > >Case: Bt toxins in Bt-transgenic GEPs > >It is very important to be aware of the fact that the Bt-toxins >expressed in GEPs have never been carefully analysed, and >accordingly, their characteristics and properties are not known. What >is clear from the starting point, however, is that they are vastly >different from the bacterial Bacillus thuringiensis protoxins, used >in organic and traditional farming and forestry for decennia . The >difference is evident already at the gene level, since the versions >found in GEOs are engineered to produce active Bt toxins. By >extrapolation these have a number of potentially unwanted biological >characteristics, ranging from solubilization of the protein under >natural conditions and effects on insect and mammalian cells, to >persistence and non-target effects in the environment. In addition, >the posttranslational modifications that may influence conformations, >cellular targets and biological effects of GEP-expressed Bt-toxins >are unknown, and hence we once more identify an area of omitted >research. > >During the last few years a number of observations that may be >conceived of as "early warnings" of potential health and >environmental risks, have appeared in the literature. Most of them >have, however, not been followed up by extended studies. > >Case: Transgenic, glyphosate-tolerant (Roundup Ready) GEPs > >These GEPs have an inserted transgene, cp4 epsps, coding for an >enzyme that degrades the herbicide glyphosate. The whole idea is of >course the combined use of the GEP and the herbicide. Recent studies >indicate that in some cases such GEPs are associated with greater >usage of glyphosate than the conventional counterparts . A very >restricted number of experimental studies have been devoted to health >or environmental effects of the GEPs or the herbicide itself. Some of >these may be considered "early warnings" of potential health and >environmental risks, and they should be rapidly followed up to >confirm and extend the findings . Consequently: yet another area of >omitted research. > >Is the 35S CaMV promoter inactive in mammalian cells? > >Cauliflower mosaic virus (CaMV) is a DNA-containing para-retrovirus >replicating by means of reverse transcription (Poogin et al., 2001). >One of the viral promoters, called 35S is a general, strong plant >promoter. It has been used to secure expression of the transgenes in >most of the GEOs commercialized so far. > >Industry proponents have claimed unconditionally that the 35S is an >exclusive plant promoter, and hence cannot, even theoretically, >represent a food/feed safety issue . > >In addition to studies in yeast and in Schizosaccharomyces pombe , >there are published studies indicating that the 35S CaMV promoter >might have potential for transcriptional activation in mammalian >systems . And the final proofs have been made available during the >last couple of years. First, 35S promoter activity was demonstrated >in human fibroblast cell cultures , thereafter in hamster cells , and >very recently one of us (TT) has demonstrated substantial 35S >promoter activity in human enterocyte-like cell cultures. Such cells >are lining up the surface of human intestines. However, no published >studies have investigated 35S CaMV activity in vivo, and this is >hence an obvious area of omitted research. > >May the use of antibiotic resistance marker genes (e.g. nptII) >present health hazards? > >The antibiotic kanamycin is used extensively in crop genetic >engineering as a selectable marker, inter alia in GE oilseed rape >event lines like MS1Bn x RF1Bn and Topas 19/2. > >A selectable marker is a gene inserted into a cell or organism to >allow the modified form to be selectively amplified while unmodified >organisms are eliminated. In crop genetic engineering the selectable >marker is used in the laboratory to identify cells or embryos that >carry the genetic modifications that the engineer wishes to >commercialize. The selection gene is used once briefly in the >laboratory, but thereafter the genetically modified (GM) crop has the >unused marker gene in each and every one of its cells. > >There are multiple well-known mechanisms for cross-resistance to >antibiotics of a particular type . Kanamycin is a member of the >family aminoglycoside antibiotics. There are approximately 17 >different classes of aminoglycoside-modifying enzymes. Some of these >inactivate up to four different aminoglycosides. Cross-resistance >between kanamycin and other aminoglycosides, e.g. gentamycin and >tobramycin, was found to vary markedly between isolates. All of the >antibiotics mentioned are used to treat human diseases. > >Along with cross-resistance to aminoglycoside antibiotics, pathogenic >bacteria frequently develop multiple drug resistance transmitted on a >single plasmid . Pathogenic bacteria do acquire plasmids with >multiple antibiotic resistance genes in areas where the antibiotics >are used extensively. Such incidents illustrate the potential health >effects of HGT. Multiple resistance genes on a single plasmid can >simultaneously adapt a bacterium to several unrelated antibiotics. >One antibiotic at a time is all that is necessary to maintain the >plasmid. > >In spite of the belief of many genetic engineers that kanamycin is no >longer employed in medical applications, there is evidence that the >antibiotic is used extensively for some applications. > >Concluding remarks: Where do we go from here? > >We have discussed in some detail a handful of selected, unanswered >risk questions related to the first generation of transgenic GEOs. >There are many more risk issues. Among them are issues of Horizontal >Gene Transfer (HGT), the new generations of multitransgenic GEOs for >pharmaceutical and industrial purposes, safety questions related to >GE vaccines, the new nanobiotechnology approaches and the >applications of small inhibitory (si) RNAs for a number of medical >purposes. Furthermore, we have the "questions not yet asked", and we >have the problem of whether available methods and regulatory >frameworks will be able to pick up and manage the conceived risks >once they become reality. > >In recent publications it has been demonstrated that the presently >used sampling and detection methods may fail to detect GE materials >in food and feed. In another article it was demonstrated that HGT >events, that potentially carry very serious public health >consequences, would not be detected in time for any meaningful >preventive actions. And it has been illustrated that the siRNA >techniques are not as "surgically targeted" as initially indicated. > >We are left with a high number of risk issues lacking answers, adding >up to a vast area of omitted research, and this falls together in >time with a strong tendency towards corporate take-over of publicly >funded research institutions and scientists. > >We must as citizens and professionals join together to reverse the >present situation. Publicly funded, independent research grants must >become a hot political issue. That would be the most efficient remedy >for lacking answers and corporate take-over of science. And finishing >off, we once more quote Mayer and Stirling : "Deciding on the >questions to be asked and the comparisons to be made has to be an >inclusive process and not the provenance of experts alone". But then >again, whom should the society rely on for answers and advice when >the time comes that all science resource persons work directly or >indirectly for the GE producers? > > >Dr. Terje Traavik is the author of more than 180 scientific articles >and book chapters. He founded and was the professor of virology at >the University of Tromsö, Norway from 1983-2003. He has had a high >number of national and international assignments. At the present he >serves as the Executive Committee Chairman for the GE/GMO Biosafety >Capacity Building Program covered by a MoU (Memorandum of >Understanding) between GENOK-Norwegian Institute of Gene Ecology and >and UNEP (United Nations Environment Program). Being originally a >medical and molecular virologist, Traavik later crossed into >molecular and cellular cancer research. In 1992 he received the Erna >and Olav Aakre Foundation Prize for Excellent Cancer Research. In the >early 1990s he was the Board Chairman of the national research >program "Environmental effects of biotechnology", which was funded by >the Research Council of Norway. In 1997 he initiated and became the >first Director of GENOK-Norwegian Institute of Gene Ecology, and >since 2003 he is professor of gene ecology at the University of >Tromso. > >Dr. Jack Heinemann is at the present an Assoc. Professor at the >School of Biological Sciences, University of Canterbury, >Christchurch. He is the Director of the NZIGE-New Zealand Institute >of Gene Ecology, and an adjunct professor at GENOK-Norwegian >Institute of Gene Ecology. He serves on the United Nations >Environment Programme-GENOK Biosafety Capacity Building Executive >Committee. Dr. Heinemann was the 2002 recipient of the New Zealand >Association of Scientists Research Medal. He is the author of a high >number of scientific articles, reviews and book chapters. He was one >of the real pioneers within HGT (horizontal gene transfer) research, >and has given major contributions to this area as well as related >fields within bacterial genetics and molecular biology. > > > > >Hi Ken ; > > > > > > If someone developed a genetically modified plant > > > > that would grow well in marginal areas and > > > produced > > > > high quality vegetable oil, that could be easily > > > > extracted, would that be a good thing or a bad > > > > thing? Or for that matter, if someone developed a > > > > plant that grew well in marginal areas and > > > contained > > > > high-quality protein, low glycemic carbohydrates, > > > > and many needed trace nutrients, would that be a > > > > good thing or a bad thing? > > > > > > This is the cruel hoax and seduction. Taken in > > > isolation of course it is a good thing, but the > > > problem is it is never in isolation. How many tests > > > and failures were needed to make this one success? > > > What was the total cost to the earth? How many > > > crops > > > needed to be destroyed? How many small farmers put > > > out of business or committed suicide? How many > > > other > > > life forms (birds, animals, fish, people, viruses, > > > bacteria, etc) were affected or decimated (or made > > > more dangerous)? And your case is only hypothetical > > > wishful thinking for the future. The failures are > > > here already. > > > >I should have added the failures and suicides are > >already here. Furthermore, the question is not > >whether this is a good thing or not, the question is > >whether it should receive patent protection or not. > > > >What if I add to this fantastic oil and protein plant > >the fact that is has very small seeds which can be > >carried everywhere by wind, water, train, ship, and > >combine. Then we add that it is a strong growing > >plant which tends to overgrow the existing vegetation. > > Then the developers of this plant ride around the > >country and spread seeds everywhere. Seed is spread > >worldwide even against the wishes of many nations. > >Private household farm crops are overtaken by this > >plant and destroyed worldwide. Commercial farm crops > >are overgrown by this plant and on top of that need to > >pay patent licensing fees (as well as lawyer and court > >costs if they choose to fight). Then we add that the > >developers of this plant expect very high patent fees, > >and the courts agree (in other words farms are forced > >to pay or close). > > > >Still think it should have patent protection? > > > >BR > >Peter G. > >Thailand > > >_______________________________________________ >Biofuel mailing list >Biofuel@sustainablelists.org >http://sustainablelists.org/mailman/listinfo/biofuel_sustainablelists.org > >Biofuel at Journey to Forever: >http://journeytoforever.org/biofuel.html > >Search the combined Biofuel and Biofuels-biz list archives (50,000 messages): >http://www.mail-archive.com/biofuel@sustainablelists.org/ _______________________________________________ Biofuel mailing list Biofuel@sustainablelists.org http://sustainablelists.org/mailman/listinfo/biofuel_sustainablelists.org Biofuel at Journey to Forever: http://journeytoforever.org/biofuel.html Search the combined Biofuel and Biofuels-biz list archives (50,000 messages): http://www.mail-archive.com/biofuel@sustainablelists.org/
