Author: markm Date: Sun Apr 16 09:11:02 2017 New Revision: 317015 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/317015
Log: Replace the RC4 algorithm for generating in-kernel secure random numbers with Chacha20. Keep the API, though, as that is what the other *BSD's have done. Use the boot-time entropy stash (if present) to bootstrap the in-kernel entropy source. Reviewed by: delphij,rwatson Approved by: so(delphij) MFC after: 2 months Relnotes: yes Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10048 --This line, and those below, will be ignored-- > Description of fields to fill in above: 76 columns --| > PR: If and which Problem Report is related. > Submitted by: If someone else sent in the change. > Reported by: If someone else reported the issue. > Reviewed by: If someone else reviewed your modification. > Approved by: If you needed approval for this commit. > Obtained from: If the change is from a third party. > MFC after: N [day[s]|week[s]|month[s]]. Request a reminder email. > MFH: Ports tree branch name. Request approval for merge. > Relnotes: Set to 'yes' for mention in release notes. > Security: Vulnerability reference (one per line) or description. > Sponsored by: If the change was sponsored by an organization. > Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D### (*full* phabric URL needed). > Empty fields above will be automatically removed. Added: head/sys/crypto/chacha20/chacha.c (contents, props changed) head/sys/crypto/chacha20/chacha.h (contents, props changed) Modified: head/sys/boot/forth/loader.conf head/sys/conf/files head/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.c head/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.h head/sys/libkern/arc4random.c head/sys/sys/libkern.h head/sys/sys/random.h Modified: head/sys/boot/forth/loader.conf ============================================================================== --- head/sys/boot/forth/loader.conf Sun Apr 16 09:00:10 2017 (r317014) +++ head/sys/boot/forth/loader.conf Sun Apr 16 09:11:02 2017 (r317015) @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ bitmap_type="splash_image_data" # and pl entropy_cache_load="YES" # Set this to NO to disable loading # entropy at boot time entropy_cache_name="/boot/entropy" # Set this to the name of the file -entropy_cache_type="/boot/entropy" # Required for the kernel to find +entropy_cache_type="boot_entropy_cache" # Required for the kernel to find # the boot-time entropy cache. This # must not change value even if the # _name above does change! Modified: head/sys/conf/files ============================================================================== --- head/sys/conf/files Sun Apr 16 09:00:10 2017 (r317014) +++ head/sys/conf/files Sun Apr 16 09:11:02 2017 (r317015) @@ -3810,6 +3810,7 @@ kgssapi/gsstest.c optional kgssapi_debu # the file should be moved to conf/files.<arch> from here. # libkern/arc4random.c standard +crypto/chacha20/chacha.c standard libkern/asprintf.c standard libkern/bcd.c standard libkern/bsearch.c standard Added: head/sys/crypto/chacha20/chacha.c ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/sys/crypto/chacha20/chacha.c Sun Apr 16 09:11:02 2017 (r317015) @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* +chacha-merged.c version 20080118 +D. J. Bernstein +Public domain. +*/ + +/* $OpenBSD: chacha.c,v 1.1 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */ + +#include <sys/cdefs.h> +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/types.h> + +#include <crypto/chacha20/chacha.h> + + +typedef uint8_t u8; +typedef uint32_t u32; + +typedef struct chacha_ctx chacha_ctx; + +#define U8C(v) (v##U) +#define U32C(v) (v##U) + +#define U8V(v) ((u8)(v) & U8C(0xFF)) +#define U32V(v) ((u32)(v) & U32C(0xFFFFFFFF)) + +#define ROTL32(v, n) \ + (U32V((v) << (n)) | ((v) >> (32 - (n)))) + +#define U8TO32_LITTLE(p) \ + (((u32)((p)[0]) ) | \ + ((u32)((p)[1]) << 8) | \ + ((u32)((p)[2]) << 16) | \ + ((u32)((p)[3]) << 24)) + +#define U32TO8_LITTLE(p, v) \ + do { \ + (p)[0] = U8V((v) ); \ + (p)[1] = U8V((v) >> 8); \ + (p)[2] = U8V((v) >> 16); \ + (p)[3] = U8V((v) >> 24); \ + } while (0) + +#define ROTATE(v,c) (ROTL32(v,c)) +#define XOR(v,w) ((v) ^ (w)) +#define PLUS(v,w) (U32V((v) + (w))) +#define PLUSONE(v) (PLUS((v),1)) + +#define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \ + a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a),16); \ + c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c),12); \ + a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a), 8); \ + c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c), 7); + +static const char sigma[16] = "expand 32-byte k"; +static const char tau[16] = "expand 16-byte k"; + +void +chacha_keysetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits) +{ + const char *constants; + + x->input[4] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0); + x->input[5] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4); + x->input[6] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8); + x->input[7] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12); + if (kbits == 256) { /* recommended */ + k += 16; + constants = sigma; + } else { /* kbits == 128 */ + constants = tau; + } + x->input[8] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0); + x->input[9] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4); + x->input[10] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8); + x->input[11] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12); + x->input[0] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 0); + x->input[1] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 4); + x->input[2] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 8); + x->input[3] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 12); +} + +void +chacha_ivsetup(chacha_ctx *x, const u8 *iv, const u8 *counter) +{ + x->input[12] = counter == NULL ? 0 : U8TO32_LITTLE(counter + 0); + x->input[13] = counter == NULL ? 0 : U8TO32_LITTLE(counter + 4); + x->input[14] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 0); + x->input[15] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 4); +} + +void +chacha_encrypt_bytes(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes) +{ + u32 x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15; + u32 j0, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, j7, j8, j9, j10, j11, j12, j13, j14, j15; + u8 *ctarget = NULL; + u8 tmp[64]; + u_int i; + + if (!bytes) return; + + j0 = x->input[0]; + j1 = x->input[1]; + j2 = x->input[2]; + j3 = x->input[3]; + j4 = x->input[4]; + j5 = x->input[5]; + j6 = x->input[6]; + j7 = x->input[7]; + j8 = x->input[8]; + j9 = x->input[9]; + j10 = x->input[10]; + j11 = x->input[11]; + j12 = x->input[12]; + j13 = x->input[13]; + j14 = x->input[14]; + j15 = x->input[15]; + + for (;;) { + if (bytes < 64) { + for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) tmp[i] = m[i]; + m = tmp; + ctarget = c; + c = tmp; + } + x0 = j0; + x1 = j1; + x2 = j2; + x3 = j3; + x4 = j4; + x5 = j5; + x6 = j6; + x7 = j7; + x8 = j8; + x9 = j9; + x10 = j10; + x11 = j11; + x12 = j12; + x13 = j13; + x14 = j14; + x15 = j15; + for (i = 20;i > 0;i -= 2) { + QUARTERROUND( x0, x4, x8,x12) + QUARTERROUND( x1, x5, x9,x13) + QUARTERROUND( x2, x6,x10,x14) + QUARTERROUND( x3, x7,x11,x15) + QUARTERROUND( x0, x5,x10,x15) + QUARTERROUND( x1, x6,x11,x12) + QUARTERROUND( x2, x7, x8,x13) + QUARTERROUND( x3, x4, x9,x14) + } + x0 = PLUS(x0,j0); + x1 = PLUS(x1,j1); + x2 = PLUS(x2,j2); + x3 = PLUS(x3,j3); + x4 = PLUS(x4,j4); + x5 = PLUS(x5,j5); + x6 = PLUS(x6,j6); + x7 = PLUS(x7,j7); + x8 = PLUS(x8,j8); + x9 = PLUS(x9,j9); + x10 = PLUS(x10,j10); + x11 = PLUS(x11,j11); + x12 = PLUS(x12,j12); + x13 = PLUS(x13,j13); + x14 = PLUS(x14,j14); + x15 = PLUS(x15,j15); + + x0 = XOR(x0,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 0)); + x1 = XOR(x1,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 4)); + x2 = XOR(x2,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 8)); + x3 = XOR(x3,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 12)); + x4 = XOR(x4,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 16)); + x5 = XOR(x5,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 20)); + x6 = XOR(x6,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 24)); + x7 = XOR(x7,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 28)); + x8 = XOR(x8,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 32)); + x9 = XOR(x9,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 36)); + x10 = XOR(x10,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 40)); + x11 = XOR(x11,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 44)); + x12 = XOR(x12,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 48)); + x13 = XOR(x13,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 52)); + x14 = XOR(x14,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 56)); + x15 = XOR(x15,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 60)); + + j12 = PLUSONE(j12); + if (!j12) { + j13 = PLUSONE(j13); + /* stopping at 2^70 bytes per nonce is user's responsibility */ + } + + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 0,x0); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 4,x1); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 8,x2); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 12,x3); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 16,x4); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 20,x5); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 24,x6); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 28,x7); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 32,x8); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 36,x9); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 40,x10); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 44,x11); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 48,x12); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 52,x13); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 56,x14); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 60,x15); + + if (bytes <= 64) { + if (bytes < 64) { + for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) ctarget[i] = c[i]; + } + x->input[12] = j12; + x->input[13] = j13; + return; + } + bytes -= 64; + c += 64; + m += 64; + } +} Added: head/sys/crypto/chacha20/chacha.h ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/sys/crypto/chacha20/chacha.h Sun Apr 16 09:11:02 2017 (r317015) @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.4 2016/08/27 04:04:56 guenther Exp $ */ + +/* +chacha-merged.c version 20080118 +D. J. Bernstein +Public domain. + + $FreeBSD$ +*/ + +#ifndef CHACHA_H +#define CHACHA_H + +#include <sys/types.h> + +struct chacha_ctx { + u_int input[16]; +}; + +#define CHACHA_MINKEYLEN 16 +#define CHACHA_NONCELEN 8 +#define CHACHA_CTRLEN 8 +#define CHACHA_STATELEN (CHACHA_NONCELEN+CHACHA_CTRLEN) +#define CHACHA_BLOCKLEN 64 + +void chacha_keysetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *k, u_int kbits); +void chacha_ivsetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *iv, const u_char *ctr); +void chacha_encrypt_bytes(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *m, + u_char *c, u_int bytes); + +#endif /* CHACHA_H */ + Modified: head/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.c ============================================================================== --- head/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.c Sun Apr 16 09:00:10 2017 (r317014) +++ head/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.c Sun Apr 16 09:11:02 2017 (r317015) @@ -352,10 +352,19 @@ random_harvestq_prime(void *unused __unu * Get entropy that may have been preloaded by loader(8) * and use it to pre-charge the entropy harvest queue. */ - keyfile = preload_search_by_type(RANDOM_HARVESTQ_BOOT_ENTROPY_FILE); + keyfile = preload_search_by_type(RANDOM_CACHED_BOOT_ENTROPY_MODULE); +#ifndef NO_BACKWARD_COMPATIBILITY + if (keyfile == NULL) + keyfile = preload_search_by_type(RANDOM_LEGACY_BOOT_ENTROPY_MODULE); +#endif if (keyfile != NULL) { data = preload_fetch_addr(keyfile); size = preload_fetch_size(keyfile); + /* skip the first bit of the stash so others like arc4 can also have some. */ + if (size > RANDOM_CACHED_SKIP_START) { + data += RANDOM_CACHED_SKIP_START; + size -= RANDOM_CACHED_SKIP_START; + } /* Trim the size. If the admin has a file with a funny size, we lose some. Tough. */ size -= (size % sizeof(event.he_entropy)); if (data != NULL && size != 0) { Modified: head/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.h ============================================================================== --- head/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.h Sun Apr 16 09:00:10 2017 (r317014) +++ head/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.h Sun Apr 16 09:11:02 2017 (r317015) @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /*- - * Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Mark R V Murray + * Copyright (c) 2013-2015, 2017 Mark R V Murray * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without @@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ struct harvest_event { void read_rate_increment(u_int); -#define RANDOM_HARVESTQ_BOOT_ENTROPY_FILE "/boot/entropy" - #define RANDOM_HARVEST_INIT_LOCK(x) mtx_init(&harvest_context.hc_mtx, "entropy harvest mutex", NULL, MTX_SPIN) #define RANDOM_HARVEST_LOCK(x) mtx_lock_spin(&harvest_context.hc_mtx) #define RANDOM_HARVEST_UNLOCK(x) mtx_unlock_spin(&harvest_context.hc_mtx) Modified: head/sys/libkern/arc4random.c ============================================================================== --- head/sys/libkern/arc4random.c Sun Apr 16 09:00:10 2017 (r317014) +++ head/sys/libkern/arc4random.c Sun Apr 16 09:11:02 2017 (r317015) @@ -1,11 +1,28 @@ /*- - * THE BEER-WARE LICENSE + * Copyright (c) 2017 The FreeBSD Foundation + * All rights reserved. * - * <d...@freebsd.org> wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you - * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you - * think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + * in this position and unchanged. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * - * Dan Moschuk */ #include <sys/cdefs.h> @@ -14,144 +31,122 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/param.h> #include <sys/kernel.h> -#include <sys/random.h> #include <sys/libkern.h> +#include <sys/linker.h> #include <sys/lock.h> +#include <sys/malloc.h> #include <sys/mutex.h> -#include <sys/time.h> +#include <sys/random.h> #include <sys/smp.h> -#include <sys/malloc.h> +#include <sys/time.h> + +#include <crypto/chacha20/chacha.h> -#define ARC4_RESEED_BYTES 65536 -#define ARC4_RESEED_SECONDS 300 -#define ARC4_KEYBYTES 256 +#define CHACHA20_RESEED_BYTES 65536 +#define CHACHA20_RESEED_SECONDS 300 +#define CHACHA20_KEYBYTES 32 +#define CHACHA20_BUFFER_SIZE 64 + +CTASSERT(CHACHA20_KEYBYTES*8 >= CHACHA_MINKEYLEN); int arc4rand_iniseed_state = ARC4_ENTR_NONE; -MALLOC_DEFINE(M_ARC4RANDOM, "arc4random", "arc4random structures"); +MALLOC_DEFINE(M_CHACHA20RANDOM, "chacha20random", "chacha20random structures"); -struct arc4_s { +struct chacha20_s { struct mtx mtx; - u_int8_t i, j; - int numruns; - u_int8_t sbox[256]; + int numbytes; + int first_time_done; time_t t_reseed; - + u_int8_t m_buffer[CHACHA20_BUFFER_SIZE]; + struct chacha_ctx ctx; } __aligned(CACHE_LINE_SIZE); -static struct arc4_s *arc4inst = NULL; +static struct chacha20_s *chacha20inst = NULL; -#define ARC4_FOREACH(_arc4) \ - for (_arc4 = &arc4inst[0]; _arc4 <= &arc4inst[mp_maxid]; _arc4++) - -static u_int8_t arc4_randbyte(struct arc4_s *arc4); - -static __inline void -arc4_swap(u_int8_t *a, u_int8_t *b) -{ - u_int8_t c; - - c = *a; - *a = *b; - *b = c; -} +#define CHACHA20_FOREACH(_chacha20) \ + for (_chacha20 = &chacha20inst[0]; \ + _chacha20 <= &chacha20inst[mp_maxid]; \ + _chacha20++) /* - * Stir our S-box. + * Mix up the current context. */ static void -arc4_randomstir(struct arc4_s* arc4) +chacha20_randomstir(struct chacha20_s* chacha20) { - u_int8_t key[ARC4_KEYBYTES]; - int n; struct timeval tv_now; + size_t n, size; + u_int8_t key[CHACHA20_KEYBYTES], *data; + caddr_t keyfile; /* - * XXX: FIX!! This isn't brilliant. Need more confidence. - * This returns zero entropy before random(4) is seeded. + * This is making the best of what may be an insecure + * Situation. If the loader(8) did not have an entropy + * stash from the previous shutdown to load, then we will + * be improperly seeded. The answer is to make sure there + * is an entropy stash at shutdown time. */ - (void)read_random(key, ARC4_KEYBYTES); - getmicrouptime(&tv_now); - mtx_lock(&arc4->mtx); - for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) { - arc4->j = (arc4->j + arc4->sbox[n] + key[n]) % 256; - arc4_swap(&arc4->sbox[n], &arc4->sbox[arc4->j]); + (void)read_random(key, CHACHA20_KEYBYTES); + if (!chacha20->first_time_done) { + keyfile = preload_search_by_type(RANDOM_CACHED_BOOT_ENTROPY_MODULE); + if (keyfile != NULL) { + data = preload_fetch_addr(keyfile); + size = MIN(preload_fetch_size(keyfile), CHACHA20_KEYBYTES); + for (n = 0; n < size; n++) + key[n] ^= data[n]; + explicit_bzero(data, size); + if (bootverbose) + printf("arc4random: read %zu bytes from preloaded cache\n", size); + } else + printf("arc4random: no preloaded entropy cache\n"); + chacha20->first_time_done = 1; } - arc4->i = arc4->j = 0; + getmicrouptime(&tv_now); + mtx_lock(&chacha20->mtx); + chacha_keysetup(&chacha20->ctx, key, CHACHA20_KEYBYTES*8); + chacha_ivsetup(&chacha20->ctx, (u_char *)&tv_now.tv_sec, (u_char *)&tv_now.tv_usec); /* Reset for next reseed cycle. */ - arc4->t_reseed = tv_now.tv_sec + ARC4_RESEED_SECONDS; - arc4->numruns = 0; - /* - * Throw away the first N words of output, as suggested in the - * paper "Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4" - * by Fluher, Mantin, and Shamir. (N = 768 in our case.) - * - * http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=646557.694759 - */ - for (n = 0; n < 768*4; n++) - arc4_randbyte(arc4); - - mtx_unlock(&arc4->mtx); + chacha20->t_reseed = tv_now.tv_sec + CHACHA20_RESEED_SECONDS; + chacha20->numbytes = 0; + mtx_unlock(&chacha20->mtx); } /* - * Initialize our S-box to its beginning defaults. + * Initialize the contexts. */ static void -arc4_init(void) +chacha20_init(void) { - struct arc4_s *arc4; - int n; - - arc4inst = malloc((mp_maxid + 1) * sizeof(struct arc4_s), - M_ARC4RANDOM, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO); - KASSERT(arc4inst != NULL, ("arc4_init: memory allocation error")); + struct chacha20_s *chacha20; - ARC4_FOREACH(arc4) { - mtx_init(&arc4->mtx, "arc4_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF); - - arc4->i = arc4->j = 0; - for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) - arc4->sbox[n] = (u_int8_t) n; - - arc4->t_reseed = -1; - arc4->numruns = 0; + chacha20inst = malloc((mp_maxid + 1) * sizeof(struct chacha20_s), + M_CHACHA20RANDOM, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO); + KASSERT(chacha20inst != NULL, ("chacha20_init: memory allocation error")); + + CHACHA20_FOREACH(chacha20) { + mtx_init(&chacha20->mtx, "chacha20_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF); + chacha20->t_reseed = -1; + chacha20->numbytes = 0; + chacha20->first_time_done = 0; + explicit_bzero(chacha20->m_buffer, CHACHA20_BUFFER_SIZE); + explicit_bzero(&chacha20->ctx, sizeof(chacha20->ctx)); } } -SYSINIT(arc4, SI_SUB_LOCK, SI_ORDER_ANY, arc4_init, NULL); +SYSINIT(chacha20, SI_SUB_LOCK, SI_ORDER_ANY, chacha20_init, NULL); static void -arc4_uninit(void) +chacha20_uninit(void) { - struct arc4_s *arc4; + struct chacha20_s *chacha20; - ARC4_FOREACH(arc4) { - mtx_destroy(&arc4->mtx); - } - - free(arc4inst, M_ARC4RANDOM); + CHACHA20_FOREACH(chacha20) + mtx_destroy(&chacha20->mtx); + free(chacha20inst, M_CHACHA20RANDOM); } +SYSUNINIT(chacha20, SI_SUB_LOCK, SI_ORDER_ANY, chacha20_uninit, NULL); -SYSUNINIT(arc4, SI_SUB_LOCK, SI_ORDER_ANY, arc4_uninit, NULL); - - -/* - * Generate a random byte. - */ -static u_int8_t -arc4_randbyte(struct arc4_s *arc4) -{ - u_int8_t arc4_t; - - arc4->i = (arc4->i + 1) % 256; - arc4->j = (arc4->j + arc4->sbox[arc4->i]) % 256; - - arc4_swap(&arc4->sbox[arc4->i], &arc4->sbox[arc4->j]); - - arc4_t = (arc4->sbox[arc4->i] + arc4->sbox[arc4->j]) % 256; - return arc4->sbox[arc4_t]; -} /* * MPSAFE @@ -159,28 +154,36 @@ arc4_randbyte(struct arc4_s *arc4) void arc4rand(void *ptr, u_int len, int reseed) { - u_char *p; + struct chacha20_s *chacha20; struct timeval tv; - struct arc4_s *arc4; + u_int length; + u_int8_t *p; - if (reseed || atomic_cmpset_int(&arc4rand_iniseed_state, - ARC4_ENTR_HAVE, ARC4_ENTR_SEED)) { - ARC4_FOREACH(arc4) - arc4_randomstir(arc4); - } + if (reseed || atomic_cmpset_int(&arc4rand_iniseed_state, ARC4_ENTR_HAVE, ARC4_ENTR_SEED)) + CHACHA20_FOREACH(chacha20) + chacha20_randomstir(chacha20); - arc4 = &arc4inst[curcpu]; + chacha20 = &chacha20inst[curcpu]; getmicrouptime(&tv); - if ((arc4->numruns > ARC4_RESEED_BYTES) || - (tv.tv_sec > arc4->t_reseed)) - arc4_randomstir(arc4); + /* We may get unlucky and be migrated off this CPU, but that is expected to be infrequent */ + if ((chacha20->numbytes > CHACHA20_RESEED_BYTES) || (tv.tv_sec > chacha20->t_reseed)) + chacha20_randomstir(chacha20); - mtx_lock(&arc4->mtx); - arc4->numruns += len; + mtx_lock(&chacha20->mtx); p = ptr; - while (len--) - *p++ = arc4_randbyte(arc4); - mtx_unlock(&arc4->mtx); + while (len) { + length = MIN(CHACHA20_BUFFER_SIZE, len); + chacha_encrypt_bytes(&chacha20->ctx, chacha20->m_buffer, p, length); + p += length; + len -= length; + chacha20->numbytes += length; + if (chacha20->numbytes > CHACHA20_RESEED_BYTES) { + mtx_unlock(&chacha20->mtx); + chacha20_randomstir(chacha20); + mtx_lock(&chacha20->mtx); + } + } + mtx_unlock(&chacha20->mtx); } uint32_t @@ -188,6 +191,13 @@ arc4random(void) { uint32_t ret; - arc4rand(&ret, sizeof ret, 0); + arc4rand(&ret, sizeof(ret), 0); return ret; } + +void +arc4random_buf(void *ptr, size_t len) +{ + + arc4rand(ptr, len, 0); +} Modified: head/sys/sys/libkern.h ============================================================================== --- head/sys/sys/libkern.h Sun Apr 16 09:00:10 2017 (r317014) +++ head/sys/sys/libkern.h Sun Apr 16 09:11:02 2017 (r317015) @@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ extern int arc4rand_iniseed_state; /* Prototypes for non-quad routines. */ struct malloc_type; uint32_t arc4random(void); -void arc4rand(void *ptr, u_int len, int reseed); +void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t); +void arc4rand(void *, u_int, int); int bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); void *bsearch(const void *, const void *, size_t, Modified: head/sys/sys/random.h ============================================================================== --- head/sys/sys/random.h Sun Apr 16 09:00:10 2017 (r317014) +++ head/sys/sys/random.h Sun Apr 16 09:11:02 2017 (r317015) @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /*- - * Copyright (c) 2000-2015 Mark R. V. Murray + * Copyright (c) 2000-2015, 2017 Mark R. V. Murray * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without @@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ enum random_entropy_source { #define RANDOM_HARVEST_EVERYTHING_MASK ((1 << (RANDOM_ENVIRONMENTAL_END + 1)) - 1) +#define RANDOM_LEGACY_BOOT_ENTROPY_MODULE "/boot/entropy" +#define RANDOM_CACHED_BOOT_ENTROPY_MODULE "boot_entropy_cache" +#define RANDOM_CACHED_SKIP_START 256 + #if defined(DEV_RANDOM) void random_harvest_queue(const void *, u_int, u_int, enum random_entropy_source); void random_harvest_fast(const void *, u_int, u_int, enum random_entropy_source); _______________________________________________ svn-src-all@freebsd.org mailing list https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/svn-src-all To unsubscribe, send any mail to "svn-src-all-unsubscr...@freebsd.org"
